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Abstract
My dissertation examines two kinds of statistical tools for taking prior information
into account, and investigates what reasons we have for using one or the other in
different sorts of inference and decision problems.
Chapter 1 describes a new objective Bayesian method for constructing ‘precise
priors’. Precise prior probability distributions are statistical tools for taking account
of your ‘prior evidence’ in an inference or decision problem. ‘Prior evidence’ is the
wooly hodgepodge of information that you come to the table with. ‘Experimental
evidence’ is the new data that you gather to facilitate inference and decision-making.
I leverage this method to provide the seeds of a solution to the problem of the priors,
the problem of providing a compelling epistemic rationale for using some ‘objective’
method or other for constructing priors. You ought to use the proposed method, at
least in certain contexts, I argue, because it minimizes your need for epistemic luck
in securing accurate ‘posterior’ (post-experiment) beliefs.
Chapter 2 addresses a pressing concern about precise priors. Precise priors, some
Bayesians say, fail to adequately summarize certain kinds of evidence. As a class,
precise priors capture improper responses to unspecific and equivocal evidence. This
motivates the introduction of imprecise priors. We need imprecise priors, or sets of
distributions to summarize such evidence. I argue that, despite appearances to the
contrary, precise priors are, in fact, flexible enough to capture proper responses to
unspecific and equivocal evidence. The proper motivation for introducing imprecise
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priors, then, is not that they are required to summarize such evidence. We ought to
search for new epistemic reasons to introduce imprecise priors.
Chapter 3 explores two new kinds of reasons for employing imprecise priors. We
ought to adopt imprecise priors in certain contexts because they put us in an unequiv-
ocally better position to secure epistemically valuable posterior beliefs than precise
priors do. We ought to adopt imprecise priors in various other contexts because they
minimize our need for epistemic luck in securing such posteriors. This points the way
toward a new, potentially promising epistemic foundation for imprecise Bayesianism.
Thesis Supervisor: James M. Joyce




to the Problem of the Priors
“In realistic problems of decision or inference,” Edwin Jaynes notes, “we often have
prior information which is highly relevant to the question being asked; to fail to take
it into account is to commit the most obvious inconsistency of reasoning and may lead
to absurd or dangerously misleading results” (Jaynes 1968, 1). When a microbiologist,
for example, designs and performs an experiment to adjudicate between competing
theoretical hypotheses, e.g., whether over expression of a certain gene causes chromo-
somal instability in breast tumors, it would be both epistemically irresponsible and
practically disastrous for her to ignore the great deal of prior information at her dis-
posal. This includes information about the levels of different genes expressed in past
patients, as well as their various clinical symptoms, recurrence rates, etc., informa-
tion about the broader causal mechanisms that give rise to breast cancer, and so on.
Unfortunately, finding a well-motivated, practically useful method for taking prior
information into account is difficult. Prior information such as the microbiologist’s is
incredibly multifarious and complex.
Bayesians argue that the best method for incorporating prior evidence E in de-
cision and inference problems is to specify a ‘prior’ probability distribution p over
the competing hypotheses H1, ..., Hn which somehow “summarizes [the] great deal
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of heterogeneous information” contained in E (Suppes 1966, 203). We can think of
these probabilities as estimates of the truth-values of H1, ..., Hn which (i) satisfy con-
straints imposed by E while intuitively (ii) going no further than those constraints
require. Subjective Bayesians say that experienced physicists, biologists, medical
researchers, engineers, etc. — agents who are typically quite adept at synthesizing
multifarious and complex data — ought to look to their own opinions to furnish these
priors. They ought to specify some prior probability distribution which captures their
best estimates of the truth of H1, ..., Hn, and in turn reflects their prior evidence E
(as well their personal inductive quirks and hunches).
Frequentist statisticians object: if the best method for taking account of prior
information requires expert researchers to look to their own opinions to determine
‘subjective priors’, then we ought to simply ignore this information. Better to make
do with statistical tests that “could be described as independent of these [prior] prob-
abilities” than to rob scientific practice of its objectivity (Pearson 1962, 55). Any
method for incorporating prior information in inference and decision problems, if it
is to have any relevance to science, must be ‘objective’ in at least the following sense:
it prescribes adopting the same prior probability distribution in any two problems
where the prior evidence imposes the same constraints (cf. Jaynes 1968, 3). The
subjectivist method violates this demand. Expert opinions about the plausibility of
competing theoretical hypotheses may differ — sometimes significantly — even if they
agree, broadly, on the constraints forced on us by the prior evidence.
Contemporary objective Bayesians, in contrast, generally endorse the maximum
entropy method (MaxEnt), which satisfies the demand for objectivity:
• Summarize your prior evidence by constraints C1, ..., Cn, which you model by a
set of probability distributions C .
2
• Adopt the prior p that maximizes entropy H(p)= –
∑
i p(Hi) · log(p(Hi)) on C .
Though a researcher’s own opinions may be important for determining the constraints
imposed by her prior evidence (cf. Jaynes 1976, 181-194), they should not be used
to determine the prior distribution in its entirety, on the objectivist view. Instead,
all researchers who arrive at the same evidential constraints should proceed in the
same manner. They ought to adopt the prior that maximizes entropy on the set of
probabilities that satisfy those constraints.
While MaxEnt may provide an ‘objective’ method for incorporating prior infor-
mation, in the sense that it prescribes adopting the same prior in any two problems
where we have the same evidential constraints, frequentists and subjectivists doubt
that there is any compelling epistemic rationale undergirding it. More generally,
they think, there is no compelling rationale for us to use any ‘objective’ method for
constructing prior probability distributions. This is the problem of the priors. In
addition, John Venn (1866), J.M. Keynes (1921) and R.A. Fisher (1922) all provide
examples that seem to show that MaxEnt yields inconsistent results in a range of
cases, depending on how you describe them.1 This paper outlines and defends a new
kind of objective Bayesian solution to the problem of the priors.
In §1.1, I describe Jaynes’ rationale for employing MaxEnt, and give some reason to
find this rationale wanting. In §1.2, I outline a novel, anti-luck rationale for adopting
an alternative prior, the maximally sensitive (MaxSen) prior. In §1.3-1.6, I fill in this
outline. In §1.3, I investigate the theoretical role of priors, to elucidate the form that a
proper response to the problem of the priors ought to take. I suggest that the central
role of priors is to help us secure accurate posterior beliefs, and to minimize our need
for epistemic luck in securing those beliefs. In §1.4, I distinguish two importantly
different types of epistemic luck. In §1.5, I illustrate how one prior might depend
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more on luck for success than another. In §1.6, I explore the extent to which the
MaxEnt prior ameliorates the need for such luck. In §1.7, I describe the MaxSen
prior. I argue that this prior does more to ameliorate the need for luck than the
MaxEnt prior. In fact, it minimizes the need for luck in securing accurate posteriors,
and so is best suited to play the primary theoretical role of priors. In §1.8, I draw
together the preceding threads, to resolve the problem of the priors. Finally, in §1.9,
I address two pressing concerns, including a concern about MaxSen’s consistency.
1.1 The Problem of the Priors
In situations of complete ignorance regarding hypotheses H1, ..., Hn, when our evi-
dence provides no constraints on probabilities over H1, ..., Hn, the maximum entropy
distribution is just the uniform distribution.2 So MaxEnt agrees with Laplace’s Prin-
ciple of Insufficient Reason (PIR):
PIR. In situations of complete ignorance regarding hypotheses H1, ..., Hn,
when there is no reason to think that any hypothesis is more or less
probable than any other, the uniquely correct prior to adopt is the uniform
distribution u, so that u(Hi) = u(Hj) for all i and j.
Proponents of MaxEnt and PIR disagree however about why you ought to adopt
the uniform prior. Laplace reasons as follows: “when we see no reason that makes
one [hypothesis] more probable than the other... this uncertainty makes us regard
them as equally probable” (Laplace 1774, 378). But frequentists and subjectivists
see this as no better than an admission that there is no good rationale for adopting
any particular prior in situations of ignorance, coupled with an arbitrary selection of
the uniform distribution. Here is Fisher: the choice of the uniform prior is “evidently
extremely arbitrary... evolving a vitally important piece of knowledge, that of the
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exact form of the distribution... out of an assumption of complete ignorance” (Fisher
1922, 324-5). In situations of ignorance, we lack reason to think any one hypothesis
more probable than any other. It would indeed be arbitrary to simply suppose that
this forces us to pretend that we have one set of reasons — reasons that speak equally
strongly in favor of each hypothesis — rather than any other set of reasons.
Jaynes offers a different rationale. “The maximum-entropy distribution may be
asserted,” he says, “for the positive reason that it is uniquely determined as the one
which is maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information, instead of the
negative one that there was no reason to think otherwise” (Jaynes 1957, 623; emphasis
mine). The entropy of a distribution p, H(p)= –
∑
i p(Hi) · log(p(Hi)), is uniquely
reasonable, Jaynes argues, as a measure of the informativeness of that distribution.
This “supplies the missing criterion of choice which Laplace needed to remove the
apparent arbitrariness of the principle of insufficient reason” (Jaynes 1957, 623). Gone
is the old Laplacian rationale, viz., that we are forced to see ourselves as having
reasons that speak equally strongly in favor of all hypotheses whenever we lack reasons
altogether. In is the new, information-theoretic rationale: in situations of ignorance,
our prior evidence is minimally informative. The uniform distribution encodes the
minimum amount of information about theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn, since it
maximizes entropy (and informativeness decreases as entropy increases). Hence, the
uniform distribution best reflects our prior evidence aboutH1, ..., Hn, at least in terms
of informational content.
There is good reason, however, to doubt Jaynes’ rationale, and in turn, to doubt
the adequacy of the maximum entropy method. The primary theoretical role of priors
is not to best reflect your prior evidence, as I will argue shortly. Rather, it is to help
you secure accurate posterior beliefs by updating on your evidence, and to minimize
your need for epistemic luck in securing those beliefs. A proper justification for the
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maximum entropy method, if there were one, would illuminate why the MaxEnt
distribution is best suited to play the theoretical role of priors. In fact, however, an
alternative distribution, the MaxSen prior, is best suited to play this role.
1.2 Main Argument
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to outlining and defending a new kind of
objective Bayesianism: the maximum sensitivity method, or MaxSen. Schematically,
the argument for MaxSen goes as follows.
1. You ought to adopt whichever prior is best suited to play the primary theoretical
role of priors, if there is one.
2. The primary role of priors is to help you secure accurate beliefs by updating on
your evidence, and to minimize your need for epistemic luck in securing those
beliefs.
3. Various priors put you in a position to secure accurate posteriors by updating
on your evidence.
4. Only the MaxSen prior, however, minimizes your need for epistemic luck in
securing accurate posteriors.
C. You ought to adopt the MaxSen prior to incorporate prior information in infer-
ence and decision problems.
I qualify this conclusion a bit in §1.5 and §1.7-1.8. I also do not fully defend any
of premises 1-4. To defend premise 4, for example, I construct the MaxSen prior
in toy cases involving simple theoretical hypotheses (about the bias of a coin) and
binomial data (data that comes in the form of a sequence of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’).
6
I then show that the MaxSen prior minimizes the need for epistemic luck in these toy
cases. This simple approach, however, is sufficient for the modest end of this paper:
to gesture toward a promising, anti-luck rationale undergirding the MaxSen method,
and in turn, to draw attention to a promising resolution to the problem of the priors.
1.3 The Theoretical Role of Priors
When we ask,“Is there a good rationale for adopting any particular prior?” we are
asking for a certain kind of reason in response. If adopting priors suddenly made us
better cooks, or lovers, or conversationalists, that would be one reason — a pragmatic
reason — to adopt them. But our question demands reasons that speak to the primary
theoretical role of priors. A proper answer to our question takes the form: we ought
to adopt this prior or that because it is best suited to play the relevant theoretical
role (whatever that may be).
We must, then, be clear about what this theoretical role is. Some objective
Bayesians, such as Jaynes, assume that the primary role of priors is representational.
Jaynes prescribes adopting the maximum entropy prior for the “positive reason that
it is... maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information” (Jaynes 1957,
623); the maximum entropy prior best reflects or represents the informational content
of our prior evidence.
Informational Account. The primary theoretical role of prior probabili-
ties is to accurately reflect the informational content of the agent’s prior
evidence.
Certain subjective Bayesians agree that the primary role of priors is representa-
tional, but insist that Jaynes and others ought not restrict their attention to evidence.
Prior probabilities ought to represent an agent’s all-things-considered prior judgments
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about the plausibility of hypotheses, which might depend not only on her prior evi-
dence, but also on her assessment of their intrinsic plausibility, her personal inductive
quirks, etc.
Subjectivist Account. The primary theoretical role of priors is to accurately
represent the agent’s prior opinions about the plausibility of hypotheses.
Still other Bayesians, such as Jon Williamson, claim that the primary role of priors
is practical. Williamson prescribes adopting the maximum entropy prior because it
yields the most ‘cautious’ decision-making policy consistent with the prior evidence
(Williamson 2007, 12-7).
Practical Account. The primary theoretical role of priors is to yield the
most sensible decision-making policy under conditions of ignorance.
To illustrate Williamson’s proposal, suppose that you would like to visit a friend in
the city, but you have no evidence about whether the train that you need is running
or not. You also have an important Skype meeting in an hour. Your roommate is
willing to give you a ride to the station. As long as the train is running, you will
make the meeting and see your friend. But if the train is not running, you will have
to take an expensive cab home, and may well miss your meeting. If you adopt the
MaxEnt (uniform) prior, Williamson observes, your credence that the train is running
is 1/2, and hence (given that the costs of taking an expensive cab and missing your
important meeting outweigh the benefits of seeing your friend) the expected utility
of staying home is higher than the expected utility of going with your roommate to
the station. This ‘cautious’ decision-making policy, Williamson claims, is clearly the
sensible one, given how scant your evidence is. (You have none!) Hence, the MaxEnt
prior, in virtue of delivering this sensible policy, is well-suited to play the relevant
theoretical role.
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Each of these accounts is inadequate. The practical account is difficult to make
sense of in a non-question-begging manner. The reason: which decision-making policy
counts as most cautious depends on which epistemic perspective you evaluate it from.
Suppose, for example, that you are nearly certain that the train is running, despite
having no evidence about the matter. Then the decision-making policy that MaxEnt
recommends appears downright foolish from your perspective, not cautious. It will
not do, by the way, to insist that in light of your evidence (you have none) you ought
to evaluate MaxEnt’s decision-making policy from a more ‘even-handed’ epistemic
perspective, e.g., one in which you treat the competing hypotheses — that the train is
running, and that it is not — as equally probably. This is just to evaluate MaxEnt’s
decision-making policy from its own perspective. And the decision-making policy
yielded by any prior appears most cautious from that prior’s own perspective.
The informational and subjectivist accounts, on the other hand, are inadequate be-
cause they pay insufficient attention to the theoretical role of evidence itself. Evidence
helps us secure accurate posterior credences, or truth-value estimates. Credences are
more accurate the closer they are to the actual truth-values. And accuracy is a ‘basic
epistemic good’. Whatever else is true of them, credences are more valuable, from
the epistemic perspective, the more accurate a picture of the world they paint (cf.
Joyce 2009, 267-71). But evidence does more than just this. It also helps us secure
accurate posteriors in a way that minimizes our need for epistemic luck. For example,
gathering ballistic evidence, DNA evidence, etc. minimizes the detective’s need for
epistemic luck in arriving at a true belief about who killed Jones.
This fully characterizes the theoretical role of evidence. Evidence is important to
our epistemic lives, at bottom, exactly because it helps us secure accurate posteriors
in a luck-minimizing fashion. Plausibly, then, prior probabilities — statistical tools
for taking prior evidence into account — are important exactly to the extent that they
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enable evidence to play its role, i.e., to assist us in securing accurate posteriors in a
luck-minimizing fashion. This suggests the following position about the theoretical
role of priors:
Instrumental Account. The primary theoretical role of priors is to put
us in a position to secure accurate, minimally luck-dependent posterior
credences by updating on new data.
When the various roles listed above conflict, it is clear that this final role takes
precedence. When, for example, the prior that best represents a researcher’s opinions
about the plausibility of hypotheses happens to put her in a rather poor position to
secure accurate, minimally luck-dependent posterior credences, it would be absurd
to advise her to adopt that prior (the same goes for the prior that most accurately
reflects the informational content of her prior evidence).3 Suppose, for example, that
a scientist has scant prior evidence about the causal mechanism under investigation
(a particular virus’ infection mechanism, perhaps). She does, however, find one par-
ticular hypothesis extremely intrinsically plausible. But she does not find it plausible
for any good reason. Her hunch reflects no particular skill at assessing intrinsic plau-
sibility. She simply ‘feels it in her bones’. Then advising her to adopt a prior that
reflects this hunch, by concentrating probability on her favorite hypothesis, would be
absurd. It would result in her discounting new data that she really ought to be more
sensitive to (in much the way that a conspiracy theorist discounts data that tells
against her favorite hypothesis, e.g., that an alien spacecraft crashed near Roswell,
New Mexico in 1947).
This illustrates what should be clear: whichever prior best enables evidence to play
its theoretical role is ipso facto best suited to play the theoretical role of priors. It is
worth noting that the instrumental account does, in fact, enjoy a certain measure of
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support in the literature. Here, for example, is Patrick Suppes: “It is of fundamental
importance to any deep appreciation of the Bayesian viewpoint to realize that the
particular form of the prior distribution expressing beliefs held before the experiment
is conducted is not a crucial matter... The well-designed experiment is one that will
swamp divergent prior distributions with the clarity and sharpness of its results”
(Suppes 1966, 204). The reason that it is not a crucial matter exactly which form the
prior distribution takes is that, in a ‘well-designed’ experiment, the data we receive is
fairly weighty. And when the data we receive is weighty, the ‘washing out’ theorems
show that a range of priors converge on the true theoretical hypothesis (with high
objective probability).4 As a result, those priors are all likely to yield fairly accurate
— and minimally luck-dependent — posterior distributions. Hence, they all play the
primary theoretical role of priors close to equally well. And they do so even though
some priors do a rather poor job representing, for example, the agent’s prior opinions
about the plausibility of hypotheses. This latter fact is — or at least ought to be —
“not a crucial matter” from the Bayesian viewpoint.
One final aside: unfortunately, not all experiments yield data weighty enough
to “swamp divergent prior distributions with [its] clarity and sharpness” in the way
Suppes envisions (Suppes 1966, 204). Limits on time, personnel, funding, etc. keep
scientific researchers from gathering as much data as they would like. And in those
pitiable, but all-too-common circumstances, the washing out theorems do not have
much purchase. Many priors will depend significantly on luck for success (accuracy).
If there is one prior that is minimally luck-dependent, then, at least in these cir-
cumstances, there will be good reason to use it to take your prior information into
account.
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1.4 Two Kinds of Epistemic Luck
Now when we ask, “Is there a good rationale for adopting any particular prior?” we
have something of an answer. Our answer: there is a good rationale if there is some
prior distribution that minimizes the need for epistemic luck in securing accurate
posterior beliefs. Such a distribution would be uniquely suited to play the primary
theoretical role of priors. I will argue that there is such a distribution: the maximally
sensitive, or MaxSen prior. Before describing the MaxSen prior, though, we ought to
get clearer on the target phenomenon: epistemic luck.
There are various kinds of epistemic luck. If the ground under an archer could
easily have shifted, but did not, and she fires off a skillful shot which hits the bullseye,
then her success is subject to what virtue epistemologists such as Pritchard (2009)
call environmental luck. This is the sort of luck that enables agents to exercise skill.
Without it, our archer would not have gotten her shot off, and so would not have
been successful (hit the bullseye). Even so, note: certain important contrastive facts
about her success are explained primarily by her skill, an internal factor, e.g., the
fact that she hit the bullseye dead on, rather than two (or three, or four) inches below
the bullseye (or above the bullseye, or to the left of the bullseye, etc.).
In contrast, another sort of luck — intervening luck — severs this explanatory link.
If an expert archer’s shot is knocked off-track and then back on-track by subsequent
gusts of wind, then she is subject to intervening luck. Her shot is, to a high degree,
successful, but not because it was skillful (her shot is not apt, in Sosa’s terminology; cf.
Sosa 2007, 79). Her particular degree of success (the fact that it hit the bullseye, rather
than two, or three, or four inches below, etc.) is not explained primarily by internal
factors (the agent’s skill). Rather, it is explained by external factors (fortuitous gusts
of wind). We will take this to be the defining characteristic of intervening luck: it
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is in play when external factors are primarily responsible for explaining an agent’s
particular degree of success (why she achieved exactly this degree of success, rather
than some other degree).
Prior distributions are also subject to intervening epistemic luck, in the following
sense: when you update a prior on evidence, it yields a posterior which is more or
less accurate (more or less successful). This particular degree of accuracy (why the
posterior is accurate to exactly this degree, rather than some other degree), in turn,
is explained more or less by two different kinds of factors. On the one hand, internal
factors — facts about the prior’s intrinsic properties, such as how resilient it is (cf.
§1.5) — might bear the bulk of the explanatory burden. On the other hand, external
factors — facts about the prior’s extrinsic properties, such as the proximity of a coin’s
true bias to the prior’s expected bias — might end up shouldering a bigger part of
this burdern.
Of course, no prior minimizes dependence on luck tout court. There are various
kinds of both environmental and intervening luck that adopting a prior — any prior
— will simply not mitigate. No prior mitigates the environmental luck in play when
a researcher’s heart keeps functioning normally, rather than failing (as it easily could
have, perhaps). No prior helps eliminate the luck involved in stumbling upon a friend
returning from a movie, and learning that the ending was a disaster (“...and then
she opened her eyes, and it was all a dream!”). (No prior mitigates this sort of luck
in receiving new evidence.) And no prior (fully) ameliorates the luck involved in
avoiding wildly misleading evidence, of the sort that a gambler faces if she observes a
coin with bias B = 0.9 (biased strongly toward heads) come up tails 19 of 20 tosses.5
In searching, then, for a distribution best suited to play the primary theoretical role
of priors, we ought to attempt to identify a prior that yields posterior credences
which depend minimally on a special kind of intervening epistemic luck (the sort of
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luck susceptible to mitigation by savvy prior construction), not epistemic luck tout
court. A plausible candidate: luck in having the true chances fall close to one’s prior
estimates of the chances. When we talk of epistemic luck from here on out, we will
have this special kind of luck in mind.
1.5 Dependence on Luck: An Example
To illustrate how one distribution might depend more on luck for success than another
— in particular, luck in having the true chances fall close to its prior estimates —
compare priors of varying resilience. A prior distribution p is resilient with respect
to a datum D to the extent that the posterior distribution pD (p conditioned on D)
is close to p. Compare, for example, the maximum entropy (uniform) distribution
u over hypotheses about the bias of a coin, B = x, on the one hand, and a more
concentrated distribution b on the other hand (e.g., a beta distribution with α = 10
and β = 4).6 (Beta distributions b are parameterized by two quantities, α and
β. These ‘shape parameters’ determine which hypotheses B = x the distribution b
focuses its probability mass on. The larger (smaller) α is compared to β, the more
b focuses probability mass on B = x with x ≈ 1 (x ≈ 0). For more information,
see endnote 7.7) Suppose that you flip the coin 15 times. It comes up heads 12
times and tails 3 times. When you condition the maximum entropy distribution on
this data sequence (H12T 3), it moves quite a bit: the distance from u to uD is 0.107
(at least when you measure distance using one plausible distance function, Cramer-
von Mises, detailed in §1.6).8 The more concentrated distribution, in contrast, moves
much less: the distance from b to bD is 0.007. (Both priors and posteriors are pictured
right, next page.) Even if you had observed the data sequence that makes the more
concentrated distribution move most (H0T 15), it would not have moved much more
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than the maximum entropy distribution: 0.35 as compared to 0.3.
Figure 1.1: Left: u and uD. Right: b and bD.
Priors that are more
resilient than others
with respect to a wide
range of data tend
to depend more on
luck for success (i.e.,
luck in have the true
chances fall close to its prior estimates). Consider Betsy and Jim, for example, two
climate scientists working on papers about the future impact of climate change on
coastal areas for the new IPCC report (intergovernmental panel on climate change).
They are both competent, let’s suppose. But neither are Sherlock Holmesian ‘super
sleuths’. Neither are especially skilled at assessing the ‘intrinsic plausibility’ of the
various candidate climate models. They do, however, have access to large experi-
mental data sets (the same data sets). This includes data about current land air
temperature, sea surface temperature, sea level, ozone, etc. It also includes data
about these quantities over the last 100 years. In addition, they have a great deal
of prior information about how these quantities interact, about the broader causal
mechanisms that give rise to climate change, and so on (the same prior information,
suppose). In order to incorporate their prior information, both Betsy and Jim adopt
priors over theoretical hypotheses (climate models). Jim adopts a prior that con-
centrates probability almost exclusively on one particular theoretical hypothesis (a
concentrated beta distribution). In contrast, Betsy adopts a prior that is much less
resilient than Jim’s with respect to a wide range of data (the MaxEnt prior). The
effect is that Betsy’s prior is much more malleable, much more prone to change in
the face of new data.
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Both Betsy and Jim consult the climate data for the last 100 years. As Betsy
pores over it, she updates her prior, which tends to move quite a bit and forces her
to revise her credences for observing different sorts climate-related effects in coastal
areas (conditional on the current ozone levels being one way or another, on greenhouse
emission rates staying constant, etc.). In contrast, as Jim pores over the data for the
last 100 years, his prior tends to not move much at all. So he revises his credences
minimally.
Finally, Betsy and Jim both update their priors on the data regarding current
climatic conditions and deliver their reports to the IPCC. Their total data is non-
misleading, let’s suppose, and both Betsy and Jim are successful. They both end up
making accurate predictions about what sorts of effects to expect in coastal areas over
the next 10 years (e.g., erosion, ecosystem loss, coral bleaching). But Jim’s success
depends more on luck than Betsy’s. In particular, it depends more on luck in having
the true theoretical hypothesis (climate model) fall close to his prior estimate. Had
the true climate model been rather dissimilar from Jim’s preferred model, and had
Jim received similarly non-misleading evidence, his posterior distribution would have
been much further from the truth than it currently is. In turn, his predictions about
what sorts of effects to expect in coastal areas over the next 10 years would have
been much less accurate. Not so for Betsy. Her posterior distribution would have
converged on the true climate model to nearly the same extent that it actually does
(see §1.6 for more detail).
One might wonder, “Why restrict our attention to non-Holmesian researchers?
Why not imagine that Jim is especially skilled at assessing the intrinsic plausibility of
theoretical hypotheses? Suppose he is. Suppose the bias in his prior reflects this skill.
And suppose that intrinsic plausibility is a reliable guide to the truth. Then we could
say that Jim’s success depends rather minimally on luck as well.” True enough, but be-
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side the point. Remember, our aim is to identify a general, impersonal, well-motivated
method for constructing priors over theoretical hypotheses, which researchers can use
to incorporate prior evidence in inference and decision problems. The sort of Holme-
sian skill imagined by our objector, however, presumably delivers information much
too complex to be summed up (even approximately) by constraints on expectations,
and does so in a manner much too complex to be captured by any tractable algo-
rithm (perhaps similar to skill at diagnosing obscure medical conditions). But then
it is hopeless to write such skill into the actual protocol for constructing priors. And,
unfortunately, many researchers lack this skill. So no sufficiently general method for
constructing priors simply advises individual researchers to exercise this skill, while
staying silent on what this amounts to. The upshot: Sherlock Holmes and his ilk
are well-advised to exercise their skill to arrive at a prior, rather than employing an
‘objective’ method like MaxSen. But it is, nonetheless, worthwhile to identify a gen-
eral, impersonal method for incorporating prior information in inference and decision
problems, which non-Holmesian researchers can use to arrive at accurate, minimally
luck-dependent posteriors.
1.6 Ameliorating Dependence on Luck
Priors that are more resilient than others with respect to a wide range of data tend
to depend more on luck for success. To make this claim a bit more precise, and to
substantiate it, consider one attractive measure of datum-relative resilience. Recall, a
distribution p is resilient with respect to a datum D to the extent that pD(·) = p(·|D)
is close to p. Deza and Deza (2009) survey a wide range of distance functions on the
space of probability distributions, each of which gives us a different way of saying







Figure 1.2: Cramer-von Mises distance.
C specifies the distance between distribu-
tions p and q as a function of the area be-
tween their corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution functions, P and Q (counting re-
gions of smaller divergence for less and re-
gions of greater divergence for more; pic-
tured left).9 (It is the squared L2 metric
between P and Q.) It is attractive because
(i) it is an analogue of squared Euclidean
distance on the space of probability densities, and (ii) it yields the correct verdict
about comparative closeness in those cases where obviously correct answers are to be
had.10 In addition, note that the Brier score, I(p, w) = (1/N) ·
∑N
i=1(p(Xi)−w(Xi))2
— a paradigmatically reasonable scoring rule (see Joyce 1998, 2009 and Leitgeb and
Pettigrew 2010) — measures the inaccuracy of discrete distributions by squared Eu-
clidean distance. Because C provides a natural extension of squared Euclidean dis-
tance to the space of continuous distributions, I will sometimes speak of C(p,H) (the
Cramer-von Mises distance between p and the indicator distribution iH which places
all of its probability on H) as the accuracy of p with respect to H.
On the proposed view, a distribution p is resilient with respect to a datum D to
the extent that the following is close to zero: C(p, pD) =
∫ 1
0
|P (x) − PD(x)|2dx. To
see why resilient priors tend to depend more on luck for success (posterior accuracy),
consider an illustrative case. Compare, once more, the maximum entropy (uniform)
distribution u over hypotheses about the bias of a coin, and a more concentrated beta
18
distribution b (with α = 10 and β = 4). A bookie hands you and your friend a coin,
and offers you a bet. Neither of you have any prior evidence about the coin’s bias.
The bookie allows you to flip the coin for awhile prior to deciding whether or not to
take the bet. You adopt the maximum entropy prior u. Your friend adopts the more
biased beta prior b (she feels it in her bones that the coin’s bias is roughly b’s mean,
viz., 5/7). Note: b is more resilient than u with respect to a wide range of data.
Figure 1.3: uD and bD.
You flip the coin 14 times. It comes up
heads 10 times and tails 4 times. When you
both condition on this data D, you arrive
at the posteriors uD and bD, respectively
(right). Suppose that D is perfectly non-
misleading evidence; the true hypothesis H
about the bias of the coin is B = 5/7 (ex-
actly the frequency of heads in your data
sequence). Then your friend is more suc-
cessful (accurate). Her distribution converges more on H than yours: C(uD, H) =
0.028 > 0.020 = C(bD, H). But her success also depends more on luck in having the
coin’s true bias fall close to her prior estimate than yours. Had the coin’s true bias
fallen further from her prior estimate, and had she received similarly non-misleading
evidence, then her posterior distribution would have ended up much further from the
truth than it currently is. Not so for you. Your posterior distribution would have
converged on the true hypothesis about the coin’s bias to nearly the same extent.






 · xk · (1− x)14−k · C(uD, H)
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stays fairly constant across hypotheses H of the form B = x (i.e., hypotheses about
the coin’s bias; left). To see that this is the crux of why her success depends more on
luck than yours, consider an example.
The Rain Machine. You stumble upon a machine with the potential to
affect the rainfall in London. Let R be the amount of rainfall in London
tomorrow. The machine (somehow) graphs the marginal chance distribu-
tion p for R. It also has two knobs, set all the way to the left, in the ‘off’
position. As you spin the top knob, p changes fairly significantly. As you
spin the bottom knob, it remains largely unaltered. Before you leave the
machine, you spin both knobs all the way to the right.
Figure 1.4: The objective expected posterior
accuracy of u from the perspective of chance
hypotheses H of the form B = x.
The next day London gets 3mm
of rain. The fact that it gets this
amount of rain (3mm), rather than
something less (2mm, 1mm, etc.), is
explained, in part, by the position of
the top knob. The position of the
bottom knob, in contrast, is more
or less irrelevant. Why? Well, the
explanation of the fact that London
gets 3mm of rain, rather than 2mm,
1mm, etc. is probabilistic. The most
proximate explanatory factor is that
the marginal chance distribution p for R has a particular character (a particular,
mean, variance, etc.). To explain why London gets 3mm of rain, rather than 2mm,
1mm, we must cite not only probability mass that p assigns to R = 3, but also the
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mass that p assigns to R = 2, R = 1, and so on; the entire distribution is relevant (all
of its moments: mean, variance, etc.). In addition, p serves as an explanatory screen.
Any other factor relevant for explaining why London gets 3mm of rain, rather than
2mm, 1mm, etc. is only relevant in virtue of explaining why p takes the exact form
that it does. Now, the position of the top knob, clearly, is relevant for explaining why
p has the character it does. Had you only turned it half way to the right, rather than
all the way to the right, p would have had a much different character. In contrast,
the position of the bottom knob is next to irrelevant for explaining why p has the
character it does. Regardless of how you turn the bottom knob, p remains almost
entirely unaltered. Plausibly, then, the position of the bottom knob is (more or less)
irrelevant for explaining why London gets 3mm of rain, rather than 2mm, 1mm, etc.11
Similarly, the explanation of the fact that uD is inaccurate to a particular degree
(C(uD, H) = 0.028), rather than some other degree (0.027, 0.026, etc.) is probabilistic.
The most proximate explanatory factor is that, immediately prior to your experiment
(flipping the coin), the true marginal chance distribution p for C(uD, H) had a par-
ticular character (pictured right). And just as above, to explain why uD is inaccurate
to the exact degree that it is, rather than something slightly higher or lower, we must
cite not only probability mass that p assigns to the hypothesis C(uD, H) = 0.028, but
also the mass that p assigns to C(uD, H) = 0.027, C(uD, H) = 0.026, etc.; the entire
distribution is relevant. In addition, p serves as an explanatory screen. Any other
factor relevant for explaining why uD is inaccurate to exactly the degree that it is
(0.028), rather than some other degree (0.027, 0.026, etc.), is only relevant in virtue
of explaining why p takes the exact form that it does.12
Now note: p is more or less invariant across hypotheses H about the coin’s bias.
Whether the true bias is 5/7, 11/64 or 82/97, the marginal chance distribution p
for C(uD, H) will look more or less the same.13 This is reflected in the fact that p’s
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mean — u’s expected posterior accuracy — stays fairly constant across hypotheses
H (see figure 1.4, p. 20). The upshot: the external factor in question — how close
Figure 1.5: The marginal chance distribu-
tion for C(uD, H), which stays fairly constant
across hypotheses H about the coin’s bias.
the coin’s true bias happened to fall
to u’s prior estimate — is not terribly
relevant to explaining why p takes the
exact form that it does. Hence, it is
also not terribly relevant to explaining
why uD is inaccurate to exactly degree
0.028, rather than 0.027, 0.026, etc.
The moral: u depends fairly minimally
on luck in having the true chances fall
close to its prior estimates for success
(posterior accuracy).
To hammer this point home, consider a less fanciful analogy than the rain machine.
The Expert Archer. A highly skilled archer faces a number of different
targets T arranged at varying distances. Given her expertise, the marginal
chance distribution p for D (distance of her arrow from the center of
the target) looks more or less the same, regardless of which target she
takes aim at. Whether she aims at some target T rather close by, or
some T ′ rather far away (within reasonable bounds, of course), p assigns
roughly the same (high) probability mass to the hypothesis D = 0 (hitting
the target dead center), roughly the same (low) probability mass to the
hypothesis D = 15 (hitting 15cm off target), and so on.
Because p remains largely unaltered across targets T , the initial proximity of
our archer to T is plausibly (more or less) irrelevant for explaining why p takes the
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exact form that it does. And because facts about the form that p takes serve as an
explanatory screen vis-á-vis D — any other factor relevant for explaining why D = 0
(she hits the target dead center), rather than D = 1, D = 2, etc., is only relevant in
virtue of explaining why p takes the exact form that it does — that initial proximity
is (more or less) irrelevant for explaining why our archer is successful to the exact
degree that she is. This mirrors the coin flipping case. Because p remains largely
Figure 1.6: The objective expected posterior
accuracy of b from the perspective of various
chance hypotheses H of the form B = x.
unaltered across chance hypotheses H,
the (initial) proximity of your prior u
to H is plausibly (more or less) irrel-
evant for explaining why p takes the
exact form that it does. And because
facts about the form that p takes serve
as an explanatory screen vis-á-vis pos-
terior accuracy — any other factor rel-
evant for explaining why C(uD, H) =
0.028, rather than C(uD, H) = 0.027,
C(uD, H) = 0.026, etc., is only relevant
in virtue of explaining why p takes the
exact form that it does — that initial proximity is next to irrelevant for explaining
why your posterior uD is successful (accurate) to the exact degree that it is (0.028).
Your friend, however — the one who adopts the more biased beta prior b — is
in a different boat. The marginal chance distribution q for C(bD, H) varies rather
significantly across chance hypotheses H. This is reflected in the fact that q’s mean
— the expected posterior accuracy of her distribution b — varies significantly across
H (left, previous page). The upshot: the (initial) proximity of her prior b to H is
relevant for explaining why q takes the exact form that it does. In turn, it is relevant
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for explaining why her posterior bD is successful (accurate) to the exact degree that
it is (0.020).
The situation here is not unlike that of an unskilled archer. Such an archer might
face targets T arranged at varying distances. Suppose she aims at a close one and
hits the bullseye dead center. Unlike in the expert archer case, the marginal chance
distribution q for D (distance of her arrow from the center of the target) varies
significantly across T . If she aims at some target T rather close by, the mean of q
(i.e., the expected value of D) might be close to 0. There is a high chance of hitting
the bullseye dead center, a lower chance of hitting 1cm off target, an even lower
chance of hitting 5 cm off target, etc. But if, instead, she aims at some T ′ far away,
the mean of q might be much higher. There is a much higher chance of missing the
bullseye by quite a bit. The upshot: the unskilled archer’s initial proximity to her
target is relevant for explaining why q takes the exact form that it does. In turn, it
is relevant for explaining why she is successful to the exact degree that she is.
This all serves to highlight an important virtue of the MaxEnt prior. It renders
external factors less explanatorily relevant than certain other priors (more concen-
trated beta priors), and thereby does more to ameliorate dependence on intervening
epistemic luck. The MaxEnt prior is better suited, then, to play the primary theo-
retical role of priors. But an alternative prior, viz., the MaxSen prior, is even better
suited to play this role.
1.7 The MaxSen Method
When a scientist designs and performs an experiment aimed at adjudicating between
competing theoretical hypotheses, H1, ..., Hn, she ought to, according to the MaxSen
method, take her prior information into account as follows:
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• Summarize her prior evidence by constraints C1, ..., Cm, which we model by a
set of probability distributions C .
• Adopt the prior s in C that is ‘maximally sensitive’ to evidence in the follow-
ing sense: the experimental data, rather than the initial proximity of the true
theoretical hypothesis H to s’s prior estimate, explains, to the greatest extent
possible, posterior accuracy.
– Formally: minimize f(p) = maxi ExpHi(d(pD, Hi)) - minj ExpHj(d(pD, Hj))
on C .14 (Read d(pD, Hi) as the distance between pD and the indicator
distribution iHi which places all of its probability on Hi.)
∗ We continue to use C to measure the distance between probability
distributions, though it is open to the proponent of MaxSen, of course,
to use an alternative distance function.
To illustrate the MaxSen method, imagine once more that you have a coin of
unknown bias. You plan to perform n independent coin flips, in order to adjudi-
cate between competing chance hypotheses. You have no relevant prior information,
suppose, save for the following (which we assume only to limit computational com-
plexity): your prior ought to take the form of a beta distribution. So C is the set of
all beta distributions.
At this point, MaxEnt prescribes adopting the uniform prior. The distribution
that maximizes entropy on C is the beta prior with α=β=1, which is just the uniform
prior. MaxSen, in contrast, prescribes adopting a non-unform beta prior. Which prior
it prescribes depends on the details of the experimental set-up. I address this issue
in §1.9.1. For now, just note that this is to be expected, if what we have said about
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Figure 1.7: The beta distribution with
α = β = 1.45.
the theoretical role of priors is correct. If
what we have said is correct, then priors
are merely instrumentally valuable tools
for securing accurate, minimally luck-
dependent posterior credences by updat-
ing on new data. It is no surprise that
which tools are best suited for this end
depends on what new experimental data
you stand to receive. And it is no sur-
prise that what data you stand to receive
depends on the details of the experimental set-up. This includes details about what
kind of evidence the experiment is designed to yield: evidence about the outcomes of
coin flips, or about levels of gene expression, or about sea surface temperature, etc. It
also includes details about, for example, the number of times n that the experiment
is to be repeated. In our coin flip example, if you are going to flip the coin 8 times
(n = 8), then the MaxSen prior is the beta distribution with α = β = 1.45 (right). If
instead you are going to flip the coin twenty times (n = 20), then the MaxSen prior
is the beta distribution with α = β ≈ 2.
To construct the MaxSen prior, one might use any number of optimization algo-
rithms, e.g., a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. I use simple regression analysis
here, since my purposes are merely illustrative. Consider, for example, the case of
n = 8 (you flip the coin eight times). In this case, if you choose a reasonably fine
partition of C , and evaluate f(p) = maxi ExpHi(d(pD, Hi)) - minj ExpHj(d(pD, Hj))
at the upper and lower bounds of the elements of this partition, regression analysis
yields the polynomial approximation f ∗ of f (pictured left, next page).15 As is clear
from inspection of this graph, f takes a minimum, roughly, at the beta distribution
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Figure 1.8: Approximation of f given n=8.
with α = β = 1.4. Standard La-
grangian methods reveal the unique
minimum to be, more precisely, at
the beta distribution s with α = β =
1.45. This is the MaxSen prior. Sim-
ilar techniques can be used to ap-
proximate the MaxSen distribution
for any n. In addition, Orbanz and
Teh (2010) describe how to use stan-
dard inference techniques in a way
that can be leveraged to construct
the MaxSen distribution in more difficult inference and decision problems (we re-
turn to this issue in §1.8.2).
The MaxSen prior s, rather than the MaxEnt (uniform) prior u, minimizes the
need for epistemic luck in securing accurate posteriors. Recall, u’s expected posterior
accuracy varies fairly minimally across chance hypotheses H. There is a fairly high
chance that the experiment will yield data that causes it to converge significantly on
the true chance hypothesis H, regardless of which H is true. As a result, the MaxEnt
prior u performs better than many other priors (low variance beta priors) vis-á-vis
ameliorating dependence on epistemic luck. This notwithstanding, the MaxSen prior
s’s expected posterior accuracy varies significantly less than u’s with changes in H
(pictured next page). In fact, the difference between the maximum and minimum
expected accuracy is only 0.012 (f(s) = 0.012). The result: facts about how close
the true chances happened to fall to s’s (prior) estimates — an external factor —
play virtually no role in explaining the (posterior) accuracy of sD. Not only does the
MaxSen prior perform better than the MaxEnt prior vis-á-vis ameliorating dependence
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on luck, but it performs (more or less) as well as any prior could perform in this regard.
Figure 1.9: Expected posterior accuracy of s
(from the perspective of various chance hy-
potheses H of the form B = x).
Once more, the situation is not
unlike that of an expert archer.
Whether she aims at some target
rather close by, or another far away
(within reasonable bounds), she has
roughly the same (high) chance of
hitting the target dead center, the
same (lower) chance of hitting 1cm
off target, and so on. The result:
facts about how close she happened
to be to her target play virtually no
role in explaining her success. Her
skill ameliorates her dependence on luck — in particular, luck in having her target
fall close to some ‘preferred’ distance — to the maximum extent possible.
Figure 1.10: Expected posterior accuracy
of both u and s (rescaled to emphasize dif-
ference in variation across hypotheses H).
The moral is this: the MaxSen prior
renders external facts — facts about how
close the true chances happened to fall
to s’s initial estimates — virtually ex-
planatorily irrelevant. In turn, it mini-
mizes the need for epistemic luck in se-
curing accurate posterior beliefs. Hence,
the MaxSen prior is uniquely suited to
play the primary theoretical role of priors
(at least in simple decision and inference




I have argued that there is a promising, anti-luck rationale for employing the MaxSen
method to incorporate prior information in inference and decision problems. If cor-
rect, this resolves the problem of the priors. To recap, the argument goes as follows:
1. You ought to adopt whichever prior is best suited to play the primary theoretical
role of priors, if there is one.
2. The primary role of priors is to help you secure accurate beliefs by updating on
your evidence, and to minimize your need for epistemic luck in securing those
beliefs.
3. Various priors put you in a position to secure accurate posteriors by updating
on your evidence.
4. Only the MaxSen prior, however, minimizes your need for epistemic luck in
securing accurate posteriors.
C. You ought to adopt the MaxSen prior to incorporate prior information in infer-
ence and decision problems.
The majority of this chapter is devoted to defending premise 4. It is worthwhile to
restate that defense here, in a more succinct form.
1′. No prior mitigates the need for epistemic luck tout court. Rather, the prior that
minimizes your need for luck, if there is one, does so by mitigating a special
kind of intervening epistemic luck: luck in having the true chances fall close to
one’s initial estimates of the chances.
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2′. Intervening luck is the sort of luck in play when external factors are primarily
responsible for explaining success. Mitigating intervening luck is a matter of
rendering such factors explanatorily irrelevant.
3′. The MaxSen prior s renders facts about how close the true chances happen to
fall to s’s initial estimates less explanatorily relevant than any other prior.
4′. So, the MaxSen prior does more to mitigate the relevant kind of luck than any
other prior. (From 2 and 3 )
C′. This is all that a prior can do to ameliorate dependence on epistemic luck tout
court ; so the MaxSen prior minimizes the need for such luck in securing accurate
posteriors. (From 1 and 4 )
1.8.2 Outstanding Issues
This chapter motivates and details a new kind of objective Bayesian method, the
MaxSen method, for constructing priors. But it does not provide a full defense of
this method. Consider premise 3′. In arguing for this premise, we restricted our
attention to inference and decision problems involving simple theoretical hypotheses
about the bias of a coin and binomial data. But, a full defense must consider a much
broader class of theoretical hypotheses and data. Microbiologists, for example, are
not concerned with the biases of coins or binomial data. They design and perform
experiments aimed at adjudicating between more complex theoretical hypotheses,
e.g., causal models that describe how over expression of a certain gene produces
chromosomal instability in breast tumors. And the data that such experiments yield
— qualitative data about the reorganization of certain cellular structures, quantitative
data about levels of DNA replication, etc. — is certainly not binomial (does not
come in the form of a sequence of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’).16 In inference and
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decision problems of this sort, Bayesian priors are nonparametric.17 A fuller defense
of the MaxSen method would illustrate how standard inference techniques (MCMC,
sequential Monte Carlo, variational inference, expectation propagation) can be used
to determine a nonparametric MaxSen prior in such problems, and to compute its
posterior (see Orbanz and Teh 2010 and Neal 2000). It would also identify the
conditions under which these techniques are applicable.
This paper also does not address some pressing concerns. For example, Venn
(1866), Keynes (1921) and Fisher (1922) all provide examples that seem to show that
MaxEnt yields inconsistent results in a range of cases, depending on how you describe
them. I briefly address Fisher’s concern below. But it is incumbent on the proponent
of MaxSen to show definitively that these problems do not extend to her proposal.
Examining the boundaries of the class of contexts in which MaxSen is applicable,
and responding fully to description or parameterization dependency concerns are tasks
that require separate investigation. Our aim here was simply to highlight the kind
of epistemic rationale undergirding MaxSen, and in turn, to highlight a promising
route for resolving the problem of the priors. I conclude by raising a few additional
questions to be addressed in future research.
• We specified the MaxSen prior using one particular distance function on the
space of probability densities, viz., Cramer-von Mises distance. Are our results
robust under a range of metrics, e.g., the Lévy metric? the Lp metrics?
• The MaxSen prior outperforms alternative precise priors, including the MaxEnt
prior, vis-á-vis ameliorating dependence on luck. But we have not compared the
MaxSen prior to imprecise priors, or sets of probability functions. Is there good
epistemic reason to prefer the MaxSen prior to alternative imprecise priors, at
least in certain contexts of inquiry? (I address this issue in chapter 3.)
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• In §1.3, we remarked that, in certain circumstances, limits on time, personnel,
funding, etc. keep scientific researchers from gathering weighty enough data for
the washing out theorems to have much purchase. And in such circumstances,
many priors will depend significantly on luck for success (accuracy). When is
an experiment sufficiently “well-designed” for some fairly large class of priors to
depend fairly minimally on luck for success?
1.9 Objections
1.9.1 Likelihood Principle
The MaxSen method seems to run afoul of the Likelihood Principle:
Likelihood Principle (LP). For any two experiments aimed at adjudicating
between theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn, and any two data sequences D
and D′ produced by those experiments, if D and D′ determine the same
likelihood function (up to an arbitrary positive constant), i.e., there is
some k > 0 such that p(D|Hi) = k ·p(D′|Hi) for allHi, then the ‘evidential
meaning’ or ‘evidential import’ of D and D′ for H1, ..., Hn is the same.
(cf. Edwards, Lindman and Savage 1963, 237)
Many Bayesian statisticians, such as Savage, de Finetti and Berger (as well as
‘frequentist’ statisticians such as Fisher) take the LP to be central to rational inductive
inference. Birnbaum (1962) summarizes the standard Bayesian rationale for the LP
as follows. First, on the Bayesian view, according to Birnbaum, the aim of rational
inductive inference is to use “experimental results along with other available [prior]
information” to determine a posterior that provides “an appropriate final synthesis
of available information” (Birnbaum 1962, 299). Posteriors ‘synthesize’ the total
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available data E by specifying truth-value estimates for the theoretical hypotheses
under investigation, H1, ..., Hn, which capture the ‘evidential meaning’ or ‘evidential
import’ of E for H1, ..., Hn.
Second, Bayes’ theorem tells us that posteriors, p(·|D), are fully determined by
two components: a prior, p(·), and a likelihood function for the experimental data
D, p(D|·), which specifies how probable the various theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn
render D.
Bayes’ Theorem. p(Hi|D) = [p(D|Hi) · p(Hi)]/p(D)
= [p(D|Hi) · p(Hi)]/
∑
j p(D|Hj) · p(Hj)
Finally, because the prior distribution captures the ‘evidential meaning’ of the prior
data (no more, no less), the likelihood function must capture the ‘evidential meaning’
of the experimental data, on the Bayesian view (no more, no less). “In this sense,”
Birnbaum says, “we may say that [Bayes’ theorem] implies [the likelihood principle]”
(Birnbuam 1962, 299). “The contribution of experimental results to the determination
of posterior probabilities is always characterized just by the likelihood function and
is otherwise independent of the structure of an experiment” (ibid.).
MaxSen seems to violate the LP by making ‘extraneous’ features of the experimen-
tal set-up — in particular, its ‘stopping rule’ — relevant to the ‘evidential meaning’ or
‘evidential import’ of experimental data. Stopping rules are rules that specify when
to stop gathering new data. They are extraneous, according to the LP, because they
have no influence on likelihoods.
The argument that MaxSen violates the LP, by making stopping rules relevant to
evidential force, goes as follows. First, as any proponent of the method would happily
admit, stopping rules are relevant to which prior you ought to adopt, according to
MaxSen. Suppose, for example, that you and your friend are going to flip a coin, in
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order to adjudicate between competing hypotheses about its bias. You adopt different
fixed stopping rules — you plan to flip the coin 8 times; your friend plans to flip it 20
times. Then MaxSen recommends that you adopt the beta prior s with α = β = 1.45.
It recommends that your friend adopt the beta prior s′ with α = β = 2.
From here, it seems, we are just a few small steps from showing that MaxSen
violates the LP.
1. Posteriors reflect the ‘evidential meaning’ of the total available data (prior and
experimental) for the theoretical hypotheses under investigation.
2. MaxSen renders posteriors sensitive to stopping rules.
3. So, according to MaxSen, the ‘evidential meaning’ of the total available data is
sensitive to stopping rules. (From 1 and 2 )
4. Stopping rules are obviously irrelevant to the meaning of the prior data. If they
are relevant to the meaning of the total data at all, it must be because they
impact the meaning of the experimental data.
5. Hence, the meaning of the experimental data is sensitive to stopping rules,
according to MaxSen. (From 3 and 4 )
6. The LP says: stopping rules are irrelevant to the meaning of the experimental
data.
C. MaxSen violates the LP. (From 5 and 6 )
In fact, though, MaxSen is perfectly consistent with the LP. The problem with this
argument: premise 1 is false. The primary role of priors is not to reflect the ‘evidential
meaning’ of the prior data, or anything of the sort, but rather, to help us secure
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accurate posteriors in a luck-minimizing fashion (or so I argued in §1.3). Similarly,
the primary role of posteriors is not to reflect the ‘evidential meaning’ of the total
data (prior and experimental together), but rather, to encode accurate, minimally
luck-dependent truth-value estimates for both theoretical hypotheses (e.g., models of
viral infection mechanisms, climate models, etc.) and non-theoretical propositions
(regarding ecosystem loss, etc.).
Rational inductive inference, on this view, is simply not aimed at using “experi-
mental results along with other available [prior] information” to determine a poste-
rior that provides “an appropriate final synthesis of available information” (Birnbaum
1962, 299). Of course, summarizing ‘what the data says’ — its ‘evidential meaning’ or
‘evidential import’ — is important for various purposes, e.g., reporting experimental
results in science journals. But rational inductive inference aims at something dif-
ferent: getting at the truth (securing accurate truth-value estimates) in a minimally
luck-dependent fashion.
The proponent of MaxSen might elaborate as follows: the ‘evidential meaning’
or ‘evidential import’ of a body of evidence is almost always best summarized by a
set probabilities. Such ‘meanings’ are rarely specific enough to single out a unique
distribution. Prior evidence, for example, typically imposes constraints on prior prob-
abilities, constraints satisfied by a range of distributions. And, given that the LP is
true, capturing the correct ‘meanings’ for experimental data items is a matter of en-
coding the correct likelihoods; many priors encode the correct likelihoods. Normally,
then, there will be a set of distributions that, when updated on the experimental data,
reflect the evidential meaning of the total evidence as well as any other distribution.
Still, if MaxSen is correct, one of these priors is uniquely well-suited to play the
primary role of priors, viz., to help us secure accurate posteriors in a luck-minimizing
fashion. The crucial point is this: its distinguishing properties — the properties that
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set it apart from the other priors that adequately summarize ‘what the data says’ —
are important merely because they make it (the MaxSen prior) well-suited to play
the relevant theoretical role. These distinguishing properties do not reflect anything
about the ‘evidential meaning’ of the data, prior or experimental. Such ‘meaning’ is
characterized by the constraints that the prior evidence imposes (which the MaxSen
prior satisfies), and the likelihood functions for potential experimental data items
(which the MaxSen prior correctly encodes).
To recap: MaxSen is consistent with the LP, despite its sensitivity to stopping
rules. Stopping rules do determine certain features of the MaxSen prior. But these
features do not reflect ‘what the data says’. They are merely instrumentally valu-
able ‘design features’ which make the MaxSen prior well-suited to play its particular
theoretical role.
A final note: appreciating the proper role of priors — to help us secure accurate,
minimally luck-dependent posteriors — not only squares MaxSen with the LP, but
also makes clear why one’s choice of a prior should be sensitive to stopping rules.
Consider a practical analogy. Monica has an investment advisor. The advisor’s
goal is to deliver the largest return that she can on Monica’s investments at some
time point, e.g., 10 years from now. She has two tools to achieve this goal: (i) the
investment capital that Monica provides each month, and (ii) an investment strategy.
Now, some features of Monica’s circumstances are irrelevant to which investment
strategy her advisor ought to adopt: whether she hopes to retire in Montana or
Monterrey, for example. This has no effect on which investment strategy will yield the
highest return. But other features of her circumstances clearly do matter. It clearly
matters how much investment capital Monica has available. If she can invest $1,000
per month, and her friend can invest $5,000 per month, then it would be foolish for
their respective advisors to adopt the same investment strategy. Her advisor might be
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best served opting for a conservative investment strategy (government bonds, etc.),
while her friend’s advisor is better served by focusing more on higher risk/higher
reward options.
Similarly, a researcher might have a couple tools at her disposal for achieving her
epistemic goal (securing accurate, minimally luck-dependent posteriors): (i) the data
that her experiment yields, and (ii) an inductive strategy (encoded by her prior).
Some features of her experimental set-up are clearly irrelevant to which inductive
strategy (prior) she ought to adopt: whether her pipettes were made by company A
rather than company B, for example. This has no effect on which inductive strategy is
likely to yield the highest ‘epistemic return’ (the most accurate, least luck-dependent
posteriors). But other features of her circumstances clearly do matter. It clearly
matters how much data that experiment will yield (which depends on the stopping
rule she employs). Just as one financial advisor might be better served opting for a
more ‘aggressive’ investment strategy than another, if her client has more investment
capital to work with, so too might one researcher be better served opting for a more
‘aggressive’ inductive strategy than another, if she has more (weightier) experimental
data to work with. She can afford to adopt a prior that concentrates probability more
on less ‘extreme’ theoretical hypotheses (hypotheses that assign less extreme objective
probabilities to experimental data items), without increasing her dependence on luck.
The reason: the more extreme hypotheses will do more to ‘make themselves heard’;
given the weightiness of the data, they will either be very strongly confirmed or very
strongly disconfirmed.
It is no surprise, then, that which prior you ought to adopt depends on how
much data your experiment is designed to yield (and other important features of
the experimental set-up, e.g., whether the kind of data that it is designed to yield
is particularly probative vis-á-vis the relevant theoretical hypotheses). And it is no
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strike against MaxSen that it respects this fact.
1.9.2 Parameterization Dependence
As frequentists and subjectivists often note, MaxEnt seems to yield inconsistent re-
sults in a range of cases, depending on how you describe them. The following example,
adapted from Fisher 1922 (pp. 324-5), illustrates the point. One final time, consider
a coin of unknown bias. You plan to flip the coin n times, in order to adjudicate
between the competing chance hypotheses. You have no relevant prior information,
save for the following: your prior ought to take the form of a beta distribution.
Given these evidential constraints, MaxEnt prescribes adopting the uniform prior
over hypotheses B = x. But, Fisher points out, you “might never have happened to
direct [your] attention to the particular quantity” B (Fisher 1922, 325). Instead, you
Figure 1.11: Non-uniform prior over
hypotheses B = x defined by f .
might have maximized entropy with respect to
θ =
√
B. “The quantity, θ,” Fisher says, “mea-
sures the degree of probability, just as well as
[B], and is even, for some purposes, the more
suitable variable” (ibid., 325). If, however, you
maximize entropy with respect to θ, you will
adopt the uniform prior over hypotheses of the
form θ = x, which is equivalent to adopting a
non-uniform prior over hypotheses B = x de-
fined by the probability density f(x) = 1/(2
√
x) (right).
The upshot: depending on which parameter you focus on, B or θ, MaxEnt will
prescribe a different prior. In turn, you will make different (inconsistent) judgments
in the two cases. For example, if you maximize entropy with respect to B, and then
observe two heads in a row, your new best estimate of the coin’s bias is 0.75. In
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Figure 1.12: MaxSen prior s for B.
contrast, if you maximize entropy with respect
to θ and observe two heads, your best estimate
is 0.71.
One might suspect that the MaxSen
method is subject to a similar sort of param-
eterization dependence. And it is. But this is
a feature, not a bug. Suppose that you plan
to flip the coin of unknown bias 5 times. The
Figure 1.13: MaxSen prior s∗ for θ.
MaxSen prior over hypotheses B = x is the
beta distribution s with α = β ≈ 1.2 (left,
above). If, in contrast, you use the MaxSen
method to determine a beta prior over hypothe-
ses of the form θ = x, you will arrive at the dis-
tribution s∗ with α ≈ 0.9 and β ≈ 1.5 (right).
And s∗ is not equivalent to s. Adopting the
prior s∗ over hypotheses θ = x is equivalent to
adopting the distribution over hypotheses B = x defined by the probability density







This is a feature, I claim, not a bug, be-
cause (i) there are grounds for focusing certain
parameters, rather than others; the MaxSen
method does not leave you in the precarious
position of yielding different prescriptions rela-
tive to different parameters, with no good rea-
son to choose between them; (ii) in virtue of
its parameterization dependence, the MaxSen
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method is flexible enough to yield appropriate prescriptions for a variety epistemo-
logical tasks.
Which parameter you ought to focus on, I claim, depends on what your epistemic
aims are in your context of inquiry. Suppose, for example, that your aim is two-fold:
Figure 1.15: Bottom curve: objective
expected posterior inaccuracy of the




sD(x)dx (measuring inaccuracy by the





(i) to arrive at an accurate, minimally-
luck dependent posterior pD over theoreti-
cal hypotheses (about the bias of the coin,
about the square root of the bias of the
coin, etc.), and (ii) to arrive at an accurate,
minimally-luck dependent estimate, pD(X),
of the truth-value of X, the proposition that
the coin will come up heads on the next toss.
Perhaps you care about the former because
it is a good means to the latter. When pD is
sufficiently accurate (it concentrates proba-
bility significantly enough on the true theo-
retical hypothesis), it will yield a truth-value
estimate for X that is (objectively) likely to
be accurate too.
If this your aim — to get at the truth of X in a minimally luck-dependent fashion
— then you ought to focus on the parameter B, rather than θ, I claim. The reason:
the objective expected accuracy of sD(X) =
∫ 1
0
x · sD(x)dx (the posterior probability
for X determined by the MaxSen prior s over hypotheses B = x) varies less across




(the posterior probability determined by the MaxSen prior s∗ over hypotheses θ = x).
So s depends less on luck in yielding a successful (accurate) posterior probability for
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X than s∗ does.
The reason, informally, is that the MaxSen prior s∗ over hypotheses θ = x is
particularly adept at converging on the true value of θ. But small changes in θ
correspond to large changes in B. So it is not quite as adept at converging on the
true value of B (the chance of X). Moreover, s∗’s posterior probability (truth-value
estimate) for X is just its estimate of B. And the accuracies of these two estimates
hang together. The less (objectively) likely it is to yield an accurate estimate of B,
the less (objectively) likely it is to yield an accurate posterior probability for X. The
upshot: it is not particularly adept at converging on the actual truth-value of X.
It requires more epistemic luck for success (accuracy) than the MaxSen prior s over
chance hypotheses B = x.
So there are grounds for focusing on B rather than θ. If your aim is to get
at the truth of X in minimally luck-dependent fashion, then you would be better
served by focusing on B than on θ. But, in other contexts of inquiry, it might be
epistemically important to arrive at accurate, minimally luck-dependent estimates of
other quantities. For this end, it might be better to adopt a prior that is better at
converging on the true value of θ. It is precisely because the MaxSen method offers
non-equivalent prescriptions for B and θ that it is able to furnish priors that are
well-suited for these different tasks.
The moral is this: researchers are typically concerned not only with securing
accurate, minimally luck-dependent truth-value estimates for theoretical hypotheses,
but also with securing such estimates for various other quantities. We might not only
care about how over expression of some gene influences instability in breast tumors.
We might also care about whether a patient will go into remission if she receives
certain therapies or treatments. Which other quantities we are concerned with — e.g.,
the truth-values of pertinent non-theoretical propositions (about remission, and so on)
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— can and ought to inform how we go about investigating theoretical hypotheses, by
informing how we parameterize them.
Notes
1Venn (1866), Keynes (1921) and Fisher (1922) aim their objections at Laplace’s Principle of
Insufficient Reason (PIR). But these problems for PIR extend directly to MaxEnt.
2More carefully, when our evidence provides no constraints on probabilities over theoretical hy-
potheses, and a countably additive uniform distribution over that space exists, then the MaxEnt
distribution is just the uniform distribution. In certain contexts, however, the MaxEnt prior exists
while a countably additive uniform prior does not. For example, Furrer et al. (2011) claim to specify
techniques that can be used to derive an ‘infinite-dimensional generalization of the entropic uncer-
tainty relation’ (Furrer et al. 2011, 12). But, it is well known that there is no Lebesgue measure on
infinite-dimensional spaces, and hence, no analogue of the standard uniform distribution.
3See ch. 3, §1.
4See Savage 1972, pp. 46-50. See also Barron, Schervish and Wasserman (1999), or Hawthorne
(1993) for discussion of conditions that guarantee convergence.
5Rather, no prior fully amerliorates the luck involved in avoiding misleading evidence without
rendering facts about evidence irrelevant to explaining posterior accuracy altogether. If a gambler
adopts a close-to-perfectly dogmatic prior — one which is nearly perfectly resilient with respect to
nearly all data — then of course the accuracy or inaccuracy of her posterior estimate of the coin’s
bias will depend minimally on the misleading nature of her new evidence. But it does so because
it depends minimally on the character of any new data. The moral: no prior singles out and fully
ameliorates exactly the sort of epistemic luck involved in avoiding misleading evidence.
6By the uniform prior u over hypotheses B = x, I mean the prior u defined by the uniform density
function f(x) = 1.
7A beta prior b is a probability distribution defined by a density function of the form f(x) =
((1 − x)−1+βx−1+α)/Beta[α, β]. Beta distributions are characterizable in terms of α and β, and
hence, fairly computationally tractable. They also form a very flexible class of distributions. For
these two reasons, we restrict our attention to beta distributions in many of our examples.
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8For simplicity, I only consider sequences of coin tosses that are exchangeable, from the perspec-
tive of the true chance distribution.
9The cumulative distribution function P corresponding to a distribution p over chance hypotheses
(defined by density f) is defined by P (ch(X) ≤ x) =
∫ x
0
f(y)dy, and specifies the probability that
the chance of X is less than or equal to x.
10For example, for any beta densities f , g and h, if they all have the same mean but increasing
variance, then f is closer to g than to h. Similarly, if they all have the same variance but larger and
larger means, then f is closer to g than to h.
11The usual caveats are needed: there is no demon intervening to make the bottom knob causally
inefficacious, except when it’s turned all the way to the right, or anything of the sort. If that were
the case, of course, then the position of the bottom knob might well be relevant to explaining why
London gets 3mm of rain, rather than 2mm, 1mm, etc., despite not being counterfactually relevant.
12Save, of course, for the fact that, at the end of the day, your experiment produced exactly the
outcome that it did.
13Of course, when B ≈ 0 or B ≈ 1, this distribution will concentrate probability almost exclusively
on one value for C(uD, H).
14It would be better to minimize g(p) = maxi,jd(chHi , chHj ), where chHi is the objective marginal
distribution for d(pD, Hi) determined by Hi. But the extra layer of complexity that this would
add would, I suspect, obscure the more important, underlying philosophical point. It would draw
attention away from the anti-luck rationale undergirding the MaxSen method.
15I evaluated f(p) = maxi ExpHi(d(pD, Hi)) - mini ExpHi(d(pD, Hi)) at all beta distributions p
with α, β ∈ {0.001, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, ..., 2}. For the raw data, the details of the polynomial (n = 5)
least-squares fit of the data, or the Mathematica code needed to run the simulations, please email
jpkonek@gmail.com.
16Of course, like any version objective Bayesianism, the MaxSen method will not be applicable in
all realistic problems of inference or decision.
17Nonparametric Bayesian models specify a joint distribution over an infinite number of parame-





In the casino, your evidence might be perfectly specific. You might, for example, know
exactly which cards have been dealt, exactly which cards your opponent needs to beat
you on the river, and so have evidence that justifies a perfectly precise credence, say
3/52, that she will win and take the rest of your money. But evidence is often
unspecific and equivocal. Consider your current evidence that it will snow next new
year’s eve, or your evidence about the price of copper twenty years from now, or about
interest rates on home equity loans forty years from now. “About these matters,”
Keynes says, “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever” (Keynes 1937, 213-4).
Imprecise Bayesians say that when your evidence is unspecific and equivocal, your
opinions should be unspecific and equivocal too. Precise priors (single probability
functions), however, do not allow for such opinions. If you adopt a precise prior,
in an attempt to incorporate unspecific/equivocal evidence in an inference or deci-
sion problem, you will be stuck with perfectly specific opinions. Taking account of
unspecific and equivocal prior evidence requires imprecise priors (sets of probability
functions). Call this the preclusion problem for precise Bayesianism.
Preclusion Problem. Precise priors preclude unspecific and equivocal opin-
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ions, and so invariably capture improper responses to unspecific and equiv-
ocal evidence.
The preclusion problem captures the central epistemic motivation for imprecise Bayes-
ianism. My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how flexible precise priors are.
Despite first appearances, precise priors do indeed allow for unspecific and equivocal
opinions.
In §2.1, I sketch the Bayesian approach to inductive inference. In §2.2, I detail the
preclusion problem. In §2.3, I identify the background assumption that generates the
preclusion problem, which I call locality. In §2.4-2.6, I present a number of reasons
for doubting locality. In §2.7, I outline a broadly Bayesian, locality-free approach to
inductive inference, and show that it avoids the preclusion problem. Finally, in §2.8,
I explore independent reason for thinking that this approach, or something much like
it is correct. If it is, this undercuts the central epistemic motivation for introduc-
ing imprecise priors. This, in turn, provides impetus to search for new epistemic
foundations for imprecise Bayesianism.
2.1 The Bayesian Approach to Inductive Inference
All Bayesians agree on certain facts about inductive inference. They agree, for exam-
ple, that when a researcher designs and performs an experiment aimed at adjudicating
between competing theoretical hypotheses, H1, ..., Hn, she ought to (i) take her prior
evidence E for H1, ..., Hn into account by adopting a ‘prior’, which somehow sum-
marizes the information in E, (ii) update that ‘prior’ on her experimental data, to
obtain a ‘posterior’, and (iii) read her new opinions about H1, ..., Hn (as well as the
propositions X that H1, ..., Hn render more or less likely) off of this ‘posterior’. They
also agree that (iv) probabilities are useful for constructing priors; constructing a
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prior involves specifying a probability distribution p (a precise prior), or a set of
distributions (an imprecise prior) over H1, ..., Hn. Finally, they agree, for the most
part, on (v) which comparative and qualitative judgments any ‘posterior’ (precise or
imprecise) commits its bearer to making; they agree on how to ‘read off’ new opinions
from a posterior.18
Imagine, for example, a virologist who designs and performs an experiment to
adjudicate between competing hypotheses H1, ..., Hn about a protein interaction in a
virus. (H1, ..., Hn might be causal models that represent how this interaction works.)
She comes to the table with a great deal of prior information, of course, e.g., in-
formation about how these sorts of interactions work in similar viruses. Then her
experiment yields new data. On the Bayesian view, to take her prior evidence E into
account in her inference problem, she ought to adopt a prior over H1, ..., Hn. Different
Bayesians, however, prescribe adopting different priors.
Subjective Bayesians say that agents ought to look to their own opinions to fur-
nish priors. If an agent’s opinions are rich enough to pin down a single truth-value
estimate for each of the H1, ..., Hn, then she ought to adopt a precise prior, a single
probability distribution p over H1, ..., Hn that summarizes E (viz., the prior p that
encodes ‘her’ truth-value estimates).19 If, in contrast, her prior opinions fail to pin
down a single probability distribution p over H1, ..., Hn, then she ought to adopt an
imprecise prior, or a set of a probabilities. In particular, she ought to adopt the set
of probabilities that are (rationally) compatible with her comparative and qualitative
judgments (rationally permissible to adopt given those judgments).
Objective Bayesians, in contrast, endorse methods for constructing priors that do
not depend, in the same way, on the agent’s prior opinions (and inductive quirks,
hunches, etc.). Edwin Jaynes (1957, 1968, 1973), for example, endorses the maximum
entropy method (MaxEnt):
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• Summarize your prior evidence by constraints C1, ..., Cn, which you model by a
set of probability distributions C .
• Adopt the prior p that maximizes entropy H(p)= –
∑
i p(Hi) · log(p(Hi)) on C .
On this view, any researcher who arrives at the same evidential constraints should
proceed in the same manner. She should adopt a precise prior, viz., the probabil-
ity distribution p over H1, ..., Hn that maximizes entropy on the set of probabilities
that satisfy those constraints. See Kass and Wasserman (1996) for an overview of
precise, objective Bayesian approaches to inductive inference. Alternatively, objec-
tive Bayesians might prescribe adopting a particular imprecise prior. Jeffrey (1983)
and Dalkey (1985), for example, propose measures of entropy for imprecise models
(sets of probabilities).20 Imprecise objective Bayesians might prescribe adopting the
maximum entropy imprecise prior consistent with your evidence (viz., C itself).
So different Bayesians prescribe adopting different priors. They agree, nonetheless,
about how inductive inference proceeds once an agent has a prior in hand. They
agree, for example, that our virologist ought to proceed by updating her prior on
her new, experimental data D. If she adopts a precise prior, i.e., a single probability
distribution p over hypotheses H1, ..., Hn (about the relevant protein interaction) that
summarizes her prior evidence E (about how these sorts of interactions work in similar
viruses, etc.), then this involves conditioning p on D, i.e., adopting the posterior
pD(·) = p(·|D). If she adopts an imprecise prior, a set of probabilities S, then this
involves conditioning every p in S on D. She ought to then ‘read off’ her new opinions
about H1, ..., Hn from her posterior. If her prior p is precise, this involves making the
comparative and qualitative judgments that her posterior pD rationally commits her
to making, according to Bayesian orthodoxy:
• She is committed to judging that X is more plausible than Y if pD(X) > pD(Y ).
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• She is committed to judging that D provides positive incremental support for
X if pD(X) > p(X).
• She is committed to judging that action A is preferable to B if the expected
utility of A (from the perspective of pD) is greater than the expected utility of
B (from the perspective of pD).
If her prior S is imprecise, reading new opinions off of her posterior SD involves
making the comparative and qualitative judgments that SD is univocal about, i.e.,
the judgments that all elements of SD commit her to making.
This last bit of orthodoxy — about which comparative and qualitative judgments
a precise prior/posterior commits you to making — though extremely entrenched,
is also extremely implausible. It forces agents to ignore a great deal of information
about the quality of their evidence — in particular, the weight of their evidence —
in inquiry and decision-making. This makes for bad inductive and practical policy in
a wide range of contexts, I will argue.
The reason this matters: this bad bit of orthodoxy generates the preclusion problem.
Fixing this bug, I will argue, reveals how flexible precise priors are. Fixing this
bug shows that precise priors plausibly capture adequate responses to unspecific and
equivocal evidence.
2.2 The Preclusion Problem
2.2.1 The Basic Issue
The question that divides precise and imprecise Bayesians is this: should you in-
variably use a single probability distribution to incorporate your prior information
in inference and decision problems? Or are there circumstances in which imprecise
priors (sets of distributions) are called for? Precise Bayesians say that you should
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invariably adopt a precise prior. Imprecise Bayesians say that there are circumstances
in which imprecise priors are called for.
It may seem obvious that there are circumstances in which imprecise priors are
called for. After all, you might think, the primary theoretical role of priors is just
to represent an agent’s actual prior opinions about the plausibility of hypotheses.
(This is a natural enough subjectivist thought.) And normal researchers’ actual
prior opinions often fail to pin down a single truth-value estimate for each of the
theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn under investigation. Here, for example, are Kyburg
and Pittarelli:
Suppose that the judgments “A is at least as probable as B” and “B or C is
at least as probable as A” are made for mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events A, B, and C. Any of the infinitely many solutions to the system
of linear inequalities
p(A) + p(B) + p(C) = 1
p(A) ≥ p(B)
p(B) + p(C) ≥ p(A)
for example
p(A) = 0.2, p(B) = 0.1, p(C) = 0.7
is compatible with these judgments. If nothing stronger than these com-
parisons is forthcoming, then there is no basis for choosing a single one of
these functions as representative of the probability information. (Kyburg
and Pittarelli 1996, 325)
An agent’s comparative probability judgments  ‘leave open’ any distribution
p that weakly represents them, i.e., is such that Hi  Hj only if p(Hi) ≤ p(Hj)
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(in the sense that p is not impermissible to adopt simply in virtue of her making
judgments ). And, as Kyburg and Pittarelli stress, a normal researcher’s actual
opinions normally ‘leave open’ many distributions. When they do, the imprecise
prior S, which contains all of these ‘open’ distributions p, best represents her actual
prior opinions. If the primary theoretical role of priors is just to represent actual prior
opinions, then she ought to adopt that imprecise prior S.
Alternatively, one might contend that the primary theoretical role of priors is to
represent the opinions about the plausibility of hypotheses that are best supported by
her prior evidence. If this is right, it is no longer obvious that certain circumstances
call for imprecise priors. The mere fact that actual researchers have less than maxi-
mally specific prior opinions (prior opinions that fail to pin down precise truth-value
estimates) no longer settles the dispute. The important question to ask now is: do
certain bodies of prior evidence support less than maximally specific states of opinion?
If so, then some evidential circumstances call for imprecise priors. If not, then not.
Imprecise Bayesians such as Levi (1980), Walley (1991) and Joyce (2005) argue
that certain bodies of evidence do indeed support less than maximally specific states
of opinion. In particular, when your evidence is unspecific and equivocal, your opin-
ions should be unspecific and equivocal too. The upshot: on either account of the
theoretical role of priors, certain circumstances call for imprecise priors. Here, for
example, is Walley:
If there is little evidence concerning [a hypothesis,] then beliefs about [that
hypothesis] should be indeterminate, and probability models imprecise, to
reflect the lack of information. (Walley 1991, 212-3)
And here is Joyce:
...the proper response to symmetrically ambiguous or incomplete evidence
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is not to assign probabilities symmetrically, but to refrain from assigning
precise probabilities at all... Imprecise credences have a clear epistemo-
logical motivation: they are the proper response to unspecific evidence.
(Joyce 2005, 171)
Unspecific evidence regarding a propositionX is evidence that fails to discriminate
X from incompatible alternatives X ′ (Joyce 2005, 167). For example, your evidence
about interest rates R on home equity loans forty years from now might be very
specific with respect to the claim that R will be higher than 15% (it might nearly
rule it out), but be relatively unspecific with respect to the claim that R will be exactly
3% (it might fail to discriminate that claim from competitors, e.g., R = 2.9, R = 3.1,
etc.). Equivocal evidence regarding X is evidence that is open to different readings,
and whose significance for X varies on those different readings (ibid.). For example,
your evidence about whether you will have health problems later in life might be
equivocal if you have some alarming symptoms, but very little information about
the underlying condition causing them (perhaps your symptoms are equally plausible
on a range of hypotheses about their cause). On different suppositions about the
underlying condition, the significance of your current symptoms (and family history,
etc.) shifts; it tells a different story, so to speak, about whether you will have health
problems later in life.
To see why imprecise Bayesians like Walley, Joyce and others hold that unspecific
and equivocal prior evidence calls for imprecision in one’s prior probabilities, consider
a case adapted from Williamson (2010, 116-20). An oncologist prescribes hormonal
treatment T to a breast cancer patient. She performs a test to determine whether the
patient’s tumor is estrogen-receptor-positive (ER+). She also has auxiliary evidence
about R, whether her patient’s breast cancer will recur given T , which includes (i)
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data about the patient’s symptoms, (ii) data from clinical databases about age, tumor
size, survival time, etc. of past patients, (iii) quantitative molecular data on tumor
cells, etc.
Our oncologist has a wealth of prior information relevant to R, much more than
we typically have about other matters: whether it will snow next new year’s eve,
what the price of copper will be twenty years from now, how high/low interest rates
on home equity loans will climb/fall forty years from now. This relatively weighty
evidence might be specific enough to impose the following constraints on any prior
that summarizes it:
• the tumor is at least 9/10-likely to be estrogen-receptor-positive;
• the patient’s cancer is 1/4-likely to recur given that her tumor is estrogen-
receptor-positive (T is a fairly effective treatment for estrogen-receptor-positive
tumors);
• the patient’s cancer is 3/4-likely to recur given that her tumor is estrogen-
receptor-negative (T is much less effective for estrogen-receptor-negative tu-
mors).
If her evidence does impose these constraints, then it plausibly commits her to making
certain comparative and qualitative judgments, e.g., “It is more probable that the pa-
tient’s tumor is estrogen-receptor-positive than it is that there will be an earthquake
in London today.” But, it does not commit her to making certain other judgments.
She is not committed to judging, “ER+ is more probable than drawing a black ball
at random from an urn containing 92 black balls and 8 red balls,” just as you or I am
not committed to judging, “Snow next new year’s eve is more probable than drawing
a black ball at random from an urn containing 43 black balls and 57 red balls.” Even
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weighty, quantitative evidence, such as our oncologist’s, is too unspecific to be this
demanding. Our oncologist’s evidence only commits her to a partial comparative
probability ordering, not a total ordering. An agent’s comparative probability order-
ing  is total if it is a partial order (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive) and also
satisfies totality : X  Y or Y  X, for all X and Y . In this sense, her less than max-
imally specific evidence at least permits (and perhaps positively requires) less than
maximally specific (merely partial) opinions, or comparative/qualitative judgments.
Suppose, however, that our oncologist adopts some precise prior, in order to incor-
porate her prior information in her inference and decision problem (to help her figure
out what to think about the prospects of sustained remission, whether to prescribe
additional treatments, etc.). Perhaps she adopts the MaxEnt prior, i.e., the prior p
that maximizes entropy on the set S of priors q that satisfy the constraints imposed
by her evidence:
• 9/10 ≤ q(ER+) ≤ 1
• q(R|ER+) = 1/4
• q(R|ER−) = 3/4.
Then her prior probabilities for ER+ and R are p(ER+) = 0.9 and p(R) = 0.3,
respectively. But, according to Bayesian orthodoxy, this means that she is committed
to making exactly the sorts of comparative probability judgments that we claimed she
need not make, given her evidence.
• She must judge that it is definitely less probable that the patient’s tumor is
estrogen-receptor-positive than it is that she will select a black ball if she ran-
domly draws from an urn containing 92 black balls and 8 red balls.
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• She must judge that it is definitely more probable that her patient’s cancer will
recur than it is that she will see 3 heads if she flips a fair coin 7 times.
Something stronger is true, in fact. All precise priors p are such that p(X) ≤ p(Y )
or p(X) ≥ p(Y ), for any X and Y . And since an agent who adopts p is committed
to judging X  Y if p(X) ≤ p(Y ), according to Bayesian orthodoxy, it follows
straightaway that your comparative probability judgments  must form a total order
if you adopt such a prior. That is, you are either committed to judging X  Y or
Y  X, for any X and Y . (Similarly, since the expectation operator Expp totally
orders actions, your preferences must form a total order as well.) But having perfectly
specific opinions — a total comparative probability ordering, total preferences, etc.
— is the wrong way to respond to unspecific and equivocal evidence.
This is why imprecise Bayesians like Walley, Joyce and others hold that unspecific
and equivocal prior evidence calls for imprecision in one’s prior probabilities. If our
oncologist adopts an imprecise prior, in order to incorporate her prior information in
her inference and decision problem, she is not necessarily committed to comparative
and qualitative judgments that all form total orders. Suppose, for example, that she
adopts the set S of distributions that satisfy the constraints imposed by her evidence.
The marginally unspecific nature of her prior evidence for R (the proposition that her
patient’s breast cancer will recur) is reflected in the spread {p(R)|p ∈ S} = [0.25, 0.3],
on the imprecise Bayesian view. The greater this spread, typically, the fewer com-
parative and qualitative judgments she will be committed to making with respect to
R. For example, if all p in S agree that the probability of observing 3 heads on 7
independent flips of a fair coin is 0.273 (p(3H) = 0.273), and some p in S say that
the probability of the patient’s cancer recurring is 0.25 (p(R) = 0.25), while other
p′ in S say that the probability is 0.3 (p(R) = 0.3) — and of course there are such
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p and p′ in S — then our oncologist is neither committed to judging R  3H nor
3H  R (according to Bayesian orthodoxy). She is only committed to making the
comparative and qualitative judgments that S is univocal about, i.e., the judgments
that all elements of S commit her to making.
The moral: agents who adopt imprecise priors are typically committed to merely
partial comparative probability judgments, comparative preferability judgments, judg-
ments of incremental support, etc. They are permitted to abstain from judgment on
various issues. In this way, imprecise priors allow for genuinely unspecific and equiv-
ocal opinions.
2.2.2 Adopting a Prior vs. Being Representable by a Prior
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to demonstrating just how flexible precise
priors are. Agents who adopt precise priors are typically committed to merely partial
comparative and qualitative judgments, I claim. They are permitted to abstain from
judgment on various issues. Precise priors are flexible enough, then, to allow for
genuinely unspecific and equivocal opinions.
We ought to address one concern now, though, at the outset. One might worry
that it betrays a rather basic confusion to suggest that a precise prior could allow for
a merely partial comparative probability ordering. The reason: to count as adopt-
ing a precise prior, one must already have a total comparative probability ordering.
Adopting a precise prior is just equivalent, one might suggest, to having a comparative
probability ordering that is rich enough to pin down a single truth-value estimate for
each of the theoretical hypotheses under investigation H1, ..., Hn. Scott (1964) shows
us just what this ‘richness’ amounts to. A comparative probability ordering  is
representable by a unique probability distribution p, in the sense that X  Y only if
p(X) ≤ p(Y ), if and only if  satisfies Scott’s axiom:
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Scott’s Axiom. If 〈X1, ..., Xn〉 and 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉 contain the same number of




iw(Yi) for any world
w, then it is not true that Xi  Yi for all i while Xj ≺ Yj for some j.
and, in addition, satisfies two other structural axioms: totality and non-atomicity (cf.
Scott 1964, p. 246; Joyce 2010, p. 285).21 The upshot: any comparative probability
ordering that is ‘rich enough’ to pin down a single truth-value estimate for each of
H1, ..., Hn must already be total. It is nonsense, then, to suggest that an agent should
adopt a precise prior, in order to incorporate her prior information in her inference or
decision problem, and yet is not rationally required to have total comparative beliefs.
This worry runs together two distinct notions: having or being representable by a
probability distribution p over hypotheses H1, ..., Hn, on the one hand, and adopting
p as one’s prior, on the other hand. Distinguishing these notions resolves our objec-
tor’s worry. Having or being representable by a probability distribution p over
theoretical hypotheses is a matter of having opinions (making comparative and quali-
tative doxastic judgments) that rationally commit you to estimating truth-values via
p.22 Adopting a distribution p over theoretical hypotheses as one’s prior, in contrast,
is a matter of making the comparative and qualitative judgments that p rationally
commits you to making, of allowing p to guide your inferential practices and decision-
making, in this sense. Importantly, the comparative/qualitative judgments that a
distribution commits you to making differ significantly from the judgments that
commit you to estimating truth-values via that distribution (or so I will argue). It is
perfectly possible for the former to be merely partial while the latter are total.
Richard Jeffrey (1987, p. 589) illustrates the distinction when, discussing the
Ellsberg paradox (cf. §5). He says, “I think you do well to find a definite probability
function to express your uncertainty, if you can... in the Ellsberg problems (were I ever
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to face them) I think I would try to express my uncertainty via a single probability
assignment — the uniform one, I imagine. If so, I differ from [Mark] Kaplan, who
would see my adoption of the uniform distribution as unjustifiable precision, whereas
I think I would adopt it as a precise characterization of my uncertainty” (emphasis
mine). Jeffrey’s point, of course, is not that you would do well to make some set of
total, non-atomic, Scott’s-axiom-satisfying comparative probability judgments, which
commit you to estimating truth-values via some single probability assignment. “We
humans are not capable of adopting opinions gratuitously, even if we cared to do
so” (Jeffrey 1983, 145). The point, rather, is just that you would do well to use
some probability assignment to facilitate decision-making in the Ellsberg problem,
by making the qualitative and comparative judgments (judgments of comparative
preferability, in this case) that it commits you to making (in a limited domain).
Adopting a precise prior is a common practice too. Objective Bayesian statis-
ticians will attest that using MaxEnt to facilitate inquiry in computational biology,
computer vision, or natural language processing (just a few of the areas where Max-
Ent has proved enormously useful) does not require making an incredibly rich set of
comparative and qualitative judgments. It only requires using the MaxEnt prior to
guide your inferential practices and decision-making, by making the judgments that
it commits you to making (in a limited domain).
Once we distinguish the notions of having or being representable by a probability
distribution p over theoretical hypotheses, on the one hand, and adopting p as one’s
prior, on the other hand, our objector’s worry dissolves. It is not confused to suggest
that a researcher could (and perhaps should) adopt a precise prior, in order to incor-
porate her prior information in her inference or decision problem, despite not being
representable by a precise prior. Neither is it confused to suggest that this researcher
might not be rationally required to make comparative probability judgments that
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form a total order, as a result of adopting such a prior.
2.3 Rational Commitment
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent who adopts a precise prior p is committed
to making the following comparative judgments:
• She is committed to judging that X is more probable than Y if p(X) > p(Y ).
• She is committed to judging that data D provides positive incremental support
for H if pD(H) > p(H).
• She is committed to judging that action A is preferable to B if the expected
utility of A (from the perspective of p) is greater than the expected utility of B
(from the perspective of p).
This bit of orthodoxy is implausible, however. To show this, I will first identify some
pro tanto reason to expect it to be false (in §2.3-2.5). I will then turn to the main
argument argument against it (in §2.6-2.8).
We ought to expect the orthodoxy about rational commitment to be false because
it directs agents to ignore a great deal of information about the quality of their
evidence — in particular, the weight of their evidence — when making comparative
and qualitative judgments, judgments which not only have epistemic value in their
own right, plausibly, but also structure subsequent inquiry, and so have downstream
epistemic consequences. Reasonable agents, however, take all information about the
quality of their evidence into account for these purposes.
To see this, note that according to orthodoxy, whether p carries a commitment to
judging X  Y (that X is more plausible than Y ) depends exclusively on p(X) and
p(Y ). These probabilities, however, are merely the first moments of certain marginal
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distributions (they are expected values, viz., the expected objective probabilities of X
and Y , respectively); p(X) =
∑
i p(X|Hi) · p(Hi) =
∑
x x · p(QX = x), where QX = x
if and only if some theoretical hypothesis Hi with p(X|Hi) = x is true. (When
considering uncountably many theoretical hypotheses, p(X) =
∫ 1
0
x · fQX (x)dx, where
fQX is the density that defines the marginal distribution of QX .) And the higher
moments of these distributions (variance, skewness, etc.) plausibly reflect important
information about the quality of one’s evidence (in particular, the weight of one’s
evidence) for X and Y .
Figure 2.1: fQX and fQY , as well as their means,
p(X) and p(Y ).
Similarly, whether p carries a
commitment to judging that data
D provides incremental support for
X depends exclusively on p(X)
and p(X|D), according to the or-
thodox account. These probabili-
ties, however, are merely the first






x x · p(QX=x) and
pD(X) =
∑
i pD(X|Hi) · pD(Hi) =∑
x x · pD(VX = x), where VX = x if and only if some theoretical hypothesis Hi with
pD(X|Hi) = x is true.23 Again, the higher moments of these distributions plausibly
reflect important information about the quality (weight) of the evidence for X (before
and after learning D).
Finally, whether p carries a commitment to judging that A is preferable to B
depends exclusively on Expp(A) and Expp(B), according to orthodoxy. These expec-
tations, once more, are merely the first moments of certain marginal distributions;
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they are the (evidential, let’s suppose) expected utilities of A and B, respectively.
Expp(A) =
∑
w u(w) · pA(w) =
∑
x x · pA(u = x).24 The higher moments of these
distributions might reflect important information about the quality of one’s evidence
that A and B will produce good outcomes.
The general theme is this: for each type of comparative judgment JX,Y between
X and Y , the orthodox account of rational commitment says that there are certain
marginal distributions, f and f ′, that encode the information relevant for determining
whether p commits its bearer to making the judgment JX,Y . Moreover, that informa-
tion is encoded in a specific ‘spot’, so to speak, in f and f ′. It is encoded locally, we
might say, in the mean, or first moment of f and f ′, respectively. It is not encoded
globally, across all of the moments of f and f ′ (mean, variance, skewness, etc.). Call
this the locality thesis.
We ought to expect the locality thesis to be false. Information about the quality
of one’s evidence — in particular, the weight of one’s evidence — for X and Y , is
distributed across all of the moments of f and f ′ (mean, variance, skewness, etc.),
as we will see in §4. And such information is plausibly relevant for determining
whether and which comparative/qualitative judgments you are rationally committed
to making, in virtue of adopting p, as we will see in §2.5 and §2.6.
2.4 How Probabilities Reflect Weight
The weight of an agent’s total evidence for a proposition is a matter of “how much
relevant information the data contains, irrespective of which way it points” (Joyce
2005, 159). Keynes introduces the notion of weight as follows:
As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of the
probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as
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the new knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evi-
dence; but something seems to have increased in either case, — we have
a more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion. I express this
by saying that an accession of new evidence increases the weight of an
argument. New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an
argument, but it will always increase its ‘weight’. (Keynes 1921, 77)
To illustrate, consider Popper’s paradox of ideal evidence (Popper 1959, 425-7).
A bookie hands you a coin and offers you a bet. You have no prior evidence about
Figure 2.2: u and uD.
the coin’s bias. Before you decide
what to do, the bookie hits you
over the head and knocks you out.
When you come to, she reports
that she flipped it 1000 times, and
that it came up heads 500 ± 20
times. To take account of your
prior information (viz., none) in
your decision problem, you decide
to adopt the maximum entropy
prior u over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s bias. You then condition u on
your new data D.
After you receive your new data, you have weightier evidence about whether the
coin will come up heads on its next flip (and so weightier evidence about whether you
will make or lose money if you take the bookie’s bet). You have a “more substantial
basis upon which to rest [your] conclusion,” as Keynes says. But this is not reflected
in your probability for H (the proposition that the coin will come up heads on the
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next flip). Both your prior u(H) and posterior probability uD(H) equal 1/2 (right).25
Richard Jeffrey notes that while u and uD assign the same probability to H, they
nonetheless “assign different values to any proposition A(n) that asserts, concerning
n ≥ 2 distinct tosses, that all of them yield heads” (Jeffrey 1965, 184). For example,
u(A(6)) = 1/7 ≈ 0.143 and uD(A(6)) ≈ 0.016 ≈ 1/26. The reason: uD is much more
resilient than u, much more steadfast in the face of new data. This is reflected in the
fact that uD(H|X) is close to uD(H) for a wide range of potential new data items
X. For example, suppose that you are going to flip the coin 6 times. Let Hi be the
proposition that it comes up heads on the ith toss. Then we have uD(H1) = 1/2,
uD(H2|H1) ≈ 1/2, uD(H3|H1&H2) ≈ 1/2, etc. UD is resilient; conditioning on new
data — H1, H1&H2, H1&H2&H3, etc. — does not alter the probability of observing
a heads on the next flip very much. That is why uD(A(6)) = uD(H1&...&H6) =
uD(H1) · uD(H2|H1) · uD(H3|H1&H2) · ... · uD(H6|H1&...&H5) ≈ 1/26.
Skyrms sums up Jeffrey’s view as follows: “In a word, the ideal evidence” — ex-
tremely weighty evidence — “has changed not the probability of tails on toss a, but
rather the resiliency of the probability of tails on toss a” (Skyrms 1977, 707). The
characteristic effect of weighty evidence is to render one’s posterior resilient with re-
spect to new data. This is a matter of stabilizing its conditional probabilities (making
uD(H|X) close to uD(H) for a wide range of X). The important point to note, for
our purposes, is that while u’s unconditional probability for H depends exclusively






xdx=1/2 — its conditional
probabilities are a function of all of its moments (mean, variance, skewness, etc.).
To see this, compare the probability that u assigns to H conditional on D with the
probability that lower/higher variance beta priors assign (pictured left, next page),
for a range of data sequences D:
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Table 2.1: Conditional probabilities across priors of decreasing variance.
u: α = β = 1
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.83
b: α = β = 0.5
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.125
b∗: α = β = 10
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.01
D = H7T 3 uD(H) = 0.667 bD(H) = 0.682 b
∗
D(H) = 0.567
D = H5T 20 uD(H) = 0.222 bD(H) = 0.212 b
∗
D(H) = 0.333
D = H1T 49 uD(H) = 0.038 bD(H) = 0.029 b
∗
D(H) = 0.157
Figure 2.3: u, b and b∗.
The probability of H conditional on D
varies as you move from u to b to b∗,
despite the fact that the first moment
(mean) of each distribution is the same
(=0.5). How resilient these priors are
with respect to data sequences D, then,
depends not just on their first moments
(means), but on their higher moments
as well (variance, etc.). This means that
higher moments encode information about the weight of one’s evidence, on Jeffrey’s
view.
Joyce (2005) suggests that the characteristic effect of weight is somewhat different.
Weighty evidence for H tends to cause a prior p’s probabilities to “concentrate more
and more heavily on increasingly smaller subsets of chance hypotheses” (Joyce 2005,
167). On Joyce’s picture, this effect is measured roughly by how small the following




|f(B = x) · (x− p(H))2 − fD(B = x) · (x− pD(H))2|dx
(where f is the density that defines p). Importantly, f(B = x)·(x−p(H))2 tends to be
small if p concentrates probability on a small, connected subset of chance hypotheses
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(hypotheses about the coin’s bias, B = x). The reason: f(B = x) is quite small when
(x − p(H))2 is large; (x − p(H))2 is quite small when f(B = x) is large. Similarly,
fD(B = x) · (x − pD(H))2 tends to be small too. The upshot: wp(H,D) is close to
zero, for a wide range of data D.
The important point to note, for our purposes, is that wp(H,D) is a function of
p’s higher moments. To illustrate this, compare the values that this quantity takes
relative to the uniform prior u, as opposed to lower/higher variance beta priors b and
b∗, across a range of data sequences D:
Table 2.2: Joyce’s measure of weight across priors of decreasing variance.
u: α = β = 1
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.83
b: α = β = 0.5
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.125
b∗: α = β = 10
mean: 0.5
variance: 0.01
D = H7T 3 wu(H,D) = 0.078 wb(H,D) = 0.121 wb∗(H,D) = 0.007
D = H5T 20 wu(H,D) = 0.079 wb(H,D) = 0.121 wb∗(H,D) = 0.011
D = H1T 49 wu(H,D) = 0.083 wb(H,D) = 0.125 wb∗(H,D) = 0.012
Figure 2.4: A sequence of mean-
preserving spreads.
Joyce’s quantity w(H,D) varies as you
move from u to b to b∗, despite the fact that
the first moment (mean) of each distribu-
tion is the same (=1/2). The value of this
quantity depends not just on the first mo-
ments (means) of the respective priors, but
on their higher moments as well (variance,
etc.). This means that higher moments en-
code information about the weight of one’s
evidence on Joyce’s view as well.
There are various other accounts of how prior (and posterior) probabilities reflect
the weight of evidence. You might, for example, eschew quantitative measures of
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weight altogether. Instead, you might borrow something like the notion of a mean-
preserving spread from Machina and Rothschild (1990). Machina and Rothschild
introduce the notion as follows (1990, p. 233):
Intuitively, such a spread consists of moving probability mass from the
centre of a probability distribution to its tails in a manner which preserves
the expected value of the distribution.
You might then suggest that a prior p reflects weightier evidence for X than p′ if
p′’s marginal for X is a mean-preserving spread of p’s. If this is right, then again,
higher moments (variance, skewness, etc.) encode information about the weight of
one’s evidence.
Whether or not any one of these proposals is fully adequate is beside the point.
The point is just this: on any plausible account of how priors p reflect the weight of
one’s evidence — Jeffrey’s, Joyce’s, or some alternative account — information about
weight is not encoded ‘locally’, exclusively in p’s first moment (mean). It encoded
‘globally’, across all of p’s moments (mean, variance, skewness, etc.).
2.5 Decision-Making and the Weight of Evidence
Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, pp. 361-2) consider a case much like the following,
in order to illustrate the importance of the weight of one’s evidence for determining
which practical (comparative preferability) judgments she is committed to making.
Julie sits down to watch a tennis match between players 1 and 2. The players are
to play a fixed number N of games. At the outset, Julie has no information about
players 1 and 2 (does not know their strengths and weaknesses, their track records
against similar opponents, their present physical conditions, etc.). Her friend sits
down and offers her a bet B. B costs $45. But it pays out $100x, where x is the
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Figure 2.5: Prior distribution over
chance hypotheses ch(W1 = x) = y.
proportion of the N games that player 1
wins. So, if player 1 wins every game, B
pays out $100. If player 1 wins half of the
games, B pays out $50. If player 1 wins 1/4
of the games, B pays out $25, and so on.
Julie adopts some prior distribution p
over hypotheses ch(W1 = x) = y about the
chance that player 1 will win a certain pro-
portion x of the games, to take account of
her prior evidence (none) about player 1’s prospects for winning, for the purposes
of decision-making. She makes whatever judgment p (together with her desires u)
Figure 2.6: Prior distribution p over
utility hypotheses u = x conditional
on B.
commits her to making and chooses accord-
ingly. Suppose, for concreteness, that p is
the MaxEnt prior, that u($k) = k, and that
N = 18 (they are going to play 3 6-game sets).
So, for each x, her distribution over chance
hypotheses ch(W1 = x) = y is given by the
density fx(y) = 19e−19y (left), her prior prob-




fx(y)dy = 1/19, and her expected utilities
for accepting and declining, respectively, are
Expp(Accept B) =
∑18
i=0 p(W1 = i/18) · ((100i/18)− 45) = 5 and Expp(Reject B) = 0.
The upshot: accepting B is, according to her best estimate, preferable to the status
quo. So she accepts.
Julie then acquires new data D. She watches players 1 and 2 for an entire day,
and learns a great deal about their strengths and weaknesses, etc. She learns that
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Figure 2.7: Prior and posterior distribu-
tions over utility hypotheses u = x condi-
tional on B.
while player 1 has an excellent service
game, player 2 has an excellent return
game. While player 2 is very effective at
the net, player 1 has a very effective pass-
ing shot. They are very evenly matched.
The next day, she sits down to watch an-
other match. Her friend offers her bet B
again. In order to incorporate her new
data in her decision problem, Julie con-
ditions p on D. The result: pD is nearly
certain that players 1 and 2 have an even
chance of winning each game; pD concentrates probability largely on ch(W1 = x) = 1
if x ≈ 1/2 and largely on ch(W1 = x) = 0 if x 6≈ 1/2. This causes pD to concentrate
probability around W1 = 1/2, which in turn causes pD to concentrate probability
around on U=5.
Importantly, none of this is reflected in the expected utility of B (just as in Pop-
per’s paradox of ideal evidence). Julie’s prior expected utility for accepting bet B
is Expp(Accept B) =
∑18







 (1/2)18((100i/18)− 45) = 5.
So Julie’s best estimate of B’s utility remains unchanged (despite the fact that she
has much weightier evidence undergirding that estimate). According to Bayesian
orthodoxy, then, Julie ought to take bet B on day 2, after acquiring a wealth of new
data, if and only if she takes it on day 1, when she knows next to nothing about the
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players. “It seems, however, perfectly rational,” Gärdenfors and Sahlin say, “if... Julie
decides to bet on [the second day’s match], but not on [the first]” (Gärdenfors and
Sahlin 1982, 362).
The lesson of cases like this, Gärdenfors and Sahlin posit, is that “the amount and
quality of information which the decision maker has concerning the possible states
and outcomes of the decision situation in many cases is an important factor when
making the decision” (Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982, 362). Information about the
amount or weight of one’s evidence that an action/bet will produce good outcomes
is not, however, reflected in that action/bet’s expected utility. Julie’s expectations
remain constant as the weight of her evidence varies. If this is right, then locality is
wrong. Whether or not Julie is committed to judging Accept B preferable to Reject
B depends on more than just Expp(Accept B) and Expp(Reject B). It depends on
whatever ‘global’ properties of her prior encode information about the weight of her
evidence.
The Gärdenfors and Sahlin case provides pro tanto reason to expect locality to
be false (though certainly not conclusive reason; for an orthodox Bayesian response,
see Broome 1991, ch. 5). The Ellsberg paradox seems to provide similar reason. In
the Ellsberg paradox (1961, pp. 653-5), a friend offers you two pairs of bets, A/A∗
and B/B∗, on a random draw from an urn containing 90 balls. You know that 30
balls are yellow, and that the other 60 are either red or black. But you have no prior
information about the proportion of red to black. The bets pay out as follows:
Yellow Red Black
A $100 $0 $0
A∗ $0 $100 $0
B $100 $0 $100
B∗ $0 $100 $100
Table 2.3: Ellsberg problem payoff table.
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Many prima facie reasonable agents prefer A to A∗ and B∗ to B (Ellsberg 1961, 669).
This pattern of preferences, however, violates Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle. The
Sure-Thing Principle says that when you evaluate two options, you ought to ignore
alternatives in which they produce the same outcome. So you ought to prefer A to
A∗ if and only if you prefer B to B∗. According to Bayesian orthodoxy, however, any
precise prior commits you to preferences that satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle.
The lesson, Ellsberg imagines a respondent saying, is not that there is anything
wrong with adopting a precise prior, or that there is anything wrong with the pattern
of preferences. Rather, the lesson is this:
...having exploited knowledge, guess, rumor, assumption, advice, to arrive
at a final judgment [precise prior probabilities for the events on which
the utility of one’s alternative actions depends]... one can still stand back
from this process and ask: “How much, in the end, is all this worth? How
much do I really know about the problem? How firm a basis for choice,
for appropriate decision and action, do I have?” (Ellsberg 1961, 659-60).
And when the answers to these questions are, “It’s not worth much,” or “I don’t know
very much,” or “I don’t have a very firm basis for choice, for appropriate decision
and action,” rationality might not demand very much from you (Ellsberg 1961, 660).
You may not be rationally committed to aligning your preferences with your best
estimates of utility. Instead, you may be permitted to “search for additional grounds
for choice,” such as an action’s ‘security level’ (its minimum expected utility relative
to the priors not ruled out by your evidence; Ellsberg 1961, 662).
The Ellsberg case provides additional pro tanto reason to expect locality to be false
(though still not conclusive reason). It seems to highlight the fact that information
about the weight of one’s evidence is relevant for determining whether or not you are
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rationally committed to judging one action preferable to another. But, information
about the weight of one’s evidence that an action/bet will produce good outcomes is
not reflected in that action/bet’s expected utility. Again, if this is right, then locality
is wrong. Rational commitments (to make comparative preferability judgments, and
perhaps also other qualitative/comparative judgments, e.g., comparative probability
judgments) supervene on whatever ‘global’ properties of priors happen to encode
information about the weight of one’s evidence.
2.6 Rejecting Locality
2.6.1 The Main Argument
Bayesian orthodoxy about rational commitment is one example (the most plausible
example) of a ‘local’ account of rational commitment. Local accounts say that for
any type of comparative judgment JX,Y between X and Y , there are certain marginal
distributions, f and f ′, that encode the information relevant for determining whether
p commits its bearer to making the judgment JX,Y . Moreover, that information is en-
coded locally, in the mean, or first moment of f and f ′, respectively. Local accounts
of rational commitment, however, are implausible. So far, we have examined only
pro tanto reason to think this. In a nutshell, the reason is: locality renders ratio-
nal commitments insensitive to those features of priors (and posteriors) that encode
information about weight (the higher moments of f and f ′). But, the Gärdenfors
and Sahlin case, as well as the Ellsberg case, seem to suggest that this information
is important for determining whether and which comparative/qualitative judgments
you are committed to making.
The more definitive reason to reject the orthodox account of rational commitment
(and any other local account) is this:
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1. The orthodox account of rational commitment yields a particular inductive
policy I , or plan for making comparative and qualitative judgments in response
to new data.
2. No plausible account of rational commitment R yields an inductive policy I
that is strongly dominated by another policy I ∗, in the sense that (i) for any
prior p and context C, I ∗’s expected epistemic utility in C, relative to p, is at
least as great as I ’s, and (ii) for some prior p′ and context C ′, I ∗’s expected
epistemic utility in C ′, relative to p′, is strictly greater than I ’s.
3. The orthodox policy I is strongly dominated by another policy I ∗. (In fact,
any local policy is strongly dominated by I ∗.)
C The orthodox account of rational commitment is implausible.
Section 2.6 defends premise 2. Sections 2.7-2.8 defend premise 3.
2.6.2 Expected Epistemic Utility of Inductive Policies
Every account of rational commitment R corresponds to an inductive policy of the
following form: an agent who adopts a prior p in context C and receives new data D
should make exactly the comparative and qualitative judgments that pD commits her
to making in C, according to R (no more, no less). For example, the orthodox account
corresponds to the following policies for making comparative probability judgments
and judgments of incremental support, respectively:
I(p, C,D,X, Y ) =
 X  Y if pD(X) > pD(Y )X  Y otherwise
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• In words: if you adopt prior p in context C and receive new data D, judge that
X is more probable than Y if pD(X) is greater than pD(Y ); judge that X is no
more probable than Y otherwise.
IConfirmation(p, C,D,H) =

D incrementally confirms H if pD(H) > p(H)
D incrementally disconfirms H if pD(H) < p(H)
D is irrelevant to H otherwise
• In words: if you adopt prior p in context C, judge that new data D provides
positive (negative) incremental support for H if pD(H) is greater (less) than
p(H); judge that D is irrelevant otherwise.
Inductive policies have epistemic consequences, and so are evaluable in terms
of expected epistemic utility. Consider, for example, a policy IAccept for accept-
ing/rejecting theoretical hypotheses. Imagine that a doctor orders a test, in order to
adjudicate between hypotheses about the disorder underlying a patient’s symptoms
(blindness in her left eye, perhaps). On the basis of her data, the doctor accepts
hypothesis H (that her patient has an autoimmune disorder) while rejecting H ′ (that
she has a viral infection), in accordance with IAccept. Typically, then, she will order
certain kinds of follow-up tests. And these tests will put her in a better or worse
position vis-á-vis securing epistemically valuable opinions regarding the patient’s ex-
act disorder (multiple sclerosis, lupus, etc.) and related issues (which treatment will
be most effective). The epistemic value or utility of a state of opinion somehow
summarizes all of its epistemically laudable qualities: accuracy, explanatory power,
simplicity, and more. As Joyce (2009) notes, accuracy — which is a matter of how
close the state of opinion is to the truth — is central to the notion of epistemic value.
“Accuracy is the one epistemic value about which there can be no serious dispute: it
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must be reflected in any plausible epistemic scoring rule,” or epistemic utility function
(Joyce 2009, 267).26
States of acceptance or rejection are plausibly evaluable directly in terms of epis-
temic utility (not simply indirectly, in terms of the downstream effects that they have
on different types of opinions). Take, for example, a naïve, but illustrative version of
a more sophisticated proposal from Briggs et al. (2013). An agent either accepts or
rejects some hypotheses H1, ..., Hn. We represent her acceptance/rejection state by a
sequence s of 0s and 1s (‘0’ for reject, ‘1’ for accept). Then we can measure the inac-
curacy of her acceptance/rejection state via the Hamming distance d(s, s′) between
this sequence s and the ‘perfectly vindicated’ sequence s′ (the sequence of 0s and 1s
that give the truth-values of H1, ..., Hn). This amounts to measuring inaccuracy by
counting up the number of mistakes she makes (where she makes a mistake by either
accepting a false hypothesis or rejecting a true hypothesis).27 In contexts in which
accuracy is paramount, then, d(s, s′) gives a rough measure of the epistemic utility
of her acceptance/rejection state.
Given that acceptance/rejection states have epistemic utility scores relative to dif-
ferent worlds (and contexts, perhaps), different policies for accepting/rejecting theo-
retical hypotheses will have different expected epistemic utilities. If an agent adopts
some prior p over theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn in some context C, the expected










j p(Dj|Hi) · eu(I (p,Dj), Hi)
where I (p,Dj) is the set of acceptance/rejection judgments that I advises our
agent to make if she receives new data Dj in context C, and eu(I (p,Dj), Hi) is the
epistemic utility of making those judgments in C given that Hi is true.28 Imagine,
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for example, that a researcher adopts the uniform prior p over competing theoretical
hypotheses, H and H ′, so that p(H) = p(H ′) = 1/2. She performs an experiment
to adjudicate between H and H ′, which can yield one of two data items, D and D′.
The objective probabilities for receiving any datum are given by: p(D|H) = 0.7,
p(D′|H) = 0.3, p(D|H ′) = 0.3 and p(D′|H ′) = 0.7. Finally, the epistemic utility of
accepting (rejecting) when H is true (false) is as follows, let’s suppose:
Table 2.4: Epistemic payoff of accepting/rejecting/abstaining.
H true H ′ true
Accept H & Reject H ′ 1 −5
Accept H ′ & Reject H −5 1
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
Then the expected epistemic utility of the most sensible ‘total’ policy I , which says
accept H/reject H ′ if you receive D, and accept H ′/reject H if you receive D′, is
Expp(eu(I )) = (0.7) · (1) + (0.3) · (−5) = −0.8. (So, it turns out, the most sensible
total policy is not very sensible at all. Abstaining come what may has higher expected
epistemic utility, relative to p.)
Other sorts of comparative and qualitative judgments have epistemic consequences
as well. Consider comparative probability judgments, for example, which will be our
focus from here on out. Suppose that a doctor orders a test, in order to adjudicate be-
tween hypotheses about a patient’s disorder. On the basis of her data, she judges that
X is more probable than Y (e.g., that significant optic nerve demyelination/vision
loss is more probable than minor demyelination/vision loss). Typically, this will af-
fect how she structures subsequent inquiry. Perhaps she will not order the exact same
suite of follow-up tests that she would if she outright accepted X and rejected Y . Still,
she will likely focus her inquiry by ordering more tests aimed at probing hypotheses
that render X probable, and fewer tests aimed at probing hypotheses that render Y
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probable (e.g., by ordering a lumbar puncture, which tests for autoimmune diseases,
rather than blood work which tests for viral infections). This will put her in a better
or worse position vis-á-vis arriving at valuable (accurate, etc.) opinions regarding
the patient’s exact disorder (multiple sclerosis, lupus, etc.) and related issues (which
treatment will be most effective).
Comparative probability judgments are plausibly evaluable directly in terms of
epistemic utility as well (not simply indirectly, in terms of their downstream epistemic
effects). Here, for example, is a naïve version of a proposal from Fitelson (2013), which
is similar in many respects to that of Briggs et al. (2013). An agent makes various
comparative probability judgments between hypotheses H1, ..., Hn. We represent her
H1 ... Hn









comparative probability ordering  by an adjacency matrix
m; ‘1’ at the 〈Hi, Hj〉 node of the matrix indicates that she
judges Hi  Hj and ‘0’ indicates that she does not. Then
we can measure the inaccuracy of her comparative probability
ordering via the Kemeny distance d(m,m′) (analog of Hamming
distance for adjacency matrices) between this matrix m and
the ‘perfectly vindicated’ matrix m′, which has a ‘0’ at the
〈Hi, Hj〉 node of the matrix if Hi is true and Hj false, and a ‘1’
otherwise. This amounts to measuring inaccuracy by counting
up the number of mistakes she makes (where she makes a mistake if she judges
Hi  Hj with Hi true/Hj false, or fails to judge Hi  Hj in any other case). In
contexts in which accuracy is paramount, then, d(m,m′) gives a rough measure of
the epistemic utility of her comparative probability ordering. (In chapter 3, I discuss
a way of measuring the epistemic value of imprecise credal states, which provides
an alternative approach to measuring the epistemic value of comparative probability
orderings.)
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Given that comparative probability orderings have epistemic utility scores relative
to different worlds (and contexts), different policies for making comparative probabil-
ity judgments will have different expected epistemic utilities. Suppose, for example,
that we make a simplifying assumption of the following sort: the epistemic utility of
judging X more probable than Y is given by:
Table 2.5: Epistemic payoff of judging X  Y , or abstaining.
X&Y X&¬Y ¬X&Y ¬X&¬Y
X  Y eu1 eu2 eu3 eu4
Abstain from judgment eu5 eu5 eu5 eu5
or perhaps:
Table 2.6: Epistemic payoff of judging X  Y , or abstaining.
ch(X) ≤ ch(Y ) ch(X) > ch(Y )
X  Y eu∗1 eu∗3
Abstain from judgment eu∗2 eu∗2
with eu∗1 > eu∗2 > eu∗3. It does not matter much which simplifying assumption we
make. The results that we obtain in §2.7-2.8 are fairly robust. But it will be helpful
to have some numbers to work with. I will opt for the latter, simpler assumption.
In contexts in which the epistemic utilities are as described in table 2.6, the
orthodox inductive policy I for making comparative probability judgments, namely:
I (p,D) =
 X  Y if pD(X) > pD(Y )X  Y otherwise
will typically have lower expected epistemic utility than various other policies I ∗,
from the perspective of a range of different priors (mutatis mutandis for any other
‘local’ policy).
To illustrate, suppose that a bookie hands you a coin and offers you a bet. You
have no prior evidence about the coin’s bias. But the bookie allows you to flip the coin
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for awhile — 25 times, for example — prior to deciding whether or not to take the
bet. To take account of your prior information (viz., none) in your decision problem,
you decide to adopt the maximum entropy prior u over hypotheses B = x about the








 · xk · (1− x)25−k · eu(I (u,HkT 25−k), B = x)dx
where D = HkT 25−k is any sequence of k heads and 25-k tails.29 For concreteness,
suppose that the epistemic utilities are given by the following table (see the appendix
for discussion of this particular assignment of epistemic utilities):
Table 2.7: Epistemic payoff of judging Heads  Tails, Heads  Tails, or abstaining.
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads  Tails 1 −5
Heads  Tails −5 1
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
Then the expected epistemic utility of I is Expu(eu(I )) = 0.535057. Now note
that I prescribes judging that heads on the next toss is more probable than tails
whenever k ≥ 13 (whenever you flip more heads than tails on your first 25 tosses), and
prescribes judging the opposite — that tails is more probable than heads — whenever
k < 13. Compare I with the policy I ∗ that prescribes (i) judging that heads is more
probable than tails if k ≥ 15, (ii) abstaining from judgment if 11 ≤ k ≤ 14, and (iii)
judging that tails is more probable than heads if k ≤ 10. One might expect I ∗
to have a higher expected epistemic utility than I , since it directs you to ‘hedge
your epistemic bets’ by abstaining from judgment when there’s significant risk (from
u’s perspective) of making a judgment with deleterious epistemic consequences. And
indeed Expu(eu(I ∗)) = 0.627876.
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This is the first step in seeing that the orthodox policy I is strongly dominated
by another policy. If some other policy both (i) weakly dominates I (has at least as
great an expected epistemic utility in every context, relative to every prior), and (ii)
yields the same verdicts in cases like this, then that policy strongly dominates I . In
the next section, I identify exactly such a policy.
We ought to pause here, before proceeding, to say why accounts of rational com-
mitment that yield strongly dominated inductive policies are implausible. The reason
is: it ought to be possible to (i) make every comparative and qualitative judgment
that you are rationally committed to making (in virtue of adopting a prior p and
receiving new data D in context C), (ii) abstain from judgment when you are not
so committed, and (iii) not contravene your best estimates (expectations), i.e., not
make comparative and qualitative judgments that are, according to p’s best estimates
(expectations), epistemically inferior to some other set of judgments that you might
have made. Whatever else is true about what you are positively committed to (in
terms of making comparative/qualitative judgments), in virtue of adopting p, it is
open to you (rationally permissible), one would think, to make exactly the judgments
that you are committed to making (whatever they happen to be) without flouting
your own best estimates. This is a bedrock fact about epistemic rationality, I posit.
Any account of rational commitment that says otherwise — e.g., any account that
yields a strongly dominated inductive policy — is mistaken.30
2.7 Proceeding Without Locality
2.7.1 Globalism
Let’s take stock. Imprecise Bayesians say that less than maximally specific evidence
at least permits (and perhaps positively requires) less than maximally specific (merely
78
partial) opinions, or comparative/qualitative judgments. But adopting a precise prior
commits you to a total comparative probability ordering, total preference ordering,
etc. So when your evidence is unspecific, you should not adopt a precise prior. You
should adopt an imprecise prior instead. Imprecise priors, unlike precise priors, permit
merely partial comparative and qualitative judgments.
We will see, however, that adopting a precise prior only seems to commit you
to maximally specific opinions, or comparative/qualitative judgments, because of
Bayesian orthodoxy about rational commitment, viz., that an agent who adopts a
precise prior p is committed to judging:
• ...that X is more probable than Y if p(X) > p(Y ).
• ...that data D provides positive incremental support for H if pD(H) > p(H).
• ...that action A is preferable to B if the expected utility of A (relative to p) is
greater than the expected utility of B (relative to p).
This bit of orthodoxy is implausible. I examined some pro tanto reason to think
this in §2.3-2.5. The more definitive reason, though, to reject the orthodox account
of rational commitment is that it encodes an inductive policy I that is strongly
dominated by another policy I ∗.
The final example in §2.6 shows that I has suboptimal expected epistemic utility
in certain contexts (those in which table 2.7 describes the relevant epistemic utili-
ties), relative to certain priors (the MaxEnt prior). But it does not show that there
is a plausible, non-orthodox account of rational commitment which yields a better
inductive policy I ∗, in the following sense: (i) I ∗ does at least as well (in terms of
expected epistemic utility) as I in every context, relative to every prior, and (ii) I ∗
does strictly better in some contexts, relative to some priors. It does not show that
I is strongly dominated.
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My aim now is to identify such an account. I plan to construct a theory of rational
commitment that takes seriously the moral from §2.5: even when you adopt a precise
prior, the weight of your evidence is relevant for determining whether and which
comparative/qualitative judgments you are rationally committed to making. I will
then show that this account yields an inductive policy I ∗ that strongly dominates
the orthodox policy I .
To see how we might construct such a theory, recall that on the orthodox account,
whether p carries a commitment to judging X  Y depends exclusively on p(X) and
p(Y ). These probabilities, however, are merely the first moments of certain marginal
distributions (they are expected values, viz., the expected objective probabilities of
X and Y , respectively); p(X) =
∑
i p(X|Hi) · p(Hi) =
∑
x x · p(QX = x), where
QX = x if and only if some theoretical hypothesis Hi with p(X|Hi) = x is true.




where fQX is the density that defines the marginal distribution of QX .
The characteristic effect of weight is to cause probabilities to concentrate more
and more heavily on increasingly smaller, typically connected subsets of theoretical
hypotheses. Weighty evidence for X causes fQX to become increasingly ‘peaked’;
likewise, weighty evidence for Y causes fQY to become increasingly ‘peaked’. As
a result, relative to any reasonable distance function d on the space of probability
densities, the distance between fQX and fQY , d(fQX , fQY ), approaches the distance
between p(X) and p(Y ). Accordingly, d(fQX , fQY )/ |p(X)− p(Y )| approaches 1.
One way to render rational commitments sensitive to those features of priors
(and posteriors) that encode information about weight is to tie them quantities like
d(fQX , fQY )/|p(X)−p(Y )|. This quantity is determined by all of the higher moments
of fQX and fQY , which is where information about weight lives. This is the option we
will explore here. In particular, the proposal is this: an agent who adopts a precise
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prior p is committed to to judging that X is more plausible than Y if (i) p(X) > p(Y )
and (ii) 1− ε < d(fQX , fQY )/|p(X)− p(Y )| < 1+ ε, for some contextually determined
Figure 2.9: A range of distributions which
concentrate probability more and more heav-
ily on smaller and smaller subsets of theoret-
ical hypotheses.
threshold ε > 0 (for discussion of
ε, see §2.8).31 (Or a bit more gen-
erally, an agent who adopts a pre-
cise prior p is committed to to judg-
ing that X is more plausible than
Y if (i) p(X) > p(Y ) and (ii)
〈d(fQX , fQY ), |p(X)− p(Y )|〉 satisfies
a contextually determined constraint
C , where C is either of the form 1 −
ε < d(fQX , fQY )/|p(X)−p(Y )| < 1+ε,
or is the limit of a series of such con-
straints, e.g., the trivial constraint,
satisfied by all pairs 〈x, y〉. This gen-
eralization will be important later.) Call this the globalist thesis.
Like Bayesian orthodoxy, this view holds that for any type of comparative judg-
ment JX,Y between X and Y , there are certain marginal distributions, f and f ′,
that encode the information relevant for determining whether p commits its bearer
to making the judgment JX,Y . But unlike Bayesian orthodoxy, this view holds that
this information is encoded globally, across all of the moments of f and f ′ (mean,
variance, skewness, etc.).
2.7.2 An Illustration: Resolving the Preclusion Problem
Imagine that you are at a horse race. A bookie offers you one of three bets. You
can either bet that Goldencents will beat a certain time T , or that Itsmyluckday
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will beat time T , or that Pataky Kid will beat time T . At the outset, you have
no relevant information about the three horses. To take account of your prior in-
formation (viz., none) in your decision problem, you decide to adopt the maximum
entropy prior u over hypotheses ch(Horse X beats time T) = x about the chance that
Goldencents/Itsmyluckyday/Pataky kid beats time T .
You then ask a friend to pull some strings. She gets you into some practice sessions.
You attend N independent runs for each horse, and observe that Goldencents (GC )
beats time T a total of a times, Itsmyluckyday (IMLD) beats it b times, and Pataky
kid (PK ) beats it c times. Call this new data ‘D’. Next week, the bookie offers you
the three bets again. To incorporate your new data in your decision problem, you
condition u on D. The result:
Table 2.8: Posterior probabilities that GC/IMLD/PK beats time T .
uD(GC beats T) uD(IMLD beats T) uD(PK beats T)
Case 1 : N = 5, a = 4,
b = 3, c = 1 0.714 0.571 0.286
Case 2 : N = 47, a = 34,
b = 27, c = 13 0.714 0.571 0.286
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, you are committed to the same total compar-
ative probability ordering  in either case. You are committed to judging (i) that
Goldencents is more likely to beat time T than Itsmyluckyday (IMLD ≺ GC), (ii)
that Goldencents is more likely to beat T than Pataky kid (PK ≺ GC), (iii) that
Itsmyluckyday is more likely to beat T than Pataky kid (PK ≺ IMLD), and so on.
PK ≺ IMLD IMLD ≺ GC PK ≺ GC
¬GC ≺ GC ¬IMLD ≺ IMLD PK ≺ ¬PK
According to the globalist thesis, however, uD only commits you to making a
comparative probability judgment between X and Y when it reflects weighty enough
82
evidence for X and Y to make it the case that 1− ε < d(fQX , fQY )/|p(X)− p(Y )| <
Figure 2.10: Cramer-von Mises distance.
1 + ε. (Again, for more on ε, see
§2.8.) When it does not reflect sufficiently
weighty evidence, uD simply does not com-
mit you to making a comparative probabil-
ity judgments between X and Y one way
or the other. It permits you to not take a
stand on the matter.
Deza and Deza (2009) survey a wide
range of distance functions on the space
of probability densities. For concreteness, I focus on one in particular. I let
d(fQX , fQY ) be the Cramer-von Mises distance between fQX and fQY , which we de-





C specifies the distance between densities f and g as a function of the area between
their corresponding cumulative distribution functions, F and G (counting regions of
smaller divergence for less and regions of greater divergence for more; pictured left).32
(It is the squared L2 metric between F and G.) It is attractive because (i) it is an
analogue of squared Euclidean distance on the space of probability densities, and
(ii) it yields the correct verdict about comparative closeness in those cases where
obviously correct answers are to be had.33
In cases 1 and 2, you arrive at the same posterior truth-value estimates for
the various propositions of interest: that Goldencents/Itsmyluckyday/Pataky kid
will beat time T . But you have much weightier evidence undergirding your es-
timates in case 2. You have a firmer basis for making comparative and quali-
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tative judgments, both doxastic and practical. This is reflected in the value of
the quantity d(fX|D, fY |D)/|uD(X) − uD(Y )| (where fX|D is the marginal density
of uD over hypotheses ch(Horse X beats time T) = x about the chance that Golden-
cents/Itsmyluckyday/Pataky beats time T ). For illustrative purposes, let ε = 0.52.
So uD only commits you to judging that horse X is likelier to beat time T than
horse Y (or vice versa) when it reflects weighty enough evidence for the propositions
Horse X will beat T and Horse Y will beat T, respectively, to make it the case that
d(fX|D, fY |D)/|uD(X)− uD(Y )| ∈ [0.48, 1.52]. Now compare:







Case 1 : N = 5, a = 4,
b = 3, c = 1 = 0.245 6∈ [.48, 1.52] = 0.6 ∈ [.48, 1.52] = 0.443 6∈ [.48, 1.52]
Case 2 : N = 47, a = 34,
b = 27, c = 13 = 0.511 ∈ [.48, 1.52] = 0.832 ∈ [.48, 1.52] = 0.736 ∈ [.48, 1.52]
In case 1, your posterior uD reflects insufficiently weighty evidence to commit you to
a total comparative probability ordering. It commits you to a merely partial order.
It permits you to not take a stand on some matters, to not make a judgment about
the comparative probability of X and Y , for certain X and Y . It does commit you
to making the following judgments:
PK ≺ GC, ¬GC ≺ GC, PK ≺ ¬PK
But it does not commit you to making other judgments: that Goldcents is definitely
likelier to beat time T than Itsmyluckyday (or vice versa); that Itsmyluckyday is
definitely likelier to beat T than Pataky kid (or vice versa); that Itsmyluckyday is
likelier than not to beat T (or vice versa).
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((((
(((hhhhhhhPK  IMLD (((((
((hhhhhhhIMLD  GC (((((
((hhhhhhhGC  IMLD
(((
((((hhhhhhhIMLD  PK (((((
((((hhhhhhhhh¬IMLD  IMLD (((((
((((hhhhhhhhhIMLD  ¬IMLD
In case 2, however, your posterior uD reflects sufficiently weighty evidence to commit
you to a total comparative probability ordering. In case 2, you are committed to
making exactly the same judgments, on both the globalist and localist (orthodox)
accounts.
This highlights how flexible precise priors are. If the globalist account of ratio-
nal commitment is right, then precise priors do indeed allow for partial comparative
probability orderings (as well as partial preference orderings, etc.). In that case, we
ought to rethink the central epistemic motivation for imprecise Bayesianism. Impre-
cise Bayesians say, “You ought to adopt imprecise priors, in certain circumstances
— in particular, when your prior evidence is unspecific or equivocal — because they
allow for unspecific opinions; they allow for partial comparative and qualitative judg-
ments. Precise priors do not.” But precise priors do allow for unspecific and equivocal
opinions in a wide range of evidential circumstances, on the globalist account; they
do allow for partial comparative and qualitative judgments.
2.8 A Rationale for Globalism
The globalist inductive policy strongly dominates the orthodox policy (and any other
‘local’ policy), I hope to show. This provides good epistemic reason to reject Bayesian
orthodoxy about rational commitment (and any other ‘local’ account).
To illustrate, imagine one more time that a bookie hands you a coin. She offers
you a bet. You have no prior evidence about the coin’s bias. The bookie allows you
to flip the coin 25 times before deciding whether or not to take the bet. You adopt
the maximum entropy prior u over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s bias. The
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epistemic utilities are given by:
Table 2.10: Epistemic payoff of judging Heads  Tails, Heads  Tails, or abstaining.
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads  Tails 1 −5
Heads  Tails −5 1
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
The globalist inductive policy is built out of policies Ix of the form: if you adopt
a prior p and receive new data D, make exactly the comparative and qualitative
judgments that pD commits you to making, given ε = x (according to globalism). In
particular, Ix says: judge that X is more plausible than Y , iff (i) pD(X) > pD(Y )
and (ii) 1 − x < d(fVX |D, fVY |D)/|pD(X) − pD(Y )| < 1 + x. (Recall, VX = x if and
only if some theoretical hypothesis Hi with pD(X|Hi) = x is true; fVX |D is the density
that defines the marginal distribution of VX conditional on D.) In our coin flipping
case, then, the expected epistemic utility of Ix is:
Table 2.11: Expected epistemic utility of Ix from the perspective of u.
x = 0 x = 0.2 x = 0.4 x = 0.6 x = 0.8 x = 1
Expu(eu(Ix)) −0.5 0.305 0.588 0.628 0.615 0.535
Figure 2.11: Expu(eu(Ix)).
The globalist inductive policy I ∗ says:
if you adopt prior p in context of inquiry
C, and receive new data D, make the com-
parative/qualitative judgments that Ix pre-
scribes making, for whichever x maximizes
expected epistemic utility Expu(eu(Ix)) in
C. In the case at hand (coin flipping, epis-
temic utilities as per above), Expu(eu(Ix))
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takes a maximum at x = 0.52 (right).34 So the globalist inductive policy I ∗ is just
I0.52 in this context. And I0.52 recommends the following:
I0.52(u,D,Heads,Tails) =

Heads  Tails if D = HkT 25−k for some k > 14
Heads ≺ Tails if D = HkT 25−k for some k < 11
Abstain from judgment otherwise
By construction, the globalist inductive policy I ∗ has at least as great an expected
epistemic utility (from u’s perspective) as any policy Ix. But there are, of course,
various policies not of the form Ix. An inductive policy is just a function:
I (p,D,X, Y ) =

X  Y if condition C1 obtains
X  Y if condition C2 obtains
Abstain from judgment otherwise
The policy that directs you to judge that heads is more probable than tails come what
may, for example, is not equivalent to any Ix. (No Ix advises an agent who adopts
the uniform prior u to judge that heads is more probable than tails in response to
D = H0T 25.)
It would be nice if I ∗ maximized expected epistemic utility in any context of
inquiry, relative to all other inductive policies (not just policies of the form Ix).
Fortunately, it is easy to check that this is so, at least in simple enough contexts.35
For example, when the epistemic utilities are given by our usual table:
Table 2.12: Old ‘conservative’ payoff matrix.
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads  Tails 1 −5
Heads  Tails −5 1
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
and n = 8 (you flip the coin a total of 8 times), then Expu(eu(I ∗)) = 0.349609, which
standard optimization techniques show to be a global maximum (maximum relative
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to all inductive policies). Similarly, if n = 10, then Expu(eu(I ∗)) = 0.414062, which
again is a global maximum.
If we consider a different context, in which the epistemic utilities are given by:
Table 2.13: New ‘liberal’ payoff matrix.
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads ≤ Tails 5 −1
Heads > Tails −1 5
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
then Expu(eu(Ix)) takes a maximum at x = 1. So the globalist inductive policy I ∗
is just I1 in this context. And I1 recommends the following:
I1(u,D,Heads,Tails) =
 Heads  Tails if D = H
kT n−k for some k ≥ n/2
Heads ≺ Tails if D = HkT n−k for some k < n/2
So, in this context, the globalist policy and local orthodox policy make the same
recommendations. Once more, it is easy to check that I ∗ has at least as great an
expected epistemic utility (from u’s perspective) as any other inductive policy. If
n = 8, then Expu(eu(I ∗)) = 4.17969. Standard optimization techniques show that
this is a global maximum. No other inductive policy has a higher expected epistemic
utility in this context. Similarly, if n = 10, then Expu(eu(I ∗)) =0.426172, which
again is a global maximum.
These examples by no means show that globalism is the uniquely plausible account
of rational commitment. They do not show that there is no other principled, non-
orthodox account which yields a better inductive policy, a policy I ∗∗ that strongly
dominates I ∗. For all I have said, there could be another policy I ∗∗ that agrees
with I ∗ in the two contexts considered here, but does strictly better in various other
contexts.
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My aim, however, is not to show that globalism is the uniquely plausible account
of rational commitment. Rather, my aim is to identify good epistemic reason to
reject the orthodox (localist) account of rational commitment, and to leverage this to
resolve the preclusion problem.
These illustrative examples suffice for this purpose. The reason: by construction,
I ∗ weakly dominates I . Proof: the orthodox policy I is just the degenerate policy
Itrivial. That is, I says: judge that X is more plausible than Y if and only if
(i) pD(X) > pD(Y ) and (ii)
〈
d(fVX |D, fVY |D), |pD(X)− pD(Y )|
〉
satisfies the trivial
constraint, i.e., the constraint satisfied by all pairs 〈x, y〉. And in any context C, I ∗
is just Ix, for whatever Ix is such that Expu(eu(·)) takes a maximum at Ix in C. So,
in any context in which I maximizes expected epistemic utility, I ∗ just is Itrivial,
which just is I . By construction, then, there is no context in which I has higher
expected epistemic utility (from u’s perspective) than I ∗. In addition, our illustrative
examples show that there are contexts in which I ∗ has strictly higher expected
epistemic utility (from u’s perspective) than I . Hence, I ∗ strongly dominates I .
This provides good epistemic reason to reject Bayesian orthodoxy about rational
commitment (and any other ‘local’ account). Moreover, the contexts C described
above are ones in which no other inductive policy has greater expected epistemic
utility (from u’s perspective) than I ∗. So the true account of rational commitment
R, then — whatever it turns out to be — will agree with the globalist account in
C, and hence make rational commitments sensitive to those features of priors (and
posteriors) that encode information about weight (higher moments) in C (though
perhaps not in exactly the way the globalist account proposes). Plausibly, then, R
will make rational commitments sensitive to those features more generally (unless the
correct account of rational commitment is a gerrymandered mess).
If this is right, then the big take-home lesson is this: there is plausibly no preclusion
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problem for precise Bayesianism. Adopting a precise prior does not commit you
to having perfectly precise opinions. It does not invariably commit you to making
comparative and qualitative judgments that form total orders. The true account
of rational commitment — whatever it turns out to be — will say: a wide range of
precise priors carry commitments to merely partial comparative probability orderings,
preference orderings, etc., in a wide range of contexts.
Of course, this does not mean that there are no good epistemic reasons to employ
imprecise priors. It just means that we should not look to the preclusion problem
to furnish those reasons. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I search for new
epistemic reasons to employ imprecise priors, for a new epistemic foundation for
imprecise Bayesianism.
2.9 Conclusion
I have argued that adopting a precise prior does not invariably commit you to a total
comparative probability ordering, preference ordering, etc. A wide range of precise
priors carry commitments to merely partial comparative probability orderings, etc.,
in a wide range of contexts. The proper motivation for introducing imprecise priors,
then, is not they are required in order to avoid overly specific posterior states of
opinion. To recap, the main argument goes as follows:
1. The globalist account of rational commitment, or something similar, is plausibly
true. The orthodox account is implausible.
2. If the globalist account of rational commitment, or something similar, is true,
then a wide range of precise priors carry commitments to merely partial com-
parative probability orderings (and preference orderings, etc.).
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3. If a wide range of precise priors carry commitments to merely partial orderings,
then they do not invariably capture improper responses to unspecific evidence.
C. Plausibly, then, precise priors do not invariably capture improper responses to
unspecific evidence.
The defense of premise 1 comes in two parts. The first part goes as follows:
1′ Every account of rational commitment R corresponds to an inductive policy
of the form: an agent who adopts a prior p in context C and receives new
data D should make exactly the comparative and qualitative judgments that
pD commits her to making in C, according to R.
2′ No plausible account of rational commitment R yields an inductive policy I
that is strongly dominated by another policy I ∗, in the sense that (i) for any
prior p and context C, I ∗’s expected epistemic utility in C, relative to p, is at
least as great as I ’s, and (ii) for some prior p′ and context C ′, I ∗’s expected
epistemic utility in C ′, relative to p′, is strictly greater than I ’s.
3′ The orthodox account of rational commitment yields an inductive policy I
that is strongly dominated by the globalist policy I ∗.
C ′ The orthodox account of rational commitment is implausible.
The second part:
1′′ For some priors p and contexts C, the globalist policy’s I ∗’s expected epistemic
utility in C, relative to p, is at least as great as any other policy’s expected
epistemic utility.
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2′′ The true account of rational commitment R, then, will agree with the globalist
account in contexts C, and hence make rational commitments sensitive to those
features of priors (and posteriors) that encode information about weight (higher
moments) in C (though perhaps not in exactly the way the globalist account
proposes).
3′′ Plausibly, then, R will make rational commitments sensitive to those features
more generally (unless the correct account of rational commitment is a gerry-
mandered mess).
C ′′ So the globalist account of rational commitment, or something similar, is plau-
sibly true.
If correct, this seems to undercut the central epistemic motivation for imprecise
Bayesianism. At a minimum, it provides impetus to search for new epistemic foun-
dations for imprecise Bayesianism. I conclude by raising a few additional questions
to be addressed in future research.
• We specified the globalist thesis using one particular distance function on the
space of probability densities, viz., Cramer-von Mises distance. Are our results
robust across a range of metrics, e.g., the Lévy metric? the Lp metrics?
• We suggested that we might be able to measure the inaccuracy of an agent’s
comparative probability ordering  over hypotheses H1, ..., Hn at a world w
by representing  as an adjacency matrix m, and taking the Kemeny distance
d(m,m′) between this matrix m and the ‘perfectly vindicated’ matrix m′ at w.
In contexts in which accuracy is paramount, then, d(m,m′) might provide a
rough measure of the epistemic utility of . But is this really the right way
to think about the epistemic utility of a comparative probability ordering at a
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world? What are the alternatives? What exactly are the relevant desiderata
for deciding between alternatives? I address some of these questions in the final
chapter of my dissertation.
• The globalist account ties rational commitments vis-á-vis comparative proba-
bility to a particular quantity, d(fQX , fQY )/|p(X)− p(Y )|, which reflects infor-
mation about the weight of the evidence that the prior p summarizes. What
other quantities might an alternative account tie such commitments to? What
reasons are there to prefer the globalist quantity to these other quantities, or
vice versa?
• How far can standard optimization techniques take us toward proving that the
globalist inductive policy I ∗ is non-undermining, in the following sense: for
any prior p and context C, I ∗’s expected epistemic utility in C, relative to p,
is at least as great as that of any other inductive policy?
Notes
18Bayesians, of course, agree about much more than this. They agree, for example, that any rea-
sonable distributions p and q agree on the likelihoods or direct inference probabilities that H1, ...,Hn
specify for the potential experimental data sequences D (p(D|Hi) = q(D|Hi), though p and q might
disagree on the unconditional probability of various Hi (p(Hi) 6= q(Hi); cf. Hawthorne 1994). They
also disagree certain issues, e.g., which quantitative confirmation judgments an agent who adopts a
prior p is committed to making.
19If, for example, an agent’s comparative probability judgments between competing theoretical
hypotheses satisfy Scott’s axiom (read ‘X ≤ Y ’ as hypothesis Y is at least as plausible as hypothesis
X), and are also rich enough to satisfy some additional structural axioms (completeness: X ≤ Y or
X > Y for all X and Y ; non-atomicity: for any X such that X > X&¬X, there is a Y such that
X&Y > X&¬X and X&¬Y > X&¬X), then those comparative judgments ‘pin down’ a precise
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prior, in the following sense: there is a unique probability distribution p that represents them, i.e.,
is such that Hi ≤ Hj only if p(Hi) ≤ p(Hj) (cf, Scott 1964, p. 246; Joyce 2011, p. 285).
Scott’s Axiom. If 〈X1, ..., Xn〉 and 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉 contain the same number of truths as a




i w(Yi) for any world w, then it is not true that
Xi ≤ Yi for all i while Xj < Yj for some j.
In that case, according to the subjective Bayesian, she ought to adopt this unique probability p as
her prior (use p to facilitate inference and decision-making).
20See Kyburg 1996, p. 326.
21Non-atomicity: for any X such that X > X&¬X, there is a Y such that X&Y > X&¬X and
X&¬Y > X&¬X.
22Having or being representable by a set of probability distributions S is a matter of having
opinions that make it impermissible to estimate truth-values via any p not in S.
23When considering uncountably many theoretical hypotheses, pD(X) =
∫ 1
0
x · fVX |D(x)dz, where
fVX |D is the density that defines the marginal distribution of VX conditional on D.
24When considering uncountably many theoretical hypotheses, Expp(A) =
∫ 1
0
x · fu|A(x)dz, where
fu|A is the density that defines the marginal distribution of u conditional on A.
25Your prior probability is u(H) =
∫ 1
0
f(H|B = x) · f(B = x)dx =
∫ 1
0
xdx = 1/2 (where f is the




fD(H|B = x) · fD(B = x)dx =
∫ 1
0





 (x)k(1− x)1000−k = 1/2.
26For discussion about features of epistemic utility beyond accuracy, see Maher 1993, ch. 9, and
Joyce 1998, 2009.
27See Deza and Deza 2009 for a catalog of distance functions that one might employ in constructing
accuracy measures for acceptance/rejection states.
28Note that the expected epistemic utility of I , from the perspective of p, is just p’s best estimate
of the objective expected utility of I .
29I assume that u treats any sequence of outcomes as exchangeable.
30For related discussion, see Gibbard 2008, p. 4, and Joyce 2009, p. 277.
31This proposal extends straightforwardly to other comparative judgments, e.g., judgments of
comparative preferability, and qualitative judgments, e.g., judgments of incremental support.
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32The cumulative distribution function P corresponding to a distribution f over chance hypotheses
(defined by density f) is defined by P (ch(X) ≤ x) =
∫ x
0
f(y)dy, and specifies the probability that
the chance of X is less than or equal to x.
33For example, for any beta densities f , g and h, if they all have the same mean but increasing
variance, then f is closer to g than to h. Similarly, if they all have the same variance but larger and
larger means, then f is closer to g than to h.
34Of course, Expu(eu(Ix)) does not take a unique minimum at x = 0.52. But this is to be
expected, since in the relevant context, Ix = Iy for any x, y ∈ [0.52, 0.61].
35When an experiment has a small enough outcome space, we can simply examine the expected
epistemic utility of every possible policy for responding to the experimental data, and check that the






When a doctor, or an engineer, or a scientist performs an experiment or test to
adjudicate between competing theoretical hypotheses, or firm up her grounds for
decision-making, she typically comes to the table with a great deal of relevant prior
information. Any competent neurologist who is trying to diagnose a patient’s disease,
and settle on an appropriate treatment plan, not only has newly acquired clinical data
— the results of blood tests, a lumbar puncture, etc. — but also an enormous amount
of prior data: information about which symptoms correlate with which diseases, how
those symptoms are caused, which treatments are most effective for which purposes,
and so on. Obviously, it is imperative to take such prior information into account
when making an inference or decision. To fail to do so is, as Jaynes says, “to commit
the most obvious inconsistency of reasoning and may lead to absurd or dangerously
misleading results” (Jaynes 1968, 1).
Unfortunately, finding a well-motivated, practically useful method for taking prior
information into account is difficult. Prior information tends to be incredibly multi-
farious and complex. Precise Bayesians argue that the best method for incorporating
prior evidence E in decision and inference problems is to specify a ‘prior’ probability
distribution p over the competing hypotheses H1, ..., Hn which somehow summarizes
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the information in E. We can think of these probabilities as estimates of the truth-
values of H1, ..., Hn which (i) satisfy constraints imposed by E while intuitively (ii)
going no further than those constraints require. Imprecise Bayesians, such as Richard
Jeffrey, Mark Kaplan, Peter Walley and Jim Joyce agree that an agent ought to take
her prior evidence into account by adopting a ‘prior’ which summarizes it. But they
disagree that priors should, in all circumstances, take the form of a single, precise
probability distribution. Certain circumstances, they say, call for imprecise priors.
In certain circumstances, you ought to use a set of distributions over H1, ..., Hn to
incorporate your prior information. Like precise distributions, sets of distributions
encode information about your prior evidence E. But a set of distributions encodes
less information than any distribution in that set. It encodes only the information
that is invariant across all elements of the set. The determinate properties of an
imprecise prior (or posterior) S are just the properties that all of the distributions in
that set S share in common.
Certain subjectivist proponents of imprecise probabilities say that an agent ought
to look to her own opinions to furnish priors. And in many circumstances, an agent’s
actual actual prior opinions fail to pin down a single truth-value estimate for each of
the theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn under investigation (cf. Kyburg and Pittarelli
1996, 325). When they do, on the subjectivist view, she ought to adopt the set S of
distributions p over H1, ..., Hn that are consistent with her prior opinions.
Joyce, Walley and others argue that there are more compelling reasons to adopt
imprecise priors. Joyce contends that precise priors fail to adequately summarize
certain kinds of evidence — in particular, unspecific and equivocal evidence. We
need imprecise priors to summarize such evidence. Here is Joyce:
...the proper response to symmetrically ambiguous or incomplete evidence
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is not to assign probabilities symmetrically, but to refrain from assigning
precise probabilities at all... Imprecise credences have a clear epistemo-
logical motivation: they are the proper response to unspecific evidence.
(Joyce 2005, 171)
Suppose, for example, that you have a coin, but very little information about its bias
(cf. Joyce 2010, 284). Perhaps you flip it over to check that it is not double sided.
But nothing more. A bookie then offers you a bet. She kindly allows you to flip
the coin a few times before deciding whether or not to accept or reject. You decide
to adopt the uniform distribution u over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s bias
(with 0 < x < 1 perhaps), to take account of your prior evidence E (viz., next to
nothing). This might seem like an appropriate prior to adopt, since you have very
little prior information, and u is minimally informative (amongst precise priors, when
measuring informativeness by Shannon entropy). But despite this fact, Joyce argues,
the uniform distribution does a poor job summarizing your prior information. To see
this, note that adopting u commits you to making the following judgments:
• Rolling an ace with a fair 6-sided die is definitely less probable (u(Ace) = 0.166)
than having the coin come up fewer than 17 times in 100 independent tosses
(u(Heads < 17) = 0.168).
• It would be definite mistake to let $100 ride on a rolling an ace than to let it
ride on the coin coming up fewer than 17 times in 100 independent tosses.
Your prior evidence, however, is simply too unspecific to be this demanding. It might
be specific enough to commit you to making certain comparative and qualitative
judgments, e.g., “It is more probable that the coin will come up heads than it is that
the sun will suddenly expand and engulf the Earth.” (You did, after all, see that
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it is not double sided; it has a non-zero chance of coming up heads.) But it does
not commit you to making specific judgments like the ones above. So any prior that
commits you to making such judgments does a bad job summarizing your evidence.
And precise priors as a class are bad in this respect. The moral is this: when you have
unspecific and equivocal prior evidence, you should avoid precise priors altogether.
You should adopt an imprecise prior instead. Imprecise priors, unlike precise priors,
permit you to abstain from judgment on various issues. So they do not, as a class,
capture improper responses to unspecific evidence, in the way that precise priors do.
The aim of this chapter is to point toward a new motivation for employing im-
precise priors. You might hope for new reasons to employ imprecise priors because
you find extent motivations less than fully compelling. (Perhaps you doubt that pre-
cise priors invariably capture improper responses to unspecific evidence, as I argue in
chapter 2.) Or you might simply be interested in identifying the full range of reasons
favoring imprecise Bayesianism. My plan is to highlight, for any interested parties,
two new kinds of reasons for employing imprecise priors. We ought to adopt impre-
cise priors in certain contexts because they put us in an unequivocally better position
to secure epistemically valuable posterior beliefs than precise priors do. We ought to
adopt imprecise priors in various other contexts because they minimize our need for
epistemic luck in securing such posteriors.
In §3.1, I investigate the theoretical role of priors, to illuminate what a compelling
reason for adopting imprecise priors might look like. I suggest that the central role
of priors is to help us secure epistemically valuable posterior beliefs, and to minimize
our need for epistemic luck in securing those beliefs. In §3.2, I outline an argument
that imprecise priors are sometimes best suited to play this role. In §3.3-3.6, I fill in
this outline. In §3.3, I sketch an accuracy-centered approach to measuring the all-
things-consider epistemic value or worth of imprecise priors and posteriors. Certain
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of these measures, I argue, reflect Jamesian liberalism, while others reflect Cliffordian
conservatism. In §3.4, I provide examples of conservative contexts in which imprecise
priors put you in an unequivocally better position to secure epistemically valuable
posteriors than precise priors do. This is the first new kind of reason to employ impre-
cise priors. In §3.5-3.6, I distinguish different types of epistemic luck, and illustrate
how one prior might do more to ameliorate our dependence on luck than another.
Lastly, in §3.7, I provide examples of conservative contexts in which imprecise priors
do more to ameliorate dependence on epistemic luck than precise priors do. This is
the second new kind of reason to employ imprecise priors.
3.1 The Theoretical Role of Priors
When we ask, “Why should we adopt imprecise priors?” we are asking for a certain
kind of reason in response. If imprecise priors somehow made our knees less achy, or
our jokes funnier, or our wallets fatter, that would be one reason to adopt them. But
our question demands an epistemic answer, not a pragmatic one. Indeed, it demands
a certain kind of epistemic answer. It demands reasons that speak to the primary
theoretical role of priors. A proper answer to our question takes the form: we ought
to adopt imprecise priors in certain contexts because they are best suited to play the
relevant theoretical role (whatever that may be).
We must, then, be clear about what this theoretical role is. Some traditional,
objective Bayesians, such as Edwin Jaynes, assume that the primary role of priors
is representational. Jaynes prescribes adopting the maximum entropy prior for the
“positive reason that it is... maximally noncommittal with regard to missing informa-
tion” (Jaynes 1957, 623); the maximum entropy prior best reflects or represents the
informational content of our prior evidence.
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Informational Account. The primary theoretical role of prior probabili-
ties is to accurately reflect the informational content of the agent’s prior
evidence.
Certain subjective Bayesians agree that the primary role of priors is representa-
tional, but insist that Jaynes and others ought not restrict their attention to evidence.
Prior probabilities ought to represent an agent’s all-things-considered prior judgments
about the plausibility of hypotheses, which might depend not only on her prior evi-
dence, but also on her assessment of their intrinsic plausibility, her personal inductive
quirks, etc.
Subjectivist Account. The primary theoretical role of priors is to accurately
represent the agent’s prior opinions about the plausibility of hypotheses.
Neither of these accounts are quite right. The reason: evidence is important
to our epistemic lives, at bottom, exactly because it helps us secure epistemically
valuable (accurate, justified, sensitive, etc.) posterior beliefs in a luck-minimizing
fashion. So priors — statistical tools for taking prior evidence into account — are
plausibly important exactly to the extent that they help us achieve this end. They
are important exactly to the extent that they put us in a position to secure valuable,
minimally luck-dependent posterior beliefs by updating on new evidence.
Instrumental Account. The primary theoretical role of priors is to put us
in a position to secure epistemically valuable, minimally luck-dependent
posteriors by updating on new data.
Imagine an objector who denies this. When the various roles listed above conflict,
she will give precedence to one of the former ones, rather than the last one. Suppose,
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for example, that a scientist has scant prior evidence about the causal mechanism
under investigation (a particular virus’ infection mechanism, perhaps). She does,
however, find one particular hypothesis extremely intrinsically plausible. But she
does not find it plausible for any good reason. Her hunch reflects no particular skill
at assessing intrinsic plausibility. She simply ‘feels it in her bones’. Our objector, if
she favors the subjectivist account, will nevertheless advise her to adopt a prior that
reflects this hunch, by concentrating probability on her favorite hypothesis. But this
would be absurd. It would result in her discounting new data that she really ought
to be more sensitive to (in much the way that a conspiracy theorist discounts data
that tells against her favorite hypothesis, e.g., that an alien spacecraft crashed near
Roswell, New Mexico in 1947).
Alternatively, our researcher might have quite a lot of prior information, but find
herself in an odd context of inquiry. For example, it might be much, much more
epistemically important to avoid determinate error, in her context, than it is to get
determinately close to the truth. Maybe all that matters is avoiding determinate
error. (Some philosophers argue that the standards of evaluation operative in a con-
texts can depend on pragmatic factors. If this is correct, and there are much more
serious negative consequences for getting it determinately wrong than there are pos-
itive consequences for getting it determinately right, then she might be in such a
context.) Our objector, if she favors the informational account, will advise the re-
searcher to adopt a prior that reflects the informativeness her evidence, presumably
by concentrating probability on some hypothesis or other. But, if getting determi-
nately close to the truth is really of no independent value — if avoiding determinate
error is really all that matters in this context, from the epistemic perspective — then
this is absurd. It is absurd in the way that gambling is absurd, if all that you care
about is not losing money. You should simply not take the risk of gambling if all you
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care about is not losing money. Similarly, our researcher should also not risk error by
‘gambling’ on some hypothesis or other (by concentrating probability on it). Instead,
she should adopt a prior that encodes no opinion whatsoever about the virus’ true
infection mechanism, which no ‘concentrated’ prior does. She should adopt such a
prior even though it does a rather poor job reflecting the informational content of her
evidence.
This illustrates what should be clear: whichever prior best enables evidence to
play its theoretical role is ipso facto best suited to play the theoretical role of priors.
It is worth noting that the instrumental account does, in fact, enjoy a certain mea-
sure of support in the literature. James Berger (2006), for example, justifies the use
objective Bayesian methods for constructing priors on the grounds that “objective
Bayes intervals [95% confidence intervals] are, on average, smaller than the classi-
cally derived intervals,” and have “better performance” in terms of average accuracy
(“whether the interval contains the true θ or misses to the left or right”) over a large
number of independent trials (Berger 2006, 390-1). This is an appropriate justifica-
tion, one might think, because the job of a prior is to put us in a position to secure
accurate posteriors by updating on new data (and, plausibly, to do so in a way that
minimizes our need for luck).
Similarly, Patrick Suppes says, “It is of fundamental importance to any deep ap-
preciation of the Bayesian viewpoint to realize that the particular form of the prior
distribution expressing beliefs held before the experiment is conducted is not a cru-
cial matter... The well-designed experiment is one that will swamp divergent prior
distributions with the clarity and sharpness of its results” (Suppes 1966, 204). The
reason that it is not a crucial matter exactly which form the prior distribution takes is
that, in a ‘well-designed’ experiment, where the experimental data is fairly ‘weighty’,
a range of priors will converge on the true theoretical hypothesis (with high objec-
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tive probability).36 As a result, those priors are all likely to yield fairly accurate —
and minimally luck-dependent — posterior distributions. Hence, they all play the
primary theoretical role of priors close to equally well. And they do so even though
some priors do a rather poor job representing, for example, the agent’s prior opinions
about the plausibility of hypotheses. This latter fact is — or at least ought to be —
“not a crucial matter” from the Bayesian viewpoint.
3.2 Main Argument
The remainder of this chapter outlines two new kinds of reasons for employing im-
precise priors. In broad strokes, the idea is this:
1. In any context of inquiry, you ought to adopt whichever prior is best suited to
play the primary theoretical role of priors in that context, if there is one.
2. The primary role of priors is to help you secure epistemically valuable posterior
beliefs, and to minimize your need for epistemic luck in securing those beliefs.
3. In certain contexts, imprecise priors put you in a better position to secure
epistemically valuable posteriors than precise priors do.
4. In other contexts, no imprecise prior puts you in a better position to secure
valuable posteriors than every precise prior, or vice versa. But imprecise priors
minimize your need for epistemic luck.
C. In some contexts, you ought to adopt imprecise probabilities to incorporate your
prior information.
If correct, this points the way toward a new, potentially promising foundation for
imprecise Bayesianism. The reasons outlined here are not like those that concern
104
Joyce and others. They have nothing to do with whether imprecise priors are required
to summarize certain kinds of evidence (cf. Joyce 2005, 2011). They are not like
those that concern Walley, in many places, viz., whether imprecise priors alone satisfy
a range of nice symmetry and invariance principles (cf. Walley 1996). Instead, the
reasons outlined here go straight to the heart of what priors are for ; imprecise models
are required because they often are best suited to play the primary theoretical role
of priors.
To be clear, I will not offer a complete, systematic defense of this thesis. My aim
here is limited. My aim is merely to gesture toward two new kinds of reasons for
employing imprecise priors. To do this, I will simply provide examples of contexts
in which (i) some imprecise prior puts you in a better position to secure valuable
posteriors than precise priors do, and (ii) some imprecise does more to ameliorate
dependence on luck than precise priors do.
3.3 Epistemic Value
3.3.1 General Remarks
Priors and posteriors often have a range epistemically laudable qualities. They are
accurate, for example. The truth-value estimates they encode are close to the actual
truth-values of the target hypotheses. (Imprecise priors and posteriors are determi-
nately accurate when the family of truth-value assignments they encode are all close
to the truth.) They are well calibrated. The relative frequency estimates they encode
are close to the actual relative frequencies. They are refined.37 They sort hypothe-
ses into classes that are (more or less) uniformly true or false. They are justified.
They capture appropriate responses to the available evidence. They are informative.
They encode truth-value estimates for hypotheses that paint a rich, detailed picture
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of the world, and so on.38 For almost any property of qualitative beliefs that tradi-
tional epistemologists focus on — being reliably produced, sensitive, etc. — there are
analogous properties of priors and posteriors.
Epistemic utility functions provide a measure of a prior (or posterior) p’s all-things-
considered epistemic value or worth at a world w, which it has in virtue of having
these laudable qualities to a greater or lesser extent at w. As Joyce (1998, 2009)
stresses, while there is room for reasonable dispute about the relative importance of
certain qualities, any reasonable epistemic utility function must reflect an overriding
concern for accuracy. Ceteris paribus, priors and posteriors are all-things-considered
better, from the epistemic perspective, the more accurate they are.39
What we might call pluralist approaches to theorizing about epistemic value treat
various of these laudable qualities — accuracy, justification, informativeness, etc.
— as making an independent contribution to all-things-consider epistemic worth.
Accuracy-centered approaches, in contrast, treat ‘auxiliary’ virtues — everything but
accuracy — as relevant to the epistemic value of a prior or posterior only to the extent
that they are reflected in its accuracy (cf. Joyce 2013). On this view, our carefully
considered judgments regarding justification, and so on, may well influence how we
value ‘closeness to the truth’, how we measure p’s accuracy at w.40 But this is the
only route by which they affect epistemic value. (This is a bit too narrow of a char-
acterization, but will do for now.) In what follows, I will sketch an accuracy-centered
approach to theorizing about the epistemic value of both precise and imprecise priors.
How exactly should we think about the accuracy of a prior (or posterior) at a
world? Following Joyce (1998, 2009), Predd et al. (2009), and Leitgeb and Pettigrew
(2010), we will measure the accuracy of precise priors/posteriors by an epistemic scor-
ing rule or inaccuracy score. An inaccuracy score is a function I , which maps prob-
ability distributions p and worlds w to non-negative real numbers, I (p, w). I (p, w)
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measures how inaccurate p is if w is actual. If I (p, w) equals zero, then p is mini-
mally inaccurate (maximally accurate) at w. Inaccuracy increases as I (p, w) grows
larger. As in Joyce (2009, p. 269, 280), we assume that any reasonable inaccuracy
score satisfies the following two conditions:
Truth-Directedness. Moving a prior p’s probabilities, or truth-value
estimates closer to the actual truth-values always improves accuracy. If p
and q differ only in that p assigns higher (lower) probabilities than q does
to some propositions that are true (false) at w, then I (p, w) < I (q, w),
i.e., p is less inaccurate (more accurate) than q at w.41
Coherent Admissibility. No probabilistically coherent prior p is less
accurate than an incoherent prior q in every world. More carefully, it is
not the case that (i) I (p, w) ≥ I (q, w), for all w, and (ii) I (p, w′) >
I (q, w′), for some w′.
Truth-Directedness guarantees that moving prior probabilities (truth-value esti-
mates) closer to the truth always has a net positive impact on accuracy (cf. Joyce
2013, 3). (The positive effect associated with getting closer to the truth always out-
weighs the negative effect associated with becoming less well-calibrated, less justified,
etc.) Coherent Admissibility guarantees that reasonable inaccuracy scores cohere
with our most robust intuitions about which priors are appropriate to adopt in which
evidential circumstances. For any probabilistically coherent prior p, we can find ev-
idential circumstances in which p seems very clearly to be the right prior to adopt
(cf. Joyce 2009, 279). If, however, p is less accurate than some other q in every world
according to an inaccuracy function I , then p is epistemically defective from I ’s
perspective. You should not adopt p in any circumstances, according to I . Coher-
ent admissibility sees this flouting of our most robust intuitions as a mark of I ’s
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unreasonableness.
Figure 3.1: Inaccuracy of p(Hi) = x
when Hi is true, relative to Brier and
log scores, respectively.
These constraints rule out many inaccuracy
scores as unreasonable.42 Nevertheless, a num-
ber of scores satisfy both Truth-Directedness
and Coherent Admissibility. The Brier score,
for example, satisfies both constraints. The
Brier score, I , measures the inaccuracy of a
prior p, defined over a partition 〈H1, ..., Hn〉,
at a world w, by the average squared Eu-
clidean distance between its truth-value esti-
mates, p(Hi), and the actual truth-values at
w, w(Hi). That is, I (p, w) = (1/n)
∑
i(p(Hi) − w(Hi))2. The logarithmic score,
which measures the inaccuracy of p at w by (1/n)
∑
i−ln[|1 − w(Hi) − p(Hi)|], also
satisfies both constraints. So do various other scores, e.g., the power score, spherical
score, any other proper scoring rule.43,44 We will measure inaccuracy by the Brier
score in what follows.
Unlike precise priors, imprecise priors and posteriors are typically not accurate
to any determinate degree. The determinate properties of an imprecise prior (or
posterior) S are just the properties that all of the distributions in S share in common.
So, for example:
• An imprecise prior encodes a determine probability x for a hypothesis H only
if every element of that set agrees that the probability of H is x.
• An imprecise prior carries a commitment to making a qualitative or comparative
judgment, e.g., that X is more probable than Y , or that X is independent of
Y , only if every element of that set carries that commitment.
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• An imprecise prior is accurate to a determinate degree y only if every element
of that set is accurate to degree y.
Except in very special circumstances, the elements p of an imprecise prior S will vary
in their accuracy at a world w. So typically imprecise priors (and posteriors) S will
not be accurate to any determinate degree at w.
This does not mean, however, that there is nothing determinate to say about the
accuracy of imprecise priors. Often there is quite a lot to say. For example, suppose
that you are wondering about the amount of rain R that Bristol received yesterday.
A friend informs you that the best estimate of R is 2.5mm. Assume that R can only
take one of three values: R = 1 in world w1, R = 2 in world w2, and R = 3 in world
w3. To incorporate your prior information, you adopt an imprecise prior: the set S of
probability distributions p over 〈w1, w2, w3〉 consistent with the constraint imposed by
your prior information, viz., p(w1) + 2p(w2) + 3p(w3) = 2.5. Then your prior S is not
accurate to any determinate degree, whatever world is actual. To see this, suppose
that w1 is actual (Bristol actually received 1mm of rain). Then there are distributions
p and q in S such that I (p, w1) = 0.42 6= 0.445 = I (q, w1).45 Nevertheless, there are
quite strong determinate facts about S’s accuracy at w1. For example, we can say
that S does at least this poorly, i.e., is at least this inaccurate: 0.375. (Every element
p of S is such that I (p, w1) ≥ 0.375.) Similarly, we can say that S does at most
this poorly: 0.5. (Every element p of S is such that I (p, w1) ≤ 0.5.) This grounds
a rather rich set of determinate facts about S’s comparative accuracy. We can say,
for example, that S is determinately more accurate than the precise prior r which is
such that r(w1) = 0.01, r(w2) = 0.01, r(w1) = 0.98 and determinately less accurate
than the prior t with t(w1) = 0.5, r(w2) = 0.25, r(w1) = 0.25. The inaccuracy of r
and t at w1 is I (r, w1) = 0.647 and I (t, w1) = 0.125, respectively.
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The accuracy-centered theorist might propose that these determinate facts are suf-
ficient to determine precise degrees of all-things-considered epistemic value or worth.
Imprecise priors and posteriors S are epistemically valuable to a determinate degree
at worlds w, even though they are not accurate to a determinate degree at w. Their
epistemic value supervenes on what we will call their lower and upper-inaccuracy
scores.
• l(S,w) = inf {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
• u(S,w) = sup {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
The first quantity, l(S,w), is S’s lower-inaccuracy. For any prior S and world w,
S does at least this poorly at w, i.e., is at least this inaccurate: l(S,w). (Every
element p of S is such that I (p, w) ≥ l(S,w).) The second quantity, u(S,w), is S’s
upper-inaccuracy. S does at most this poorly: u(S,w). (Every element p of S is
such that I (p, w) ≤ u(S,w).) As noted above, these quantities ground a rich set of
facts about S’s comparative accuracy. If l(S,w) and u(S,w) are both greater than
l(S ′, w) and u(S ′, w), then S is determinately more inaccurate (less accurate) than
S ′ at w. If l(S,w) and u(S,w) are both less than l(S ′, w) and u(S ′, w), then S is
determinately less inaccurate (more accurate) than S ′ at w. If neither is true, then
there is no determinate fact about the comparative inaccuracy of S and S ′ at w.
The reason that a prior S’s upper and lower-inaccuracy scores ground a precise
degree of epistemic value, an accuracy-centered theorist might say, is this: they al-
low us to say how S fares with respect our two “great commandments as would-be
knowers”, viz., Believe truth! Shun error! (James 1896, §VII). At bottom, she might
continue, epistemic value is a matter of obeying these two commands. (This is in
keeping with the spirit of the accuracy-centered approach.) And imprecise priors, in
virtue of having upper and lower-inaccuracy scores, obey these two commands to a
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determinate degree. A prior S’s lower-inaccuracy score, l(S,w), provides a measure
of the extent to which S avoids determinate error at w. Its upper-inaccuracy score,
u(S,w), provides a measure of the extent to which S determinately converges on the
truth at w. So any imprecise prior S ought to count as epistemically valuable to a
determinate degree at any world w.
We will measure the all-things-considered epistemic value or worth of a prior (or
posterior) at a world by an epistemic disutility score. An epistemic disutility score is a
function D , which maps priors, or sets S of probability distributions (treating precise
priors as singleton sets), and worlds w to non-negative real numbers, D(S,w). D(S,w)
measures how much disutility or disvalue S has if w is actual, from the epistemic
perspective. If D(S,w) equals zero, then S has minimal epistemic disutility (maximal
utility) at w. Epistemic disutility increases as D(S,w) grows larger. The accuracy-
centered theorist assumes that any reasonable epistemic disutility score satisfies at
least the following four conditions:
Extensionality. The epistemic disutility of a prior S at a world w is
solely a function of S’s upper and lower-inaccuracy scores at w.
Continuity. Epistemic disutility scores are continuous.
Upper/Lower Dominance. Moving a prior S’s upper and lower inac-
curacy scores uniformly downward always improves epistemic utility. If
u(S,w) and l(S,w) are both less than u(S ′, w) and l(S ′, w), then D(S,w) <
D(S ′, w).
Normalization. When a prior S has a determinate degree of inaccuracy
at w, its epistemic disutility at w just is that degree of inaccuracy. If
I (p, w)=x, for all p in S, so that u(S,w)=l(S,w)=x, then D(S,w)=x.
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Extensionality guarantees that accuracy is the cardinal ‘epistemic good’. ‘Aux-
iliary’ goods — calibration, justification, etc. — impact the all-things-considered
epistemic value or worth of a prior/posterior S at a world w by impacting how we
value ‘closeness to the truth’ (how we measure accuracy), or by impacting how we
balance off different determinate facts about accuracy (upper and lower-inaccuracy
scores) against one another to arrive at an all-things-considered epistemic (dis)utility
score. Continuity guarantees that small changes to facts about accuracy do not
result in excessively large changes in facts about epistemic utility. Upper/Lower
Dominance guarantees that determinate improvements in accuracy always result in
determinate improvements in epistemic utility. Finally, Normalization guarantees
that when a prior is informationally rich enough to pin down a precise degree of accu-
racy, nothing else matters to its epistemic utility. Its degree of epistemic (dis)utility
just is its degree of (in)accuracy.
3.4 Cliffordian Conservatism and Jamesian Liberalism
William James emphasizes the first of our two “great commandments as would-be
knowers,” viz., Believe truth! The risk of being in error, he says, is “a very small
matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge.” W. K. Clifford, on the
other hand, emphasizes the second, Shun error! “It is wrong always, everywhere, and
for anyone,” he says, “to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1877).
All inaccuracy scores strike some balance between these two commandments, and
in this way take some stand in the Clifford/James debate (cf. Joyce 2009, 281). The
more convex an inaccuracy score I is, the more it emphasizes avoiding error; the
more it reflects Cliffordian conservatism. An inaccuracy score I is convex at a world
w if (1/2)I (p, w)+(1/2)I (q, w) ≥ I ((1/2)p+(1/2)q, w), for any prior distributions
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p and q.46 The more concave it is, the more it emphasizes the pursuit of truth; the
more it reflects Jamesian liberalism.
Figure 3.2: Inaccuracy of p(Hi) =
x when Hi is true, according
to increasingly convex exponential
scores.
To illustrate, compare the Brier score,
I (p, w) = (1/n)
∑
i |p(Hi) − w(Hi)|2, which
is convex, with the power score (z = 8),
I ∗(p, w) = (1/n)
∑
i 7p(Hi)
8 + w(Hi) · (1 −
8p(Hi)
7), which is almost everywhere concave.
Suppose that I have an urn containing black,
green and yellow balls mixed in some unknown
proportion. (See Joyce 2009, p. 283 for a sim-
ilar example.) I decide to adopt the uniform
prior u over hypotheses H regarding the chance
of drawing a black, green or yellow ball, respec-
tively. So my prior probability (truth-value estimate) for observing a black ball on
next draw is 1/3 (similarly for green and yellow). Now imagine that you draw a ball
Figure 3.3: Inaccuracy of p(Hi) =
x when Hi is true, according
to increasingly concave exponential
scores.
and observe that it is black. You decide not
to tell me the outcome of your draw outright.
But you have a pill that you can give me, which
will randomly raise or lower my prior probabil-
ity for Black (the proposition that the selected
ball is black), with equal chance, by 1/3, while
leaving the rest of my prior probabilities the
same. What should you do?
If all you care about is the accuracy of
my prior, and you measure inaccuracy by the
(mostly) concave power score I ∗, then you
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should opt for the more aggressive, truth-seeking option. You should give me the
pill. Because I ∗ is concave, the benefits of getting closer to the truth significantly
outweigh the costs of getting further from it. This is reflected in your best estimates
of the inaccuracy of my prior conditional on my taking the pill, on the one hand, and
standing pat, on the other. You are sure that if I stand pat, then my prior probabil-
ities for Black, Green and Yellow, respectively, are inaccurate to degree 0.333. Your
best estimate of their inaccuracy if I take the pill, however, is 0.302. You expect me
to improve, in terms of inaccuracy, if I take the pill.
If you measure inaccuracy by the convex Brier score I , however, then you should
opt for the more conservative option. You should tell me to stand pat. Because
I is convex, the benefits of getting closer to the truth pale in comparison to the
costs of getting further from it. This, again, is reflected in your best estimates of the
inaccuracy of my prior, conditional on my taking the pill/standing pat. You are sure
that if I stand pat, my prior probabilities are inaccurate to degree 0.222. Your best
estimate of their inaccuracy if I take the pill, however, is 0.259. You expect me to do
worse, in terms of inaccuracy, if I take the pill.
The moral is this: the convexity/concavity properties of inaccuracy scores reflect
some way of balancing our two “great commandments as would-be knowers”, viz.,
Believe truth! Shun error! Concave scores place more of an emphasis on believing
the truth. Convex scores place more of an emphasis on avoiding error.
On the accuracy-centered view, every reasonable epistemic disutility score D is a
function of some inaccuracy score I . The epistemic disutility of S at w, D(S,w), is
determined by S’s upper and lower-inaccuracy scores at w:
• l(S,w) = inf {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
• u(S,w) = sup {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
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Epistemic disutility scores strike a balance between our ‘two great commandments’,
then, by featuring inaccuracy scores which strike a particular balance. Some scores D
feature the Brier score, while others D ′ feature the logarithmic score, while still other
D ′′ feature a power score, and so on. In virtue of the different balances that these
inaccuracy scores strike, D , D ′ and D ′′ count as doing so as well, as taking different
positions in the Clifford/James debate. But epistemic disutility scores strike a balance
between our ‘two great commandments’ in another way too. Different disutility scores
afford upper and lower-inaccuracies, u(S,w) and l(S,w), different degrees of relative
importance. Depending on which dictum you are inclined to place more emphasis on
— Believe truth! or Shun error! — you will see certain weightings as more reasonable
than others.
Jamesians will see disutility scores D that treat u(S,w) as more important than
l(S,w) as capturing a more reasonable view about how to balance off all of the deter-
minate facts about S’s accuracy at w to arrive at an all-things-considered judgment
about epistemic worth. “Avoiding determinate error,” they will say, “is a very small
matter when compared with the blessings of getting determinately close to the truth.”
Avoiding determinate error is a matter of having a low lower -inaccuracy score, l(S,w).
Getting determinately close to the truth, in contrast, is a matter of having a low up-
per -inaccuracy score, u(S,w). The upshot: any reasonable measure of epistemic
disutility, or all-things-considered epistemic disvalue, according to the Jamesian, will
count u(S,w) as much more important than l(S,w). It will reward a prior S more
for having u(S,w) close to zero than for having l(S,w) close to zero.
Cliffordians, on the other hand, will see disutility scores D that treat l(S,w) as
more important than u(S,w) as capturing a more reasonable view about all-things-
considered epistemic worth. “The sin of being in determinate error,” they will say, “is
a much greater offense than the sin of failing to get determinately close to the truth.”
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So, any reasonable measure of epistemic disutility, or all-things-considered epistemic
disvalue, according to the Cliffordian, will count l(S,w) as much more important than
u(S,w). It will penalize a prior S much more for having a high lower-inaccuracy score
(i.e., for being in determinate error) than it will for having a high upper-inaccuracy
score (i.e., for failing to get determinately close to the truth).
In what follows, I will consider only the simplest epistemic disutility scores, ‘linear
scores’ of the form:
Dλ(S,w) = λ · l(S,w) + (1− λ) · u(S,w).
Linear scores Dλ with λ > 1/2 treat lower inaccuracy, l(S,w), as more important
than the upper inaccuracy, u(S,w). We call these Cliffordian disutility scores. Linear
scores Dλ with λ < 1/2 treat u(S,w) as more important than l(S,w). We call these
Jamesian disutility scores.
Linear disutility scores are ‘reasonable’, in the sense described in §3.3.1. They
satisfy Extensionality, and so guarantee that accuracy, in some sense, is the cardi-
nal ‘epistemic good’. They satisfy Continuity, and so guarantee that small changes
to facts about accuracy do not result in large changes in facts about epistemic util-
ity. They satisfy Upper/Lower Dominance, and so guarantee that determinate
improvements in accuracy always result in determinate improvements in epistemic
utility. Finally, they satisfy Normalization, and so guarantee that when a prior is
informationally rich enough to pin down a precise degree of accuracy, nothing else
matters to its epistemic utility.
Many other epistemic disutility scores satisfy these constraints as well. I focus on
linear disutility scores because the aims of this chapter are limited. I only hope to
gesture toward some new kinds of reasons for employing imprecise priors. And for
this end, it is sufficient to simply provide examples of contexts in those reasons are
116
extremely salient. Linear disutility scores are particularly useful for furnishing such
examples.
Figure 3.4: The Cramer-von Mises dis-
tance between two beta distributions,
given by a function of the area between
their respective cumulative distribution
functions.
For concreteness, I will also restrict
my attention to disutility functions that
feature the Brier score, at least when
considering discrete priors (priors de-
fined over countably many theoretical
hypotheses). When we consider continu-
ous priors (priors defined over uncount-
ably many theoretical hypotheses, e.g.,
chance hypotheses), we will measure in-
accuracy by Cramer-von Mises distance,
which is a natural extension of squared
Euclidean distance (‘Brier distance’) to
the space of continuous distributions.47
The Cramer-von Mises distance between continuous distributions p and q, C(p, q) =∫ 1
0
|P (x) − Q(x)|2dx, is just the squared L2 metric between their respective cumula-
tive density functions, P and Q (Deza and Deza 2009, 245).48 C(p, q) specifies the
distance between p and q as a function of the area between the CDFs, P and Q,
counting regions of smaller divergence for less and regions of greater divergence for
more (left, previous page). The proposal, a bit more carefully then, is to measure the
inaccuracy of a continuous prior p at a world in which H is true by the Cramer-von
Mises distance between p and the indicator distribution ιH , which is defined by the
Dirac density that centers all of its probability mass on H. Again, restricting our
attention in this way will allow us to provide specific examples of contexts in which
the reasons for employing imprecise priors are extremely salient.
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3.5 A Dominance Argument for Imprecise Priors
We ought to adopt imprecise priors in certain contexts because they put us in an
unequivocally better position to secure epistemically valuable posterior beliefs than
precise priors do. In such contexts, imprecise models are better suited to play the
primary theoretical role of priors than precise models are.
What exactly does it take, though, for one prior to put you in a better position
to secure epistemically valuable posteriors than another prior? We can get a handle
on this question, I suggest, by comparing the objective expected posterior epistemic
value of different priors S across all relevant theoretical hypotheses. In any exper-
imental context aimed at adjudicating between hypotheses H1, ..., Hn, we can ask:
how (objectively) likely is it that the experiment will yield any particular data item
D1, ..., Dm if hypothesis Hi is true? We can also ask: to what extent will S converge
on Hi when conditioned on Dj? How epistemically valuable will the posterior, SDj , be
as a result? Finally, we can ask what the (objectively) best estimate of S’s posterior
epistemic value is if hypothesis Hi is true. What is ExpHi(D(SD, Hi))? In certain
cases, I claim, facts about these (objective) best estimates settle our question defini-
tively; they settle the matter of whether one prior S puts you in a better position
than another prior S∗ to secure epistemically valuable posteriors.
Consider a concrete case. A scientist is going to perform an experiment to adjudi-
cate between competing theoretical hypotheses H1, ..., Hn about whether (and how)
over expression of a certain gene causes chromosomal instability in breast tumors.
She has a great deal of relevant prior evidence E: information about the levels of
different genes expressed in past patients, as well as their various clinical symptoms,
recurrence rates, etc.; information about the broader causal mechanisms that give
rise to breast cancer, and so on. If two priors, S and S ′, both satisfy the constraints
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imposed by E, but S’s objective expected posterior epistemic disutility is lower than
S∗’s relative to every theoretical hypothesis Hi, then S must put her in a better posi-
tion than S∗ to secure epistemically valuable posteriors. Whatever else is true about
“putting oneself in a good position” with respect to some goal, it must be the case that
if one option gives you a better chance of achieving the goal than another, however
the world happens to be (whatever the true chance hypothesis is), then that option
puts you in a better position with respect to that goal.
So we have a sufficient condition for one prior S to put you in a better position
than another S∗, in terms of securing epistemically valuable posteriors:
(F) S puts you in a better position than S∗ to secure epistemically valu-
able posteriors if S’s objective expected posterior epistemic disutility is
lower than S∗’s relative to all Hi.
The goal now is to provide examples of contexts in which imprecise priors put you
in an unequivocally better position to secure epistemically valuable posterior beliefs
than precise priors do.
Figure 3.5: MaxEnt prior u over hy-
potheses B = x.
In some contexts, certain precise priors
put you in a better position to secure epis-
temically valuable posteriors than imprecise
priors do. Imagine that a bookie hands you
a coin and offers you a bet. You have no
prior evidence about the coin’s bias. But the
bookie allows you to flip the coin for awhile
— 5 times, for example — prior to deciding
whether or not to take the bet. Consider two
options that you have for taking your prior
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information (viz., none) in your decision problem. (Of course, these are not the only
two options.) Option 1: adopt the (precise) maximum entropy (uniform) prior u over
hypotheses B = x about the coin’s bias. Option 2: adopt an imprecise beta-binomial
model, with some level of concentration s, e.g., s = 10 (see Walley 1991, §5.3, for a
more detailed exposition). Beta distributions b are parameterized by two quantities,
Figure 3.6: Beta distributions with
concentration s = 10.
α and β. These ‘shape parameters’ deter-
mine which hypotheses B = x the distribu-
tion b focuses its probability mass on. The
concentration parameter, s = α + β, corre-
sponds roughly to how ‘peaked’ b is around
its mean. The imprecise beta model with
concentration 10 is the set M10 of all beta
distributions b with s = 10 (examples of such
distributions pictured left). Nota bene: I fo-
cus on beta priors in what follows because
(i) they are very rich; any prior distribution can be approximated by a finite mix-
ture of beta distributions; (ii) they are mathematically tractable; they generate beta
posterior distributions. (cf. Walley 1996, 9).
Suppose that, given the standards of evaluation operative in your context of in-
quiry, the appropriate measure of epistemic disutility D is completely Jamesian:
D(S,w) = D0(S,w) = 0 · l(S,w) + 1 · u(S,w) = sup {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
Such a disutility function D reflects an unmitigated commitment to getting deter-
minately close to the truth. It sees no independent value in avoiding determinate
error. Posteriors that get determinately close to the truth (have low upper-inaccuracy
scores), of course, will also avoid determinate error (have low lower-inaccuracy scores).
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But error avoidance is not something to be sought for its own sake, on this view.
Figure 3.7: Top curve: M10’s objective
expected (Jamesian) disutility, relative to
chance hypotheses B = x. Bottom: u’s
objective expected disutility, relative to
B = x.
The important observation is this:
given a completely Jamesian measure
D , the MaxEnt prior u’s objective ex-
pected posterior epistemic disutility is
lower than M10’s relative to every chance
hypothesis B = x. The reason: for any
chance hypotheses B = x and any data
sequence D = HkT 5−k, there is some
distribution b in M10 that converges on
B = x less than u does, when con-
ditioned on D. (This is just a conse-
quence of the ‘inclusiveness’ of the im-
precise beta model M10.) This ensures
that the upper-inaccuracy of u is lower than the upper-inaccuracy of M10, whichever
data sequence you observe, and whatever the true chance hypothesis happens to
be. And that guarantees that u’s objective expected posterior epistemic disutility is
lower than M10’s, come what may. It guarantees that u dominates M10, in terms of
objective expected disutility.
This shows that there are contexts in which certain precise priors (viz., the MaxEnt
prior) put you in a better position to secure epistemically valuable posteriors than
certain imprecise priors (viz., the imprecise beta prior with concentration s = 10). We
will now show that the converse occurs as well. There are contexts in which certain
imprecise priors put you in a better position than various precise priors to secure
epistemically valuable posteriors. In fact, there are contexts in which they put you in
a better position than any reasonable precise prior. This provides decisive epistemic
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reason to employ imprecise priors in those contexts.
Suppose once more that you are considering different options for incorporating
your prior information about the coin’s bais (viz., none) in your decision problem.
Now, however, the operative standards of evaluation yield a measure of epistemic
disutility D that is completely Cliffordian, rather than Jamesian.
D(S,w) = D1(S,w) = 1 · l(S,w) + 0 · u(S,w) = inf {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
Such a disutility function D reflects unadulterated concern for avoiding error. It
sees no independent value in getting determinately close to the truth. Of course,
getting determinately close to the truth (have a low upper-inaccuracy score) is in-
strumentally valuable; it guarantees avoidance of determinate error (it guarantees a
Figure 3.8: Top curve: u’s objective ex-
pected (Cliffordian) disutility, relative
to chance hypotheses B=x. Bottom:
M10’s objective expected disutility, rel-
ative to B=x.
low lower-inaccuracy score). But getting de-
terminately close to the truth is not worth
pursuing for its own sake, on this view.
Given a completely Cliffordian measure
D , the imprecise beta model, M10, domi-
nates the MaxEnt prior u, in terms of ob-
jective expected posterior epistemic disutil-
ity. The reason: for any chance hypotheses
B = x and any data sequence D = HkT 5−k,
there is some distribution b in M10 that con-
verges on B = xmore than u does when con-
ditioned on D. (Again, this is just a conse-
quence of the ‘inclusiveness’ of the imprecise
beta model M10.) This is sufficient to guarantee that the lower-inaccuracy of M10 is
less than the lower-inaccuracy of u, whichever data sequence you observe, and what-
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ever the true chance hypothesis happens to be. This, in turn, guarantees that M10’s
objective expected posterior epistemic disutility is lower than u’s, come what may.
This phenomenon — objective expected disutility domination — is rare. But it
is not entirely restricted to contexts in which the appropriate measure of all-things-
considered epistemic value or worth is given by a maximally Jamesian or Cliffordian
disutility score. Compare, for example, the objective expected disutilities of the
Figure 3.9: Top curve: u’s objective
expected disutility, relative to chance
hypotheses B=x, measuring disutility
by D0.9. Bottom: M10’s objective ex-
pected disutility, relative to B=x.
imprecise beta model, M10, and the Max-
Ent prior, u, when the appropriate disutility
score is Dλ(S,w) = λ · l(S,w) + (1 − λ) ·
u(S,w), with λ > 0.9. Such scores are Clif-
fordian, but not maximally Cliffordian. In
any such context, M10 dominates u, in terms
of objective expected disutility (right).
Or consider a context in which the ap-
propriate disutility score is D0.95(S,w) =
0.95·l(S,w)+0.05·u(S,w). Again, this score
is Cliffordian, but not maximally so. Rel-
ative to this score, M10 dominates all beta
priors b, in terms of objective expected disu-
tility, other than those with excessively low entropy.49 It is not difficult to see why,
either. For every relatively high entropy beta prior b, every chance hypothesis B = x,
and every data sequence D, there is a lower entropy b′ in M10 that converges more
on B = x when conditioned on D than b does. Only if b has particularly low entropy,
and is centered on B = x, will it tend to converge on B = x more than any prior in
M10.
The consequence is that the imprecise beta prior M10 puts you in a better position
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to secure epistemically valuable posteriors than any prima facie reasonable precise
Figure 3.10: Left: M10’s objective expected disutility across hy-
potheses B=x, compared to the beta distribution p with α = 0.8
and β = 2.4 (entropy: -0.425). Right: M10’s objective expected








that you have no
relevant prior ev-
idence about the
coin’s bias, low entropy priors will depend significantly on epistemic luck for suc-
cess (posterior epistemic value), in a sense to be made precise in §3.6.
This provides good epistemic reason to employ imprecise priors in contexts like
the ones considered here, contexts in which all-things-considered epistemic value is
best measured by a severely conservative disutility score. Still, such contexts are
(plausibly) too exotic to be central to the foundations of imprecise Bayesianism.
So we turn to another new motivation for employing imprecise priors. This second
motivation provides good reason to employ imprecise priors in a much wider range of
contexts than the first.
3.6 Epistemic Luck
Even when imprecise priors do not dominate precise priors, in terms of objective
expected disutility, there is often good epistemic reason to adopt one, rather than a
precise prior. The primary role of priors is to help you secure epistemically valuable
posteriors, and to minimize your need for epistemic luck in securing them. In a fairly
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wide range of conservative contexts, imprecise priors minimize your need for luck.
There are various kinds of epistemic luck. If there could easily be an earthquake
in Los Angeles right now, but it fails to materialize, and a talented artist in the midst
of a project goes on to produce her most beautiful painting to date, then her success
is subject to what virtue epistemologists such as Pritchard (2009) call environmental
luck. This is the sort of luck that enables agents to exercise skill. Without it, our
artist would not have managed to paint anything at all, and so would not have
been successful (produced a beautiful painting). Even so, note: certain important
contrastive facts about her success are explained primarily by her skill, an internal
factor, e.g., the fact that her subject’s eyes glisten to just the right degree, rather
than slightly more, or less.
In contrast, another sort of luck — intervening luck — severs this explanatory
link. Suppose, for example, that our artist’s arch nemesis tries to sabotage her. He
covers her canvas with a chemical which, when mixed with oil-based paint, produces
colors at random. Fortunately for our artist, this random process happens to return
each stroke, time after time, to its original color. So she is successful. Her efforts
yield a beautiful painting. But she is not successful because skillful (her performance
is not apt, in Sosa’s terminology; cf. Sosa 2007, 79). Her particular degree of success
(the fact that her painting is nearly perfect, rather than marred by 1, or 2, or 100,
or 1000 off-colored strokes) is not explained primarily by internal factors (the agent’s
skill). Rather, it is explained by external factors (fortuitous chemical reactions). We
will take this to be the defining characteristic of intervening luck: it is in play when
external factors are primarily responsible for explaining an agent’s particular degree
of success (why she achieved exactly this degree of success, rather than some other).
Priors are also subject to intervening epistemic luck, in the following sense: when
you update a prior on evidence, it yields a posterior which is more or less epistemically
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valuable (more or less successful). The fact that the posterior is valuable to exactly
this degree, rather than some other degree, in turn, is explained more or less by
two different kinds of factors. On the one hand, internal factors — facts about the
prior’s intrinsic properties, such as how resilient it is — might bear the bulk of the
explanatory burden. On the other hand, external factors — facts about the prior’s
extrinsic properties, such as the proximity of a coin’s true bias to the prior’s expected
bias — might end up shouldering a bigger part of this burdern.
Of course, no prior minimizes dependence on luck tout court. There are various
kinds of both environmental and intervening luck that adopting a prior — any prior
— will simply not mitigate. No prior mitigates the environmental luck in play when
the ground underneath one’s lab stays intact, rather than opening up and swallowing
the building whole (as it easily could have, perhaps, if the conditions were right
for an earthquake). No prior helps eliminate the luck involved in stumbling upon a
particularly pertinent journal article. (No prior mitigates this sort of luck in receiving
new evidence.) And no prior ameliorates the luck involved in avoiding misleading
evidence, of the sort that a detective faces if the primary suspect in her investigation
is being framed.
When evaluating the claim, then, that imprecise priors minimize your need for luck
in a range of conservative contexts, we ought to focus our attention on a particular
kind of luck, not epistemic luck tout court. We ought to focus attention on whatever
kind of luck a well-constructed prior could plausibly mitigate. A good candidate:
luck in having the true theoretical hypothesis (e.g., the coin’s true bias) fall close to
one’s prior estimate of the true theoretical hypothesis (e.g., its prior expected bias).
When we talk of epistemic luck from here on out, we will have this special kind of
(intervening) luck in mind.
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3.7 Ameliorating Dependence on Luck
A prior depends on this special sort of luck — luck in having the true theoretical
hypothesis fall close to its prior estimate — for success (posterior epistemic value) to
the extent that facts about the proximity of that estimate to the true hypothesis are
relevant for explaining success. It depends on this special sort of luck to the extent
that such facts are relevant for explaining why the posterior is epistemically valuable
to some particular degree, rather than some other degree.
Figure 3.11: Uniform prior u (bot-
tom) and more concentrated beta
prior b (top).
To show, then, that imprecise priors do
more to ameliorate dependence on luck than
precise priors, in certain contexts, we need to
show that the relevant proximity-facts do less
to explain their degrees of success, in those
contexts, than they do to explain the success
of precise priors. As a warm-up, let’s first il-
lustrate how fortuitous proximity-facts might
do less to explain the success of one precise
prior than another. Take our standard exam-
ple: a bookie hands you a coin and offers you
a bet; you have no prior evidence about the coin’s bias. Consider two options for tak-
ing your prior information (viz., none) into account. You could adopt the (precise)
maximum entropy (uniform) prior u over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s bias.
Alternatively, you could adopt a more concentrated beta distribution b (with α = 10
and β = 4).
Now imagine that you flip the coin 14 times. It comes up heads 10 times and
tails 4 times. When you condition both priors on this data D, you arrive at the
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Figure 3.12: uD and bD.
posteriors uD and bD, respectively (pic-
tured left, next page). Suppose that the
true hypothesis H about coin’s bias is
B = 5/7 (exactly the frequency of heads in
your data sequence). Then bD is (determi-
nately) more accurate, and hence (determi-
nately) more epistemically valuable than
uD, on the accuracy-centered view. The
former is inaccurate to degree C(bD, H) = 0.020, while the latter is inaccurate to
degree C(uD, H) = 0.028 (measuring inaccuracy by Cramer-von Mises distance).
Though the concentrated beta prior b is more successful (attains a higher degree
of posterior epistemic value), the uniform prior u’s success depends less on luck.
Figure 3.13: The marginal chance distribu-
tion p for D(uD, H), relative to the true hy-
pothesis H about the coin’s bias, B = 5/7.
To see this, note: the explanation of
the fact that uD has a particular de-
gree of epistemic disutility (D(uD, H) =
C(uD, H) = 0.028), rather than some
other degree (0.027, 0.026, etc.) is prob-
abilistic. The most proximate explana-
tory factor is that, immediately prior
to your experiment (flipping the coin),
the true marginal chance distribution p
for D(uD, H) had a particular charac-
ter (pictured right). To explain why uD
is valuable to the exact degree that it is, rather than something slightly higher
or lower, we must cite not only probability mass that p assigns to the hypothe-
sis D(uD, H) = 0.028, but also the mass that p assigns to D(uD, H) = 0.027,
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D(uD, H) = 0.026, etc.; the entire distribution is relevant. In addition, p serves
as an explanatory screen, it seems. Any other factor relevant for explaining why uD
is valuable to exactly the degree that it is (0.028), rather than some other degree
(0.027, 0.026, etc.), is only relevant in virtue of explaining why p takes the exact form
that it does.50
The key observation: p is more or less invariant across hypotheses H about the
coin’s bias. Whether the true bias is 5/7, 11/64 or 82/97, the marginal chance
distribution p for D(uD, H) will look more or less the same.51 This is reflected in
the fact that p’s mean — u’s expected posterior epistemic disutility — stays fairly
constant across hypotheses H (see figure 13, p. 24). The upshot: the external factor
in question — how close the coin’s true bias happened to fall to u’s prior estimate
— is not terribly relevant to explaining why p takes the exact form that it does.
Hence, it is also not terribly relevant to explaining why uD is valuable to exactly
degree 0.028, rather than 0.027, 0.026, etc. The moral: u depends fairly minimally on
luck in having the true chances fall close to its prior estimates for success (posterior
epistemic value).
To underscore this point, consider an analogy.
The Expert Archer. A highly skilled archer faces a number of different
targets T arranged at varying distances. Given her expertise, the marginal
chance distribution p for D (distance of her arrow from the center of
the target) looks more or less the same, regardless of which target she
takes aim at. Whether she aims at some target T rather close by, or
some T ′ rather far away (within reasonable bounds, of course), p assigns
roughly the same (high) probability mass to the hypothesis D = 0 (hitting
the target dead center), roughly the same (low) probability mass to the
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hypothesis D = 15 (hitting 15cm off target), and so on.
Figure 3.14: The objective expected
posterior epistemic disvalue of u, rel-
ative to chance hypotheses B = x.
Because p remains largely unaltered
across targets T , the initial proximity of our
archer to T is plausibly (more or less) irrel-
evant for explaining why p takes the exact
form that it does. And because facts about
the form that p takes serve as an explana-
tory screen vis-á-vis D — any other factor
relevant for explaining why D = 0 (she hits
the target dead center), rather than D = 1,
D = 2, etc., is only relevant in virtue of ex-
plaining why p takes the exact form that it
does — that initial proximity is (more or less) irrelevant for explaining why our archer
is successful to the exact degree that she is.
The uniform prior is much like this expert archer. Because p remains largely
unaltered across chance hypothesesH, the (initial) proximity of the uniform prior u to
H is plausibly (more or less) irrelevant for explaining why p takes the exact form that
it does. And because facts about the form that p takes serve as an explanatory screen
vis-á-vis posterior epistemic disutility — any other factor relevant for explaining why
D(uD, H) = 0.028, rather than D(uD, H) = 0.027, D(uD, H) = 0.026, etc., is only
relevant in virtue of explaining why p takes the exact form that it does — that
initial proximity is next to irrelevant for explaining why the posterior uD is successful
(epistemically valuable) to the exact degree that it is (0.028).
The more biased beta prior, however, is rather more like an unskilled archer. Such
an archer might face targets T arranged at varying distances. Suppose she aims at
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Figure 3.15: The objective expected
posterior epistemic disvalue of b, rela-
tive to chance hypotheses B = x.
a close one and hits the bullseye dead cen-
ter. Unlike in the expert archer case, the
marginal chance distribution q for D (dis-
tance of her arrow from the center of the tar-
get) varies significantly across T . If she aims
at some target T rather close by, the mean
of q (i.e., the expected value of D) might be
close to 0. There is a high chance of hitting
the bullseye dead center, a lower chance of
hitting 1cm off target, an even lower chance
of hitting 2 cm off target, etc. But if, instead, she aims at some T ′ far away, the mean
of q might be much higher. There is a much higher chance of missing the bullseye
by quite a bit. The upshot: the unskilled archer’s initial proximity to her target is
relevant for explaining why q takes the exact form that it does. In turn, it is relevant
for explaining why she is successful to the exact degree that she is.
Similarly, the marginal chance distribution q for D(bD, H) varies rather signifi-
cantly across chance hypotheses H. This is reflected in the fact that q’s mean —
the expected posterior epistemic disutility of b — varies significantly across H (right,
previous page). The upshot: the (initial) proximity of b to the true chance hypothesis
H is relevant for explaining why q takes the exact form that it does. In turn, it is
relevant for explaining why the posterior bD is successful (epistemically valuable) to
the exact degree that it is (0.020).
The moral of all of this is that certain priors (like certain archers) depend more on
a special sort of luck — luck in having the truth theoretical hypothesis fall close to its
prior estimate — for success (posterior epistemic value) than others. This fact, I hope
to show, gives us good epistemic reason to employ imprecise priors, in a wide range
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of conservative contexts. In these contexts, imprecise priors do more to ameliorate
dependence on luck than precise priors do.
3.8 An Anti-Luck Argument for Imprecise Priors
3.8.1 Case 1: Imprecise Informationless Priors
In many contexts of inquiry, no precise prior puts you in an unequivocally better
position to secure epistemically valuable posteriors than imprecise priors do. And
vice versa. No imprecise priors puts you in an unequivocally better position to secure
valuable posteriors than precise priors do. Nevertheless, there is often still good
epistemic reason to prefer an imprecise prior over a precise one. The primary role
of priors is to help you secure epistemically valuable posteriors, and to minimize
your need for epistemic luck in securing them. I will show that in many contexts
— conservative contexts, in particular — there are imprecise priors whose objective
expected disutility varies much less across chance hypotheses than any precise prior.
And this, I have argued, shows that these special imprecise priors depend less on
luck for success (posterior epistemic value) than precise priors. They do more to
ameliorate dependence on luck. This is the second new motivation for employing
imprecise priors.
To illustrate, suppose one last time that a bookie hands you a coin and offers you
a bet. You have no prior evidence about the coin’s bias. The bookie is going to allow
you to flip the coin 5 times prior to deciding whether or not to take the bet. Given the
standards of evaluation operative in your context of inquiry, the appropriate measure
of epistemic disutility D is Cliffordian. It is not maximally Cliffordian, however.
Perhaps D(S,w) = D0.708(S,w) = 0.708 · l(S,w) + 0.292 · u(S,w). Such a disutility
function sees some independent value in getting determinately close to the truth, but
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nevertheless, places a premium on avoiding determinate error.
Now consider two options that you have for taking your information (viz., none)
into account in your decision problem. (Of course, these are not the only two options.
But they do have implications for nearly all options, as we will see.) Option 1: adopt
the (precise) beta prior b with α = β ≈ 1.2 over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s
bias. Option 2: adopt the imprecise beta-binomial model, with concentration s = 3.
Figure 3.16: Top curve: M3’s objective
expected disutility, relative to chance
hypotheses B=x, measuring disutility
by D0.708. Bottom: b’s objective ex-
pected disutility, relative to B=x.
In this context, I claim, M3 depends
less on luck for success (posterior epistemic
value) than b. The reason: M3’s objec-
tive expected posterior disutility varies less
across chance hypotheses B = x than b’s
does (left). The difference between b’s maxi-
mum and minimum objective expected disu-
tilities, maxi ExpHi(D0.708(bD, Hi)) - minj
ExpHj(D0.708(bD, Hj)), is 0.0162. The differ-
ence between M3’s maximum and minimum
objective expected disutilities is less: 0.0102.
Not only does M3 depend less on luck
for success (posterior epistemic value) than
b, but it depends less on luck for success than any precise beta prior. The beta prior
b with α = β ≈ 1.2 is no arbitrarily chosen prior. It is what I call in chapter 1
the maximally sensitive or MaxSen beta prior. It depends less on luck for success
than any other precise beta prior. (There is no other beta prior whose objective
expected posterior disutility varies less across chance hypotheses.) So the fact that
the imprecise beta model M3 depends less on luck for success than it means that M3
depends less on luck for success than all precise beta priors.
133
This seems to me to provide good epistemic reason to adopt an imprecise prior
in conservative contexts such as the one outlined here. There is an imprecise model,
viz., M3, that is better suited to play the primary theoretical role of priors than any
precise beta model. Further, given the flexibility of the class of beta distributions,
one might expect E0.24 to be better suited than any precise distribution to play the
primary role of priors. And in any context of inquiry, we ought to adopt whichever
prior is best suited to play the primary theoretical role of priors in that context.
3.8.2 Case 2: Informative Imprecise Priors
Up to this point, we have focused on a particular class of imprecise priors, viz., the
imprecise beta models. Imprecise beta models are ‘reference priors’ or ‘informationless
priors’, meant to be used when we lack any prior information relevant to the inference
problem at hand. We have focused on this class of priors primary because (i) they
form a rich, flexible class, (ii) they are mathematically tractable, and (iii) they have
proved successful in a range of practical applications, e.g., analyzing clinical data
from randomized trials of medical treatments (cf. Burton et al. 1996).
But, in most inference problems, we come to the table with a great deal of relevant
prior information. If the present, anti-luck motivation for employing imprecise priors
is to be central to the foundations of imprecise Bayesianism, then it must say some-
thing about such cases. And it does. In many conservative contexts, the prior that
both (i) satisfies the constraints imposed by one’s prior evidence, and (ii) minimizes
one’s need for luck in securing epistemically valuable posteriors, is imprecise.
Imagine, for example, that a knowledgeable friend tells you that the best estimate
of the coin’s bias is approximately 1/2 (perhaps she services the machine that made
it, or something of the sort). Consider two options that you have for taking your
evidence E into account. (Again, not the only two options.) Option 1: adopt the
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Figure 3.17: Beta distributions p with en-
tropy H(p) ≥ 0.24 and Expp(B) = 1/2.
(precise) beta prior b with α = β ≈ 1.2
over hypotheses B = x about the coin’s
bias. Of course, since α = β ≈ 1.2, p
satisfies the constraint imposed by E,
viz., Expb(B) = 1/2 (as does any beta
prior with α = β). Option 2: adopt
what we might call an imprecise entropy
model. An imprecise entropy model is
a set Ex of beta priors p (with density
functions f) such that (i) the entropy of
p is greater than or equal to x, i.e., H(p) = −
∫ 1
0
f(y) · log(f(y))dy ≥ x, and (ii) p
Figure 3.18: Top curve: p’s objective
expected disutility, relative to chance
hypotheses B=x, measuring disutility
by D0.708. Bottom: E0.24’s objective ex-
pected disutility, relative to B=x.
satisfies the constraints imposed by E. (In
the case at hand, p satisfies the constraint
imposed by E just in case α = β = z,
for some z.) In particular, imagine that
you adopt the imprecise entropy model with
minimum entropy level x = 0.24, E0.24 (left).
Once more, the standards of evaluation
operative in your context, we suppose, de-
termine a Cliffordian measure of epistemic
disutility, D0.708(S,w) = 0.708 · l(S,w) +
0.292 · u(S,w). So, getting determinately
close to the truth is of some independent
value. But avoiding determinate error is
much more epistemically important. In this context, I claim, E0.24 depends less on
luck for success (posterior epistemic value) than b. The reason: E0.24’s objective ex-
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pected posterior disutility varies less across chance hypotheses B = x than b’s does
(see figure 3.18). The difference between b’s maximum and minimum objective ex-
pected disutilities, maxi ExpHi(D0.708(bD, Hi)) - minj ExpHj(D0.708(bD, Hj)), is 0.0162.
The difference between E0.24’s maximum and minimum objective expected disutilities
is 0.0056.
This means that E0.24 depends less on luck for success (posterior epistemic value)
than any precise beta prior. The reason, again, is that beta prior b with α = β ≈ 1.2
depends less on luck for success than any other precise beta prior. So the fact that the
imprecise entropy model E0.24 depends less on luck for success than it means that E0.24
depends less on luck for success than all precise beta priors. E0.24 also depends less on
luck for success than all other imprecise entropy models. There is no other imprecise
entropy model whose objective expected posterior disutility varies less across chance
hypotheses.
We have good epistemic reason, then, to adopt an imprecise prior in conservative
contexts like this. There is an imprecise model, viz., E0.24, that is better suited to
play the primary theoretical role of priors than any precise beta model. Given the
flexibility of the class of beta distributions, one might even expect E0.24 to be better
suited than any precise distribution tout court to play the primary role of priors. And
in any context of inquiry, we ought to adopt whichever prior is best suited to play
the primary theoretical role of priors in that context.
We now have a range of illustrative examples at our disposal. We have examples
of contexts in which some imprecise prior puts you in a better position to secure
valuable posteriors than precise priors do (§3.4). We have examples of contexts in
which some imprecise does more to ameliorate dependence on luck than precise priors
do (§3.7). This is sufficient to achieve the rather limited aims of this chapter. It is




My aim in this chapter was to illuminate two new kinds of reasons for employing
imprecise priors. We ought to adopt imprecise priors in certain contexts because
they put us in an unequivocally better position to secure epistemically valuable pos-
terior beliefs than precise priors do. We ought to adopt imprecise priors in various
other contexts because they minimize our need for epistemic luck in securing such
posteriors. I illuminated these reasons by providing examples of the relevant sorts of
contexts. This work points the way toward a new, potentially promising foundation
for imprecise Bayesianism.
To recap, my main argument went as follows:
1. In any context of inquiry, you ought to adopt whichever prior is best suited to
play the primary theoretical role of priors in that context, if there is one.
2. The primary role of priors is to help you secure epistemically valuable posterior
beliefs, and to minimize your need for epistemic luck in securing those beliefs.
3. In certain contexts, imprecise priors put you in a better position to secure
epistemically valuable posteriors than precise priors do.
4. In other contexts, no imprecise prior puts you in a better position to secure
valuable posteriors than precise priors do, or vice versa. But imprecise priors
minimize your need for epistemic luck.
C. In some contexts, you ought to adopt imprecise probabilities to incorporate your
prior information.
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I conclude by raising a few additional questions to be addressed in future research.
• I made a number of restrictive assumptions regarding the form of the epistemic
disutility scores under consideration. I only considered ‘linear scores’, and only
considered scores that measure inaccuracy by the Brier score (or Cramer-von
Mises distance). How robust are our results across all reasonable epistemic
disutility scores?
• The beta distributions are a very rich class of distributions. Any precise prior
can be approximated by a finite mixture of beta distributions. But does this
guarantee that if (i) an imprecise prior S’s objective expected disutility varies
less than all beta priors across chance hypothesis, then (ii) S’s objective ex-
pected disutility varies less than all precise priors, tout court?
• Is it possible, for fairly general classes of evidential constraints, to specify exactly
which conservative disutility scores call for imprecise priors, and to provide a
tractable method for identifying which imprecise prior they call for?
Notes
36See Savage 1972, pp. 46-50, for discussion of his ‘washing out theorem’. See also Barron,
Schervish and Wasserman (1999), or Hawthorne (1993) for discussion of conditions that guarantee
convergence.
37Murphy (1973) shows that the Brier score, an eminently plausible measure of accuracy, decom-
poses into calibration and refinement components. DeGroot and Fienberg (1982, 1983) generalize
this result, showing that any proper scoring rule can be separated into calibration and refinement
components. See Blattenberg (1985) for additional discussion.
38For illuminating discussions of epistemic value, see Maher 1993, ch. 9 and Joyce 2009.
39See in particular Joyce 2009, §2 and §4.
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40See Joyce 2013 for discussion of accuracy-centered approaches to theorizing about epistemic
value.
41See Joyce 1998, p. 593; Joyce 2009, p.269; Joyce 2013, p. 3.
42Consider, for example, the absolute value score, Iα1 . Let p be a prior defined over mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive theoretical hypothesesH1, ...,Hn. The absolute value score measures
the inaccuracy of p at a world w by the average linear distance between p’s estimate of the Hi’s truth-
value, p(Hi), andHi’s actual truth-value at w, w(Hi). That is, Iα1(p, w) = (1/n)
∑
i |p(Hi)−w(Hi)|.
The absolute value score is ruled out as unreasonable because it violates Coherent Admissibility. To
illustrate, let p be the uniform distribution over mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses
H1, H2, and H3; p(H1) = p(H2) = p(H3) = 1/3. The absolute value score of the probabilistically
coherent prior p at each world w is Iα1(p, w) = (1/3)·[2·(1/3−0)+(1−1/3)] ≈ 0.44. In contrast, the
absolute value score of the probabilistically incoherent prior q, which assigns 0 to each hypothesis,
is 1/3 at each world w: Iα1(q, w) = (1/3) · [2 · (0 − 0) + (1 − 0)] ≈ 0.33. So, according to the
absolute value score, there are probabilistically coherent priors which are accuracy-dominated by
incoherent priors, i.e., are at least as inaccurate at every world, and strictly more inaccurate at
some worlds. This is precisely what Coherent Admissibility disallows. For a very similar, but more
detailed discussion, see Joyce 2009, §9.
43An inaccuracy measure I is strictly proper just in case any probabilistically coherent prior
p minimizes expected inaccuracy, as measured by I , from its own perspective, i.e.,
∑
w p(w) ·
I (p, w) ≤
∑
w p(w) ·I (q, w) for any other q.
44See Gneiting 2007 for discussion of the power score, spherical score, and other proper scoring
rules.
45Specifically, if p(w1) = 0.1, p(w2) = 0.3, p(w1) = 0.6, and q(w1) = 0.05, q(w2) = 0.4, q(w1) =
0.55, respectively, then I (p, w1) = 0.42 and I (q, w1)0.445.
46An inaccuracy score I is concave at a world w if (1/2)I (p, w) + (1/2)I (q, w) ≤ I ((1/2)p +
(1/2)q, w), for any prior distributions p and q.
47Cramer-von Mises distance also yields the correct verdict about comparative closeness in those
cases where obviously correct answers are to be had. For example, for any beta densities f , g and h
that have the same mean but increasing variance, f is closer to g than to h, in terms of Cramer-von
Mises distance. Similarly, if f , g and h all have the same variance but larger and larger means, then
f is closer to g than to h.
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48The cumulative distribution function F corresponding to a density function f for a variable V is
defined by F (x) =
∫ x
−∞ f(y)dy, and specifies the probability that V takes a value less than or equal
to x.
49M10 dominates all beta priors b with differential entropy between roughly -0.25 and 0.
50Save, of course, for the fact that, at the end of the day, your experiment produced exactly the
outcome that it did.
51Of course, when B ≈ 0 or B ≈ 1, this distribution will concentrate probability almost exclusively
on one value for D(uD, H).
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Appendix A
In §2.6.2, we considered the following case. You have a coin, but no information about
its bias. In order to adjudicate between competing hypotheses about that bias, you
plan to flip the coin 25 times. To take account of your prior information (viz., none),
you adopt the maximum entropy prior u.
We then asked: what is the expected epistemic utility of the orthodox inductive
policy for making comparative probability judgments, viz.
I (u,D) =
 X  Y if uD(X) > uD(Y )X  Y otherwise
from u’s own perspective? We imagined that the relevant epistemic utilities are given
by the following table:
Table A.1:
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads  Tails 1 −5
Heads  Tails −5 1
Abstain from judgment −0.5 −0.5
If this is the epistemic payoff matrix, then the expected epistemic utility of I is
Expu(eu(I )) = 0.535057. We then outlined an alternative inductive policy that u
expects to do better, viz., the policy I ∗ that prescribes (i) judging that heads is more
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probable than tails if k ≥ 15, (ii) abstaining from judgment if 11 ≤ k ≤ 14, and (iii)
judging that tails is more probable than heads if k ≤ 10. This policy has an expected
epistemic utility of Expu(eu(I ∗)) = 0.627876.
A critical question: why think that any reasonable epistemic utility function yields
a payoff matrix anything like this one? The answer, which I will only briefly sketch
here, comes in three parts. First, the epistemic utility of a comparative probability
ordering  is best identified with the epistemic utility of the set S of probabilities
that represent it:
S = {p |X  Y only if p(X) ≤ p(Y )}.
Second, as I argued in chapter 3, there are a range of reasonable measures of the
all-things-considered epistemic value or worth of a set of probabilities S. In particular,
I argue, simple ‘linear scores’ of the form:
Dλ(S,w) = λ · l(S,w) + (1− λ) · u(S,w).
are prima facie reasonable. The quantities l(S,w) and u(S,w) are what I call the
lower and upper-inaccuracy scores of S at a world w.
• l(S,w) = inf {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
• u(S,w) = sup {I (p, w)|p ∈ S}
I is some ‘reasonable’ inaccuracy function. (See, for example, Joyce 1998, 2009,
Predd et al. 2009, and Leitgeb & Pettigrew 2010 for discussion of constraints on
reasonable inaccuracy functions.)
Finally, certain linear disutility scores yield a payoff matrix like the one above. In
particular, severely ‘conservative scores’ yield a similar payoff matrix, e.g., D0.925(S,w)
= 0.925 · l(S,w) + 0.075 · u(S,w), where l(S,w) and u(S,w) are determined by the
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Brier score (or in the continuous case, Cramer-von Mises distance). (See §2.3.2 for
discussion of why such scores count as conservative.)
For illustrative purposes, consider an agent who judges that heads is at least as
probable as tails (Heads  Tails), and one who abstains from judgment on the matter.
Identify their respective comparative probability orderings with the following sets of
probabilities:
SAbstain = {b | α + β ≤ 10}
SHeadsTails = {b | α + β ≤ 10 & α/(α + β) ≥ 1/2}.
SAbstain is the beta-binomial model with concentration level 10 (see §3.4, and Walley
1991, §5.3), i.e., the set of beta distributions b (over hypotheses B = x about the bias
of the coin) with concentration (α + β) less than or equal to 10. The beta-binomial
Figure A.1: Epistemic disutility of
SAbstain (bottom) and SHeadsTails
(top), respectively, as measured by the
linear score D0.925.
model is a popular ‘imprecise ignorance
prior’, well-suited for modeling suspension
of judgment. I use the beta-binomial model,
rather than the full set of priors over hy-
potheses B = x simply to reduce computa-
tional complexity. SHeadsTails is the set of
beta distributions b with (i) a concentration
less than or equal to 10, and (ii) a mean,
α/(α + β), greater than or equal to 1/2. It
is the subset of SAbstain containing exactly
the b that assign at least as much probability
to Heads as to Tails.
Now consider the epistemic disutility of SAbstain and SHeadsTails, respectively,
across worlds in which ch(Heads) = x (for all x ∈ [0, 1]), measuring disutility by
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the ‘conservative score’ D0.925(S,w) = 0.925 · l(S,w) + 0.075 · u(S,w) (pictured right,
previous page). Note that D0.925 assigns exactly the same sorts of penalties that we
observed in table 2.7. Judging Heads  Tails is slightly better, according to D0.925,
than abstaining if ch(Heads) > ch(Tails). But it is much worse than abstaining if
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails). The average disutilities in these two cases are as follows:
Table A.2:
ch(Heads) ≤ ch(Tails) ch(Heads) > ch(Tails)
Heads  Tails 0.189 0.051
Abstain from judgment 0.083 0.083
The lesson is this: table 2.7 is simply a coarse-grained representation of the sort of
epistemic disutility assignment furnished by severely conservative disutility scores,
e.g., D0.925. The upshot: prima facie reasonable epistemic utility functions yield
payoff matrices like those hypothesized in table 2.7. Table 2.7 is not an ad hoc
assignment of epistemic utilities.
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